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Abstract 
 
When we take a step back from the imposing figure of physical 
violence, it becomes possible to examine other structurally violent forces 
that constantly shape our cultural and political landscapes. One of the 
driving interests in the “turn to Paul” in recent continental philosophy 
stems from wrestling with questions about the real nature of contemporary 
violence. Paul is positioned as a thinker whose messianic experience began 
to cut through the violent masquerade of the existing order. The 
crucifixion and resurrection of the Messiah (a slave and a God co-existing in 
one body) exposed the empty grounding upon which power resided. The 
Christ-event signifies a moment of violent interruption in the existing order 
which Paul enjoins the Gentiles to participate in through a dedication of 
love for the neighbour. This divine violence aims to reveal and subvert the 
“powers,” epitomised in the Roman Empire, in order to fulfil the labour of 
the Messianic now-time which had arrived. 
The impetus behind this research comes from a typically enigmatic 
and provocative section of text by the Slovene philosopher, cultural critic, 
and Christian atheist Slavoj Žižek. He claims that 'the notion of love should 
be given here all its Paulinian weight: the domain of pure violence… is the 
domain of love' (2008a, 173). In this move he links Paul’s idea of love to 
that of Walter Benjamin’s divine violence; the sublime and the cataclysmic 
come together in this seemingly perverse notion. At stake here is the way 
in which uncovering violent forces in the “zero-level” of our narrative 
worldviews aids the diagnosis of contemporary political and ethical issues.  
It is not enough to imagine Paul’s encounter with the Christ-event as 
non-violent.  This Jewish apocalyptic movement was engaged in a violent 
struggle within an existing order that God’s wrath will soon dismantle. 
Paul’s weak violence, inspired by his fidelity to the Christ-event, places all 
responsibility over creation in the role of the individual within the 
collective body. The centre piece of this re-imagined construction of the 
Pauline narrative comes in Romans 13: the violent dedication to love 
understood in the radical nature of the now-time. 
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This research examines the role that narratives play in the creation 
and diagnosis of these violent forces. In order to construct a new 
genealogy of violence in Christianity it is crucial to understand the role of 
the slave of Christ (the revolutionary messianic subject). This turn in the 
Symbolic is examined through creating a literary structure in which we can 
approach a radical Nietzschean shift in Pauline thought. The claim here, a 
claim which is also central to Paul’s letters, is that when the symbolic 
violence which manipulates our worldviews is undone by a divine violence, 
if even for a moment, new possibilities are created in the opening for a 
transvaluation of values.  
Through this we uncover the nature of original sin: the consequences 
of the interconnected reality of our actions. The role of literature is vital 
in the construction of this narrative; starting with Cormac McCarthy’s No 
Country for Old Men, and continuing through works such as Melville’s 
Bartleby the Scrivener, this thesis draws upon the power of literature in 
the shaping of our narrative worlds. Typical of the continental philosophy 
at the heart of this work, a diverse range of illustrations and inspirations 
from fiction is pulled into its narrative to reflect the symbolic universe that 
this work was forged through.  
What this work attempts to do is give this theory a greater grounding 
in Paul’s letters by demonstrating this radical kenotic power at the heart 
of the Christ-event. Romans 13 reveals, in a way that has not yet been 
picked up by Critchley, Žižek, and others, that Paul opposed the 
biopolitical power of the Roman Empire through the weak violence of love 
that is the labour of the slaves of Christ on the “now-time” that had 
arrived. 
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Introduction 
 
Violence and Truth 
 
There is an inherent violence at play in the construction of narratives 
which form our perspectives on reality. This insight is central to the legacy 
that arises from the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. His work On the 
Genealogy of Morals exemplifies this through relating the creation of the 
categories “good,” “bad,” and “evil” to forces that manipulate the way in 
which the world is experienced and understood. Within such manipulations 
of reality, as he relates to the apostle Paul in The Antichrist, the potential 
exists to do 'violence to the truth' (1888, 158). Yet this potential does not 
begin with the actions of independently positioned individuals. To put this 
in a Biblical context: Eve does not violently rupture creation through 
eating the fruit; rather, she participates in the violence which already 
exists. The serpent, the tree, and God are implicated in the violence which 
has already formed Eve’s experience of truth. Eating the fruit is the Event 
which reveals this violence, not the act which creates it. This is what links 
original sin to divine violence: the trauma of a sudden rupture in the 
Symbolic world of representations caused by its inability to continue to 
reproduce its conditions.1 
This particular theory of violence is examined in this thesis through 
narratives evolving out of recent continental philosophy which position 
Paul as an insurrectionist who inspired a shift in the balance of power of 
his own theologico-political context.2 Paul is a figure whose messianic
                                                             
1
The idea of the Symbolic is understood generically in this context. Appearing primarily 
out of French philosophical discourses of the last century, it names the basic idea that 
mediators of representation, such as language, media, and art, are responsible for the 
creation of meaning. The Symbolic Order represents the totality of the worldview of an 
individual; the world of language and symbols that makes this totality intelligible.  
2Since Jacob Taubes brought Paul back to the attention of continental philosophy, the 
apostle has received renewed and sustained interest. See De Vries (2013) for an overview. 
Ward Blanton discusses this “turn to Paul” in continental philosophy in his introduction to 
Breton’s A Radical Philosophy of Saint Paul, arguing that it ‘may turn out to be one of the 
most significant political gestures of recent academic labour’ (2011, 1).  
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experience cut through the violent forces hidden in the Symbolic (the level 
of reality that produces representations and meaning). The Christ-event 
signifies a moment of violent interruption in the existing order which Paul 
enjoins the Gentiles to participate in through a dedication of love for the 
neighbour. This connects to a theory of divine violence; a force which 
contains the potential to reveal the empty truth at the centre of authority. 
For Paul this meant undermining the theologico-political structures and 
symbols of the Roman Empire, allowing the labour of the Messianic “now-
time” to be fulfilled. 
In this context the attention is placed upon the connections between 
moments of violent transgression; including jarring instances of physical 
violence which intrude onto the scene and the violence, lurking beneath 
the surface, which is constantly participated in. Indeed, this work is 
oriented around the idea that when we take a step back from the imposing 
figure of physical violence, it becomes possible to examine other 
structurally and symbolically violent forces which constantly shape cultural 
and political landscapes. Central to this theory is the continual return to 
stories that challenge the way in which violence is understood. This, 
essentially literary turn, focusses attention on the way that the legacy of 
Paul can be understood within a framework of narratives which helps to 
shape the way his encounter with the Christ-event is interpreted.  
The initial impetus behind this research was provided by reading No 
Country for Old Men (a grim tale that challenges preconceptions about the 
nature of violence) alongside a typically enigmatic declaration by the 
Slovene philosopher, cultural critic, and “Christian atheist” Slavoj Žižek.  
 
Sometimes hatred is the only proof that I really love you. The 
notion of love should be given here all its Paulinian weight: the 
domain of pure violence, the domain outside law (legal power), 
the domain of violence which is neither law-founding nor law 
sustaining, is the domain of love. (2008a, 173) 
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Paul's revolutionary theory of love becomes entangled here with Walter 
Benjamin’s theory of divine violence. The perversity of this notion links in 
with Žižek’s double-kenotic reading of Paul’s epistles. Paul’s proclamation 
of the death and resurrection of a slave and a God that co-existed in one 
body exposes the empty grounding upon which power resides; allowing, if 
even for a moment, a rupture in the Symbolic Order which creates the 
potential for something new to emerge. Love is the force that carries this 
truth of the Christ-event into actuality; a weak (hermeneutic) violence 
that disrupts the mechanisms that structurally and symbolically oppose the 
promises of God.  
It is against this background that this research traces Žižek’s idea 
that foundational acts of violence exist in the way that the symbolic 
nature of reality is shaped through dominant cultural narratives. The 
primary site of this interpretative battleground is found in the re-
evaluation or de-legitimisation of the way in which reality has been 
constituted through such narratives. As Ward Blanton exemplifies this 
violence: 
on being corralled and sequestered and rendered generally 
ineffectual during our protests in New York City against the 
invasion of Iraq (can you still remember?), should we have not 
started to throw rocks? Or, perhaps, once I heard the politicians' 
dismissive speech about our place in the political liturgy of the 
spectacle (“isn't it wonderful that our proud spirit of protest is 
alive…nevertheless in the real world...”), I should not have 
organised a group of people to return to the streets with rocks in 
hand. (2014, xv) 
Non-violent protests, in this sense, can become implicated in the “silent” 
symbolic violence of that which they oppose; an unintended participation 
in this violence that should be felt as a crushing blow to such protests. 
This is the point that Blanton makes in relation to Paul being disguised, 
indeed buried, within his own legacy, asking: ‘why, at any rate, would we 
participate in this crime, this madness?’ (2014, 189). This problem, so 
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accurately related to the way in which “Paul” is dragged into other, often 
competing, narratives, is visible in the diagnosis of violence which is all 
around us but scarcely acknowledged. Buried and re-buried in the 
systemic organisation and symbolic parlour tricks, its violence, even when 
not completely hidden, is obscured or rendered benign in the dominant 
narratives.  
At stake here is the potential of that which Simon Critchley places at 
the foundations of our political, philosophical, and theological discourses: 
disappointment. Bound up with the existence of disappointment in the 
foundations of our thinking is the reality of our impotency. It is in this 
same way, to bring this example closer to Critchley, that one million 
protesters on the streets of London were not only unable to prevent a 
Labour government led by Tony Blair from cajoling the United Kingdom 
into military action in Iraq, but to compound their inability to halt military 
action they were also unable to avoid being swallowed up in the power 
mechanisms, and by extension the narrative, of that which they so 
passionately opposed (“the spirit of protest is alive and well, but in the 
real world...”). This level of disconnect between the ethical and political 
will of protesters and the dominant narratives they oppose is maintained in 
the violence orchestrated, in the Nietzschean sense, in the domain of 
truth. Is this not precisely the condition of Paul’s discovery of Christ, in 
the captivity of the promises of God culminating in the Messiah shattering 
the boundaries of the Symbolic? 
At what point then, and in what way, does the theory of counter-
violence begin to be evaluated under these circumstances? This is a 
question that tugs at the intellectual left, from Žižek to Butler, Hardt to 
Agamben: in what ways is it possible to strike back against the inability to 
act in line with a political and ethical conscience, collectively and 
individually, without reducing the response to striking out physically 
against the bare life of perceived enemies of such causes? How does the 
rebel move from ineffective protest to an effective movement without 
being obstructed, humiliated, or reduced to a mere spirit of protest or 
pointlessly destructive terrorist? Paul emerges as an important figure in 
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breaking this deadlock between those inscribed as the spirited protester 
and unruly anarchist, but not as a theologian or religious figure, or even as 
a philosopher, but as, in Badiou’s words, “a poet-thinker of the Event” 
(2003, 2). As such, Paul is a figure who inspires new narratives and fictions 
that help, sometimes violently, to reshape the symbolic boundaries of 
reality. Or, as Paul would put it, the role of the “slave of Christ” (doulous 
christou) is to engage in this radical weakness in order to subvert ‘the 
rulers of this age’ (1 Cor. 2.8) as weak militants inspired by the Messiah to 
do violence to their truth. 
At the heart of this move towards being a slave of Christ is a theory of 
original sin. Understood here as the condition of the consequences of our 
inability to cope with the interconnected reality of our actions, original sin 
is the very nature of our fallen state. Yet, as Žižek points out, this is not 
the condition of a fall from a perfect creation, but the very conditions of 
creation itself (2014a, 125-132). If tied within systems of metaphysical 
thought, original sin becomes the condition that serves as the justification 
for violent dominance which keeps this deficiency in check; it is the fact of 
humankind’s guilt. This, however, is the very cruel mechanism of 
dominance which Paul attempted to reveal in the violence of Roman 
Imperial power. To give this a perverse Žižekian twist: 
 
God did not only die, He was always already dead, He only did 
not always know about it, and the sense of man’s “original sin” is 
precisely to spare Him from experiencing His “inexistence” 
(inconsistency, impotence) by assuming guilt. The logic of 
“original sin” is therefore again: better for me to be throughout 
guilty than for Him to learn about his death. (1992, 47-48) 
 
What dies on the cross is the possibility of claiming power over humankind 
on the basis of its predetermined guilt. Paul thoroughly accepted the 
reality of original sin, but it was not earthly power or dominance that 
could keep it in check, but living in service to the crucified God who 
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revealed a new genealogy of truth through the resurrection. Simon 
Critchley gives this idea in proper Pauline reading in the light of love: 
 
To be is to be in debt, I owe therefore I am. If original sin is the 
theological name for the essential ontological indebtedness of 
the self, then love is the experience of a counter-movement to 
sin that is orientated around an infinite demand that exceeds the 
projective potentiality of the self. (2012, 250-251) 
 
This work, however, does not attempt to deny the concept of original sin. 
Instead it seeks to align it with creation itself. In other words, to 
understand the potential of love, we need to understand its violent struggle 
against the forces inherent to creation from the beginning.  
What this work attempts to do is give this theory a greater grounding 
in Paul’s letters by demonstrating this radical kenotic power at the heart 
of the Christ-event. Romans 13 reveals, in a way that has not yet been 
picked up by Critchley, Žižek, and others, that Paul opposed the 
biopolitical power of the Roman Empire through the weak violence of love 
that is the labour of the slaves of Christ on the now-time that had arrived.  
 
An Overview 
 
Violence finds its roots in transgressions. It might appear directly and 
forcefully in a physical encounter, or in the manipulation of the image of 
the Other, or it might be rooted in economic structures that create 
inequality and discrimination. In each case it relies on acts of violation. 
Chapter One begins by examining the literature of an author fascinated by 
violence: Cormac McCarthy. In No Country for Old Men, the brutal 
mercenary Anton Chigurh appears as an irreducibly violent god-like figure. 
His destructive actions threaten, however, to disguise the violence that 
occurs at a deeper level: the transgressive acts in the Symbolic that guides 
this demonic figure. The consequences of which demonstrate our infinite 
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responsibility within a volatile and unpredictable divine economy of cause 
and effect.   
This leads to a questioning of the way in which such violence 
influences the direction of events. One of the central cogs that Žižek’s 
work on violence revolves around is the idea that violent forces are 
habitually obfuscated by their position within the Symbolic Order. These 
“objective” forms of violence, systemic and symbolic in their functioning, 
become hidden in the “zero-level” of reality.3 While systemic violence 
relates to the systems that maintain and facilitate exploitation, inequality, 
and eruptions of physical violence, symbolic violence can be found in the 
foundations of identities and ideas that create and sustain worldviews. 
Attempting to analyse this level of violence can reveal the ways in which it 
can become covered-up within the symbolic nature of social relations but 
also, more hauntingly, can create an awareness of the ways in which we 
are already inevitably implicated in the creation and perpetuation of 
violent activity.  
This violence, which Žižek argues is fundamental to the reality of 
capitalism, finds a counter force in divine violence; which he ties to Paul’s 
radical formulation of love. In understanding this overturning of power, 
Žižek directs us towards the crucified God. The impact of double kenosis 
(the self-emptying of Christ in his reception of a God in the form of a 
slave) based on readings of Job and of Paul’s letter to the Philippians, calls 
into question the nature of power. God Himself was subject to the nature 
of violence in His creation; violence that refuses deeper meaning in 
relation to any guilt of the victim. God therefore ‘comes to share Job’s 
astonishment at the chaotic madness of the created universe’ (2009c, 48); 
and therein exists the foundations of a materialist theology that places 
even God’s fate in the hands of this divine economy.  
This divine economy is the domain to which secularisation owes its 
possibility. As Agamben puts it: ‘the theological signature operates here as 
                                                             
3
Žižek exemplifies the idea of the zero-level of reality in the way that in Europe buildings 
start with the “ground floor” rather than the “first.” He notes that, ‘before we start 
counting, there has to be a “ground”’ (2009b, 91). It is in this sense that the zero-level 
exists, before the count (what we usually acknowledge) begins.  
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a sort of trompe l’oeil in which the very secularisation of the world 
becomes the mark that identifies it as belonging to a divine oikonomia’ 
(2011, 5). This economy is directed, but never consciously controlled, by 
the actions of those He created; it is God and history in synchronicity. 
There is no guarantee of cosmic justice, no divine authority in charge of 
fate, only the outcomes of individual and collective activity. Put 
differently, there is no true authority that is extrinsic to the collective. 
Yet the very Pauline paradox here is that this authority relies on something 
external to it: that which is no longer under its control, immediately given 
up in an act of faith. 
This collective has no direct way of claiming power without first 
exposing the empty claims to power of the authorities. Chapter Two is 
constructed around a theory of divine violence. It examines the potential 
influence over a force that can radically disrupt the stability of the 
Symbolic Order. The volatility of what is created in the divine economy 
cannot escape exposure to the divine; or in Žižek’s language, the 
“untruth” of the Symbolic is exposed to the overwhelming presence of the 
Real. This theory plays a significant role in Žižek’s work and is crucial in his 
reading of Paul. This violent intervention of the “divine” within the 
Symbolic - or as Hent de Vries (2001, 281) puts it, the ‘divine unwriting’ of 
the law - describes a moment of uncalculated rebellion. This force, allied 
to our actions but outside of our control, strikes against the inconsistencies 
of the represented world. It forces an excess onto the Symbolic Order that 
exposes the falsehood of the dominant narratives to the Real (the divine 
realm beyond our sphere of comprehension).  
In assessing the influence that can be exerted over the divine, Žižek 
evokes Bartleby the scrivener. Herman Melville’s character famed for the 
single spoken line of resistance “I would prefer not to” is used by Žižek to 
exemplify the foundations of this influence over the divine. Bartleby has 
also been the subject of attention from thinkers such as Deleuze, Rancière, 
and Agamben, who all share a fascination with the way in which he negates 
the world around him (a fascination which is echoed in many of their 
interactions with Paul’s letters). Žižek’s claim that we should follow 
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Bartleby in “preferring not to” participate in the mechanisms of 
capitalism, and Agamben’s positioning of Bartleby’s resistance as the 
return of potentiality in his world, point towards a type of messianic 
moment in which the illusory power of the current ideological stranglehold 
disintegrates. Bartleby represents a type of potentiality that Paul grasped 
in the unfolding of the Christ-event in the release of God’s promises from 
their captivity in the symbolic and systemic stranglehold of the ruling 
powers.  
This type of force is prefigured in Paul’s epistle to the Romans. 
Chapter Three develops the ideas presented in the first two chapters in 
the context of this work’s own turn to Paul. The focus of this chapter is a 
problematic section of his letter to the Church in Rome: Romans 13. In this 
passage, Paul sets out the paradox of a God who grants authority to any 
despotic ruler, yet claims that only love towards the neighbour can fulfil 
the law. The crux of the matter is thus: Paul proposes that love is the only 
truly revolutionary action. It is only in fulfilling the law through love for 
the neighbour that we can participate in the wrath of God which has the 
power to shatter the violence of the Symbolic Order cultivated under the 
Roman Empire. Paul’s wrestling with the conflicting ideas of God as the 
director of history and God as a participant in history allow him to 
articulate a Messiah who bypasses the logics of the Roman Empire and of 
the local authorities who supported it. 
This potentially violent text contains a theologically and politically 
charged narrative which is about the community of Christ dedicated to 
love (and not about a metaphysical pronouncement on the goodness of the 
ruling authorities). Paul was dealing with the abstract reality of the 
messianic intrusion into his world in the very concrete reality of his 
theologico-political context: within a violent empire and hostile local 
religious situations. The symbolism of the Roman Empire dominated the 
region, impinging upon cultural, social, and economic identities and 
possibilities. Paul’s encounter with Christ forced him to radically re-
diagnose the condition of his identity and tradition. The Messiah’s 
resurrection after subjection to death at the hands of the Roman Empire 
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and the ruling elite revealed that they had no real power over life and 
death. The real power, as testified to through the Christ-event, was in the 
fulfilment of the law in the “now-time” that followed the resurrection of 
Christ. The revolutionary action, therefore, of the community of believers 
was that which was propelled by the love for the neighbour.  
This takes us to the potential of the Christ-event to break down the 
privatisation that negates the possibility for a common force - in this case 
the community of believers that constituted the body of Christ - to 
transgress the system of authority which holds the commons captive. 
Chapter Four examines the way that Paul imagines identity and how this 
impacts upon violence in the Symbolic. For Paul it was through becoming a 
slave of Christ that a believer became part of this common body. By way 
of Badiou’s play The Incident at Antioch, this chapter explores one of the 
crucial themes of the turn to Paul and also a prominent theme in the 
diagnosis of violence in contemporary political and cultural spheres: Paul’s 
universal address.  
Christianity, in the Pauline sense, ‘represents the synthesis of 
universalism and particularism’ (Žižek 2009a, 87); this synthesis occurs in 
the idea of God emptied into creation. Traditional markers of identity are 
irreversibly altered in their meaning; Paul became a slave of Christ and 
apostle to the gentiles (while all the time remaining, in some aspects at 
least, a Jew). Imagining the interconnected aspects of these identities, at 
some points universal in their address (the call to be a slave of Christ) and 
at other points ethnically or politically particular (Roman citizen and Jew), 
is found buried in the foundations of Christianity.  
The Event of Christ’s death and resurrection caused a short circuit in 
Paul’s perception of the Symbolic Order. He now knew that there was no 
longer slave or free, male or female, Jew or Greek. All such differences 
had been reduced in the encounter with Christ (and formally through the 
act of baptism). This encounter with the subversion of his perceived logic 
of religion and empire radically redirected Paul’s already zealous passion 
for serving the promises of God.  
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Through the loss of the big Other, or the ability to justify our acts 
under the cover of divine authority, what remains is a debt of love to the 
neighbour. In light of this responsibility, Paul’s calls the believers to be 
slaves of Christ through the infinite demand to love the neighbour. This 
reverses the claim of human authority: while they claim they are given 
authority from God, the subjects of the Christ-event are given 
responsibility over the divine only through their debt of love. As a 
hermeneutics underpinned by Paul’s militant understanding of love, it 
emerges to challenge mechanisms of ideological dominance propagated by 
the Roman Empire. In the messianic era which had begun, Paul was forced 
to interpret situations in the context of what it meant to be a slave of 
Christ. This identity, which underpinned his role as an apostle, is what 
Giorgio Agamben calls the ‘messianic vocation,’ understood as the 
‘revocation of every vocation’ (2005b, 23). He worked not as a Christian as 
such, but as a messianic Jew compelled to apply the unfolding of the truth 
of the Christ-event to the particularities of the gentile communities that 
he encountered: as a slave and apostle of Christ to the Gentiles.  
Žižek has demonstrated a will to recapture a radical element of 
Christianity that evades the logics of both its fundamentalist and liberal 
readings; one violent in its refusal to acknowledge alternative truths, the 
other anaemic in its refusal to consider Jesus as being much more than 
merely a “good man.” Chapter Five examines the centrality of original sin 
in Paul’s interpretation of the Christ-event. It is in this context that Žižek 
would begin to make Paul feel uncomfortable, through taking away 
perceived theological certainties of his own context.  
Through a reading of Paul’s famous passage of text in Romans 7, we 
find the idea of the violent imagination that Paul already perceived in the 
early moments of this cult. This condition of creation, as exemplified 
through the figure of Eve in Genesis 2-3, is one of susceptibility to the 
manipulation of reality. This apparent weakness of the flesh, however, 
also demonstrates the strength (or weak violence) of the slave of Christ 
that strives to actualise the potential of the Christ-event. It is here that 
 Introduction  19 
   
the centrality to the Christ-event of narratives inherent to our shaping of 
the world becomes apparent.   
The idea of the revolutionary weak violence extracted from Paul 
comes from this site; the Bartlebian refusal to participate in the Symbolic 
Order as it has been constructed. A responsibility that not only demands 
an ethical response, as Critchley has posited, but also a narrative response 
in this dismantling of the violent forces at the heart of political and 
economic forces that determine power. This is the transvaluation of values 
made possible through the Christ-event; through a dedication to telling the 
new stories made possible in the wake of the death of God. The 
responsibility of showing fidelity to the Christ-event, and committing to 
the love for the neighbour that this demands, is to follow Paul’s example 
in radically re-evaluating our situations in this light. It is in the formation 
of this narrative of (weak) violent resistance that an important legacy of 
Pauline love emerges. 
 
Violence, the Turn to Paul, and Literature 
 
The methodology of this work follows is influenced by the hyperactive 
interdisciplinary traversal of thought so often associated with continental 
philosophy (and so forcefully exemplified in figures such as Žižek and 
Nietzsche). This is New Testament theology carried out in a sphere which 
wishes to declare God as dead and words as fallible, and, as recent works 
from those such as Ward Blanton, Clayton Crocket, and Peter Rollins have 
demonstrated, it is all the stronger for this shift. It draws on works of 
fiction from literature and film, upon history and culture, and is openly 
indebted to theory as it draws upon forms of hermeneutics and poetics 
necessary for its readings. There is an acknowledgement that this work is a 
participation in the symbolic world through which its creation was made 
possible. The novel No Country for Old Men, for example, plays a 
significant role in this work simply because it played a significant role in 
inspiring the development of its foundations. It is this type of openness 
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that makes the writings of a figure like Žižek so compelling; we are seeing 
the work develop directly out of his symbolic universe.  
This work is defined by its knitting together of Pauline theory. Each 
aspect is woven into a narrative that seeks to build a theory of weak 
violence, propelled by literature and fiction, relating to the apostle Paul. 
This thesis contends with a theory of Pauline violence in the same manner 
that Žižek, Badiou, Agamben, and Critchley, in their own ways, weave 
philosophy, theology, film, theatre, literature, contemporary events, and 
history through their works. 
In order to continue, there are three main areas of clarification that 
will be useful to the reader regarding the way in which different 
disciplines are approached. Principally of concern here: the theory of 
violence that is evoked, the relevancy of the apostle Paul, and the reason 
why literature is significant in unlocking and re-working a theory of 
violence in the zero-level of the symbolic formation of reality. 
 
Violence 
 
Žižek provides a sharp critique of the symbolic and systemic forms of 
violence which masquerade at the zero-level of reality.4 Put differently, 
the violence inherent to language, symbols, organisations, structures, and 
so forth, through which worldviews are constructed. The primary focus of 
this work is not on physical violence, though it remains a vital aspect, but 
on symbolic violence. Understood as the violent impact of signifiers and 
representation, symbolic violence is found in the creation and 
perpetuation of dominant cultural and political narratives. This is evident 
                                                             
4These terms allow for a careful qualification of violence which avoids its trivialisation. 
Supplementing “violence,” with terms such as “structural,” “systemic,” or “symbolic,” 
allows distinctions to be made between the different domains to which this theory is 
being applied. Systemic and structural violence relate to violence inherent to systems and 
structures which manipulate, coerce, and harm people and objects within that system or 
structure. Symbolic violence, which includes hermeneutic and poetic violence, acts 
through influencing perceptions of reality. Symbolic and systemic violence belong to the 
category of objective violence which, Žižek argues, ‘is invisible since it sustains the very 
zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent’ (2008a, 
2). 
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in such areas as the legitimisation of political oppression of subsets of 
society, the terrorism of religious fundamentalisms against the “other,” 
and the justification of economic models which promote exploitation and 
inequality. Each has an underpinning in symbolic forms which (on the level 
of ideas, representations, and language) is violent in the force it exerts. 
Violence is a theory that is evoked in the creation of narratives 
explaining traumatic, disrupting, and damaging phenomena. This work 
resists a common understanding that violence simply refers to ‘injurious or 
lethal harm deliberately intended’ (Wink 2002, 333). As such, and in the 
way of clarifying the importance of understanding this idea in symbolic and 
systemic contexts, there are criticisms which should be acknowledged.5 
What will be constructed here, however, is a theory of violence based 
upon forceful violation that occurs in systemic and symbolic forms as well 
as in physical acts. 
Several examples of such violence can be rooted in New Testament 
writings. Paul, the self-proclaimed apostle, wrote in a letter to Gentile 
converts of a Corinthian sect of a fledgling Jewish apocalyptic cult: 
 
women should be silent in the churches. For they are not 
permitted to speak, but should be subordinate, as the law also 
says. If there is anything they desire to know, let them ask their 
husbands at home. For it is shameful for a woman to speak in 
church. (1 Cor. 14.34-35) 
 
A surface reading of this apparent chastising of women in the Corinth 
proto-Christian community would suggest that it perpetuates the image 
(and widely held belief, still to this day) of the female as inferior to her 
male counterpart. Her silence is required to maintain order in the 
community.  
                                                             
5
It would be counterproductive in certain contexts for the theory of violence to be diluted 
in such a way that it could refer to any force. In psychology, for example, it might not be 
useful for the word to become synonymous with other words such as ‘harm,’ ‘misery,’ 
‘alienation,’ or ‘repression’ (Keane 2004, 35). Furthermore it would be 
counterproductive, and an interpretive mistake, ‘to spread the term violence across all 
interpersonal and solitary actions of which we disapprove’ (Tilly 2003, 4).  
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The Italian philosopher and “half-believer” Gianni Vattimo describes 
violence as ‘the fact of shutting down, silencing, breaking off the dialogue 
of questions and answers,’ he continues, ‘violence, then, is the fact of no 
longer permitting the other to ask questions’ (2007, 93-94). In this context 
it we can understand Paul’s letter as containing an act of violence. The 
“women” are silenced; their reality is replaced, as is inevitable of 
language, by a representation of something inferior to men. Identified as a 
member of the gender which must succumb to the dominance of the 
dominant gender of the community, their potential is radically disrupted. 
The primary site of this violence is not found in a physical outburst which 
would typically be associated with the term, but in language itself. This 
violence originates in the symbolic constructions of reality that define the 
world as it is understood.  
Symbolic violence does not arise as a simple pathway from speech 
acts, or any other act of representation, to violence; it depends on 
context, consequence, and on interpretation. In the above example we 
cannot be certain whether Paul actually wrote the particular passage or 
the extent to which the context of its writing disguises the point that was 
being put across. There is also a stark difference between reprehensible 
writings contained in sections of a first century letter (which can be 
strongly critiqued) and the infallible texts of Holy Scripture (which cannot 
be openly critiqued at all). Context is important. This is, though, one of 
the many ways in which violence is perpetrated and perpetuated within 
the Symbolic Order, and Paul is not innocent in this regard. The symbolic 
violence inherent to the portrayal of an image of women as inferior to 
men, in this case through their silencing in the Corinthian church, is 
extended in any attempt to block a proper interrogation of this passage. 
Vattimo claims that 'claims of truth are also claims of political power' and 
therefore, since one truth cannot be exchanged for another, ‘truth and 
violence become interchangeable’ in the silencing of the Other (2011, 18-
19). 
Prominent examples of this violence can be found at the heart of 
fundamental religious movements which have turned ‘the name of God into 
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the name of terror’ (Caputo 2001, 107). Žižek warns of this twisting of the 
Pauline narrative of love in the monster of fundamentalism. He writes: 
 
In the absence of any ethical standards external to your belief in 
and love for God, the danger is always lurking that you will use 
your love of God as a legitimisation for the most horrible deeds. 
(2008a, 116) 
 
He links this danger to sacred causes that rely on a figure of the ‘Absolute 
upon whom to off-load our ultimate responsibility’ (2012, 45). Religious 
fanatics, through this fight for an ultimate cause, can become, 
‘anaesthetized against their elementary sensitivity to the other’s suffering’ 
(45). Yet Žižek does no dismiss the value of a connection between love and 
violence in itself. Indeed, this work is premised on that connection. It is, 
however, vital in this context to pay a demanding attention to the effects 
wrought on the symbolic and systemic creations of reality through this 
violent love.  
Terry Eagleton aptly describes religious fundamentalism as ‘the 
house-of-cards view of life; flick away the one at the bottom and the 
whole structure comes fluttering down’ (2007, 77). In defending the fragile 
elements that define their religious beliefs, the integrity of their own 
interpretation of God moves to a sphere that is beyond reproach. Žižek 
articulates the problem in that while it is ordinary for those with some 
form of faith to believe, fundamentalists through their own conviction 
know the truth. He writes: 
 
[they] erect in panic the shield of ‘fundamentalism,’ the 
psychotic-delirious-incestuous reassertion of religion as direct 
insight into the divine Real, with all the terrifying consequences 
that such a reassertion entails, and including the return with a 
vengeance of the obscene superego divinity demanding 
sacrifices. (2008a, 70) 
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In the roots of this violence are constructions of symbolic reality. Žižek 
continues, ‘they lost their (symbolic) ground without time to establish a 
new (symbolic) balance’ (70).  
 To call it symbolic violence is not to belittle its significance or the 
reality of its impact, but an indication that this violence occurs through 
the way in which ideas are created and disseminated. As Paul W. Kahn 
puts it: ‘the forces that knit us together – language, religion, family, 
morality, politics – are no less strong for the fact that they are symbolic’ 
(2011, 62). Violence is also no less strong because it is symbolic. As Regina 
M. Schwartz, in The Curse of Cain, argues:  ‘violence is not only what we 
do to the other. It is prior to that. Violence is the very construction of the 
other.’ She continues, ‘acts of identity formation are themselves acts of 
violence’ (1997, 5). 
Key to this appropriation of violence is the idea that the line 
between what is violent and what is not violent should not be drawn 
exclusively on physical terms. Drawing upon the idea of violence as an 
emotive way of explaining a rupture in the stability of life, the terms 
symbolic and systemic violence make a more powerful point about these 
forces without trivialising the term. With this in mind, Hent de Vries makes 
a useful working definition of violence in his work Religion and violence: 
philosophical perspectives from Kant to Derrida. He writes: 
 
(violence) in both the widest possible and the most elementary 
senses of the word, entails any cause, any justified or 
illegitimate force that is exerted - physically or otherwise – by 
one thing (event or instance, group or person, and, perhaps, 
word and object) on another. (2002, 1) 
 
This work holds to this definition of violence with a significant caution: the 
greatest instances of violence are not always the most visible. We should 
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be wary of declarations such as, “we will know violence when we see it.”6 
The decision to declare something as violent is heavily influenced by 
cultural, political, and social contexts. Violence already exists before we 
see it. 
The most powerful violence related to the Shoah was not found in the 
death camps. It was found in the violation, manipulation, and destruction 
wrought in the construction of the victimisation and hatred that allowed 
the smooth functioning of mechanisms crucial to the catalogue of 
catastrophic atrocities which would tear so mercilessly through the centre 
of Europe. Without scarcely thinkable violence carried out at the most 
basic level of reality, what Hannah Arendt would call “the banality of 
evil,” the processing and murder of more than six million human beings 
would have been impossible.  
The influence of Walter Benjamin’s essay Critique of Violence (Zur 
Kritik der Gewalt) is crucial in this work, and its title indicates something 
which is at stake in the formation of the theory of violence in this work. As 
Derrida pointed out, the translated title does not do justice to its title in 
its original language. He argues that the French and English translations, 
‘while not unjust, and not so entirely violent, are very active translations 
that do not do justice to the fact that gewalt also signifies, for Germans, 
legitimate power, authority, public force’ (2001, 234).7 Gewalt is distinct 
from gewalttätigkeit, which is closely connected to the idea of physical 
                                                             
6The psychologist James Gilligan argues that, ‘Where violence is defined as criminal, many 
people see it and care about it. When it is simply a by-product of our social and economic 
structure, many do not see it; and it is hard to care about something one cannot see’ 
(Bufacchi 2010, 1). 
7 The roots of the English word “violence” are found in the Latin word vis: a physical or 
mental strength or power, related to qualities such as energy and vigour. It is a term 
which is connected to the strength of conquering military forces. From this root come 
words such as violatio (violation, profanation) and violentia (violence, vehemence, 
ferocity). At stake here is the idea of violation; to conquer, to violate with a force related 
to a vigorous strength which contains a measure of ferocity. These are the ideas in the 
nucleus of the word that would become “violence.”   
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violence.8 In the decision to translate gewalt as violence rather than force 
there is an acknowledgement of the violent forces which exist outside of 
physical actions (relating to signs, language, law, politics, and so on).  
Dealing with New Testament texts, it is already evident that there is 
no straight-forward way of defining violence.9 The language of Koine Greek 
coloured the world in a different way to that of the English language. For 
example, zoe and bios, both translated as life, split its understanding into 
either a bare or qualified existence. Agamben reminds us of this when he 
evokes Aristotle’s belief that man is a ‘living animal with the additional 
capacity for political existence’ – zoe (living animal) and bios (political 
being) (1998, 5). Agamben provides an important reminder about the non-
static nature of language but also the way it remains tied to a long history 
that deeply impacts the way in which worldviews are shaped. In this way it 
is important to use this word that signifies a powerful idea, violence, in a 
way which can radically shift our perceptions of the forces that shape 
history. 
Therefore, in a nutshell, violence is understood in this work as an 
emotive term used in the analysis of a force that violates or disrupts a 
subject(s) or object(s) in a way which disturbs, damages, or changes the 
situation in which it appears. In doing so, it forcefully impacts upon the 
way in which the world is understood. Violence might occur in any instance 
where there has been a measure of undue coercion, violation, disruption, 
damage, or destruction to subjects and/or objects. This includes physical 
outbursts of violence, but also forms of symbolic, systemic, and structural 
                                                             
8 Beatrice Hanssen in Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical 
Theory, charts the history of violence (gewalt) in contemporary theory. She claims that 
using the idea gewalt helps inform our understanding of violence: ‘Violence now includes 
such phenomenologically elusive categories as psychological, symbolic, structural, 
epistemic, hermeneutical, and aesthetic violence’ (2000, 9). 
9 In New Testament texts the words violence, violent, and violently are used to denote 
poetic, physical, and metaphorical meanings. They are used to describe weather, physical 
force, unpleasant demeanour, terror, and excessiveness. There is a negative weight 
carried by a word such as ὕβρις (arrogance, haughtiness, violence, offence, abuse) in 1 
Tim 1.13, as opposed to the more descriptive βία (force or strength) in Matt 11.12 and 
Acts 12.35. Paul describes his persecution of the church as ὑπερβολὴν; translated as 
“excessively” or “violently” it is similar in root to the word hyperbole (1 Gal 3.1). There is 
also φοβηθείς (horror) in Acts 23.10 and πλήκτην (to strike) in 1 Tim 3:3.  
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violence which constantly shape our perception and experience of reality. 
Richard Horsley makes the point that violence is ‘not only descriptive but 
also evaluative’ (2000, 21). He is not the only figure in areas of New 
Testament studies to realise the importance of being attentive to the way 
in which we understand violence.10 This brings us to the second 
qualification in the context of this work: the apostle Paul.  
 
The Turn to Paul 
 
Nietzsche accused Paul of 'doing violence to the truth’ (1888, 158), 
and he was right. Paul’s proclamation of a crucified Messiah that defeated 
death announced a violent rupture in the “truth” (or untruth) of his 
theologico-political situation. The Roman Empire established order and 
control on the basis of their power over life and death – Paul’s Christ 
disrupted that order. Nietzsche’s criticism might have been correct in this 
regard, but he failed to acknowledge that Paul’s project was very much 
like his own. It was concerned with the transvaluation of values; a 
rebalancing of power out of the hands of the ruling elite and into the hands 
of the community of believers. This connection between Paul and 
Nietzsche is not lost on many writers in recent continental philosophy, as 
Simon Critchley puts it: ‘Nietzsche’s call for a revaluation of values is 
based on a sheer jealousy of Paul’s achievement in bringing about such a 
revaluation’ (2012, 155-156). 
Paul’s message was delivered from the margins; subversive to 
authority and based on weakness. Yet its legacy is fractured, paradoxically 
found as much in power and control as it is in weakness and subversion. 
This splintered legacy is hindered by the framing of his letters within 
                                                             
10
 Horsley, in reflecting upon the violence of the subjugation of the Jews as a people, 
wrote: ‘once we begin reflecting upon our basic sense of values and the “real” world of 
socio-political affairs, it is virtually mandatory to keep expanding and deepening our 
understanding of violence’ (2000, 20). This deepening sense of understanding can be seen 
through the way that he inserts the language of structural violence into the world of the 
New Testament writings. Thomas Yoder Neufeld also acknowledges a similar point, 
writing: ‘what counts as violence has widened dramatically, with significant implications 
for how the New Testament relates to violence’ (2011, 2). 
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Biblical canon and history that disguise their situational and cultural 
particularities. Paul’s messages are not readily comprehended through the 
few historically remote and often vague letters that have survived, yet 
Paul has at many times been promoted as a bearer of clear and simple 
messages. A significant danger exists is this assumption of simplicity. Once 
we stop interpreting (having faith), and begin knowing, the texts take on a 
violently oppressive potential. Authority that is based on absolute 
assertions creates new possibilities for abuse and cruelty. In this sense, 
Christianity fails to break free from being a religion prone to such violence 
when it refuses to give up its claims on ultimate authority and absolute 
truth. The Christ-event created a power vacuum pregnant with hope that 
was also exploited by the re-establishment of mythic violence, giving rise 
to the monstrous Real of the Hebrew Bible’s fiction. The turn to Paul 
attempts to redeem something radical that became buried in the symbolic 
rubble of this catastrophe. 
It is here that we can situate a convergence between the works of 
continental philosophers such as Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, and Slavoj 
Žižek and Biblical scholars such as Brigitte Kahl, Neil Elliot and Ward 
Blanton; each charting their own, often very distinctive, way through an 
imagining of Paul outside some of his traditional Christian shackles. It is 
precisely the way in which he shifted the groundings of truth in his 
situation that makes him such a compelling figure in these readings.  
Within this context Paul has re-appeared as a significant figure in the 
diagnosis and critique of cultural and political forms of violence, and as a 
guidepost on the path to articulating forms of resistance beyond the 
sacrificial logics of physical violence. Imagining violence which is not 
merely sacrificial is an essential feature of this interest in Paul; violence 
which is utilised in the transformation of a situation through targeting the 
mechanisms which create injustice rather than striking blindly at physical 
representations of those mechanisms. For many, however, this remains a 
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peculiar, puzzling, or even unwelcome intrusion into work focussed on 
Paul.11 
There has been, after all, enough fighting within more familiar 
domains over Paul’s legacy – in perspectives old and new. In introducing 
The Apostle to the Conquered, Davina C. Lopez makes the appeal that ‘it 
is crucial to re-read, re-situate, and re-imagine the Apostle Paul' (2008, 
xi). The drive to re-imagine this first century figure, known primarily 
through a small collection of letters, has seen the rise of a plethora of new 
perspectives. Paul’s letters, as forceful and revolutionary yet inconsistent 
and vague, have provided a site of re-reading and re-situating; not only of 
the apostle, but of religious, cultural, and political movements. As some 
have moved away from the old Luther-centred interpretations at a frightful 
pace, others have cautioned not to forget the importance and diligence of 
such readings (see Westerholm 2004, for example).  
Re-imaginings or radical appropriations of the apostle stemming from 
the broad area of continental philosophy are not entirely novel. The 
apostle’s legacy has a long-standing, if strained, relationship with 
philosophy.12 This aspect of what has been called the “return of religion,” 
‘perhaps the dominant cliché of contemporary theory’ (Critchley 2012, 8), 
is adding to rejuvenated interest in Paul and his theologico-political 
context from within more traditional areas of Biblical scholarship. If 
nothing else these thinkers have added fresh provocation to those 
concerned with the first century apostle. In many cases they offer 
invigorated insights which expose the study of Paul to contemporary 
political, cultural, and philosophical concerns. 
There is, however, uneasiness from some quarters in accepting that 
this provocation has much to offer in the way of insight into Paul’s letters. 
Paula Fredriksen typifies this criticism in her essay on Badiou’s Paul, 
                                                             
11 Stephen Fowl describes how he is struck by the variety of reactions ‘to having 
philosophers and other unauthorized types romp in our playground’ (2010: 119). 
12
 Included in this history is the impact of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard evident in 
theologians and Biblical scholars such as Karl Barth and Albert Schweitzer, as well as 
Paul’s peculiar influence on Heidegger’s early work. 
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pointedly titled Historical Integrity, Interpretive Freedom.13 She argues 
that Badiou ‘has presented us not with a study of Paul and his concerns, 
but with an oblique self-portrait, and an investigation of concerns and 
ideas that are irreducibly Badiou’s’ (2009, 72).  At the core of Fredriksen's 
criticism is the point that ‘the frame of reference for historical 
interpretation is not and cannot be the present…our frame of reference is 
the past’ (2009, 61-62).  
Frederiek Depoortere, in his book on Badiou and Theology, also points 
out that ‘Badiou is not presenting the historical Paul, but his own version 
of the apostle’ (2009, 164). This is less of a problem for the theologian 
than it is for the historian. To an extent this criticism is not without 
justification. Thinkers such as Badiou and Žižek have wilfully ignored a 
great deal of scholarship on Paul. Their primary concerns revolve around 
contemporary issues rather than any historical integrity of Paul. 
Predominantly, at least, the aim of Fredriksen and other critics has not 
been to silence these voices, but to elicit honesty about the ‘oblique self-
portrait’ that is represented in their work on Paul.14 The problem with this 
though, indeed its failure, is in the lack of any real attempt to contend 
with the issues and ideas that can help to further our understanding of Paul 
without sacrificing historical integrity. The frame of reference for any 
investigation cannot solely exist in an isolated context.15 
The attempt to detach all possible “anachronisms,” as Fredriksen 
puts it, in the pursuit of a purely historical Paul ignores the significant 
questions posed about the implications of the proto-Christian or radical 
Jewish message found in Paul’s epistles. G.K. Chesterton, whose work has 
                                                             
13 Ward Blanton remarks on the ‘remarkable awkwardness’ with which Pauline scholars 
like Fredriksen have engaged with recent philosophical works interested in the apostle. 
Theodore Jennings and Larry Welborn are among those who have engaged in a more open, 
astute, and at times critical manner. 
14
 E.P. Sanders (2009) is also among a number of Biblical scholars who have shown 
scepticism towards the content of this interest in Paul.  
15 Depoortere cautions that 'we should not limit our reading of Badiou to his book on Paul' 
and that ‘his interpretation of Paul is only an illustration' (2009, 9). He argues that while 
Badiou’s interest in Paul has helped reinvigorate the charting of Paul’s legacy, it belongs 
as part of Badiou’s larger corpus of work. In this way it is also crucial that Badiou’s 
illustration is allowed to gain influence within the contexts of historical approaches to the 
apostle. 
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an important influence on Žižek’s theology, articulated this type of 
criticism well when he wrote, ‘either criticism is no good at all (a very 
defensible position) or else criticism means saying about an author the very 
things that would have made him jump out of his boots' (1989, 272). 
Indeed, Badiou, as well as Žižek, Agamben, and others, have not only used 
the Pauline texts as illustrations in their contemporary discourses, but have 
challenged the implications, as well as the intentions, of these writings. 
Many other Pauline scholars, including Dale Martin, Larry Welborn, and 
Ward Blanton, have noted this ability to ask critical questions of the 
apostle. The assertion here is that Paul is not merely a figure ripped from 
his own context as an example of a revolutionary figure (which at some 
turns he undoubtedly is), but is also a crucial figure in within his own 
context, as a thinker who encountered and participated in the rupturing of 
the Symbolic Order. 
As we conduct historical investigations we are propelled by our own 
contexts and by many other contexts between us and the sites of our 
investigations. To interpret the possible psychological, psycho-analytical, 
or political intentions of the historical Paul, we require a meeting of 
frames of reference. Even the way in which we conduct historical 
investigation requires a reference of how history is transmitted in the 
present (which implies a different mode of transmission to Paul’s context). 
This is not to take away from the often rich pictures which Fredriksen, and 
other historians who have at times maintained a distance from the 
philosophers’ turn to Paul, paint of Paul’s historical context. Such 
investigations are vital tools in the battle against violent misappropriations 
of texts, yet history and theory are not so distinct that one should not fully 
embrace the challenges of the other.  
It is not the intention here to rip Paul out of his context. In the same 
way that we should not assume that Paul understood literature, 
philosophy, or psychology in the same way as Conrad, Nietzsche, or Freud 
understood their respective fields of thought, we should not assume that 
developments in these fields (whether artistically or scientifically) do not 
fundamentally alter the ways in which we should interpret Paul’s 
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theologico-political interventions in fragile proto-Christian communities. 
The important point here is that thinkers such as Taubes, Agamben, Žižek, 
Critchley, and Badiou have provided insightful, meaningful, and also 
varying interpretations and appropriations of Paul's letters in a way that 
can add to and enhance our historical and contemporary understanding of 
Paul.  
Badiou, echoing Barth’s famous statement on the continuing 
relevancy of Paul, addresses the apostle as 'our contemporary' (2003: 
5).1617 Indeed, in the foreword to the recently published outline of Pier 
Paolo Pasolini’s unmade film about Paul, Badiou notes the shift in contexts 
that Paul’s message transcends. He remarks that, in many of our 
contemporary situations, ‘Paul’s text crosses all these circumstances 
intact, as if he had foreseen them all’ (2014, xi). This should not be used 
to obfuscate the considerable extent of the separation between Paul’s 
context and our own. We should not mistake Paul’s social, cultural, or 
even perceived eschatological, context for any other. Time and time 
again, however, Paul's provocation reappears with acute relevance to 
contemporary situations, and with an uncanny ability to prompt re-
examinations of the apostle’s primary context. It is a provocation which 
arrives to us from Paul that is also read back into Paul.  
Inherent to this feature is a growing interest in the significance of a 
religious tradition like Paulinism in terms of the diagnosis and critique of 
on-going cultural and political violence. The particular assertion of this 
work is that violence is a pivotal feature of the turn to Paul. These 
reflections on this early “Christian” figure have aided the pursuit of 
significant contemporary questions. These thinkers, unconventional in 
their connection to Paul and to theology - in a variety of, often conflicting, 
ways – utilise the apostle’s radical break in his worldview instigated by the 
Christ-event in order to think about possible resistance to the violence 
that is fundamental to capitalism. 
                                                             
16 ‘If we rightly understand ourselves, our problems are the problems of Paul; and if we be 
enlightened by the brightness of his answers, those answers must be ours’ (Barth 1933, 1). 
17 De Vries links Adorno together with Barth in acknowledging the theologian’s impact on 
aspects of continental philosophy. This is epitomised in Barth’s reading of Romans 12-13 
and his agreement with Paul that evil can only be overcome through good (De Vries 2013). 
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Badiou links our thinking of the universal to the particular in a way 
that cuts through the traditional theological divisions between liberalism 
and fundamentalism in order to show the way in which subjects are 
created in the unfolding of a Truth-Event (with Paul’s emphasis on the 
power of love, this a particularly important example for Badiou). 
Agamben, in a way that conflicts with Badiou’s reading of Paul on key 
points, understands Paul as a crucial thinker of the messianic; specifically 
how Paul envisages messianic time as disrupting the mechanisms of the 
law which blocks the potential for something truly novel to occur. 
Critchley uses Paul to think through the importance of fidelity to a cause; 
in this case thinking of love for the neighbour as an infinite demand that 
breaks beyond the confines of liberalism into a mode of anarchist thought. 
Vattimo uses the Pauline themes of kenosis and love, while retaining a 
certain measure of wariness with regards to mentioning an apostle so 
linked with social conservatism, to help in the construction of his post-
metaphysical “weak thought.” Žižek sees Paul as something more violent 
than all of this: as a thinker whose theory of love propelled by the rupture 
of the Christ-event helps us to think of a divine violence that breaks down 
the Symbolic Order.  
Each of these interconnected, yet (sometimes bitterly) conflicting, 
approaches to the apostle could be the subject of a work such as this one. 
It is Žižek’s approach, however, that propels this work, with the others 
used to create either some depth to Žižek’s approach or add tensions and 
variations on the controversial approach of the Slovene cultural critic.  
Through these approaches, Paul has become a significant figure in the 
search for answers to questions about the possibility for leftist 
revolutionary action beyond the catastrophes of the last 
century. Questions such as: is there a violence that is perhaps not linked 
to such sacrificial logics, not linked to what Badiou described as 
modernity’s devastating “passion for the real” (as revealed through 
terrorist attacks, death camps, show trials, and staged executions)? The 
key here is that such rituals fail to touch the Real, but instead remain 
entrenched in an obsession caused by their own Symbolic reality. The type 
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of violent force that Žižek wills is that which reveals such actions for what 
they really are; physical brutality that is empty of the “real” 
transformative power they wish to have. To put this differently, terrorists 
and violent militants, as seen with Islamic State, may pretend to be doing 
God’s will but only ever serve an illusion (to quite devastating ends). 
The radical resistance of Paul stands in this place. As Brigitte Kahl 
puts it with regards to the Pauline group in Galatia dedicated to the body 
of Christ: 
 
They shared the bread and a new corporeality that symbolised 
and celebrated life, rather than death, that came from the 
resurrected body of a crucified Jew. Profoundly nonviolent yet 
unconquerable, this was the negation and abrogation of the 
idolatrous eidolon of triumph and defeat: Messianic peacemaking 
in the image of the One God other than Caesar, and of the 
Messiah Jesus. (2010, 302)  
 
What Žižek adds to this is a measure of violence. That we must be 
critically attuned to the violence that we participate in all the time and 
find a way to violently interrupt its ability to reproduce itself. This is the 
violence of Pauline love.  
 
Literature 
 
An important piece of the puzzle, in terms of contextualising and 
explaining the methodology of this work, is the presence of literature 
(especially in establishing the themes and theories that drive this thesis). 
Prevalent among the philosophers prominent in the framework of this 
thesis is their employment of the classic literary genres (poetry, drama, 
and prose) as essential aspects of the process of communicating their 
thought. By this I mean the stories, narratives, and poetic diction that 
allow their work to function in the acknowledgement that access to any 
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divine language, in other words an immediacy of truth, is out of reach. It is 
in this sense that Nietzsche wrote of Zarathustra:  
 
I allow no one to pass muster as knowing that book, unless every 
single word therein has at some time wrought in him a profound 
wound, and at some time exercised on him a profound 
enchantment. (1981, 7) 
 
This work relies on biblical narratives such as found in the Book of Job or in 
Genesis 2-3, on writers including Cormac McCarthy and Herman Melville, 
and also on works from theatre and film, including Badiou’s play The 
Incident at Antioch. It relies on them not merely as illustrations which 
contribute towards the “greater meaning” of this work, but as anchors that 
continually reassert that this work is, as T.S. Eliot famously put it with 
regards to his own poetry, “a raid on the inarticulate.” Novels such as No 
Country for Old Men and The Last of the Just dramatize not only 
representations of violence but also the symbolism and structures inherent 
to what creates their violence.  
What thinkers within the broad area of continental philosophy 
manage to do with the gap between the Word and words (this very essence 
of the connection between literature and theology) is draw in the power of 
literature to demonstrate the gap between what we are attempting to 
communicate and the path back to the their origin in the “divine,” or, as 
Žižek would put it, in demonstrating the gap between the Symbolic and the 
Real.  
Rex Butler, in his introduction to Žižek, describes this way of 
communication as an attempt to ‘take in the entirety of Western 
philosophy, both low and high: from Schoenberg to sci-fi, from quantum 
mechanics to the latest Hollywood Blockbuster’ (2005, 2). Introductions to 
Žižek's work cannot fail to pick up on this tendency towards an 
amalgamation of sources in his apparently chaotic writings. All of these 
elements are crucial to his work; indeed, what makes Žižek “Žižek” is tied 
to his method. The films, literature, scientific, and cultural references 
 Introduction  36 
   
employed in his writings provide a critique of both dominant and obscure 
references within his audience’s perception of reality. In examining what 
shapes their ideological landscapes, he is also influencing the thought of 
his readers through contributing to the little symbolic building blocks that 
create the gaze that filters the material properties of existence. The crux 
of the matter is that these illustrations, references, and jokes form a 
staging post between the Symbolic and the Real. To put it in a different 
way, Žižek acts as a theologian searching for the Word among the forms of 
revelation in the postlapsarian world.  
This work follows Žižek and a host of thinkers from continental 
philosophy who draw upon works of fiction not only for their provocation, 
illustration, and explanation, but also in the inherent role they play in 
shifting the lens on the world which shapes the worldview of the subject. 
The works of Badiou, Žižek, Agamben, Rancière, Critchley, and many 
others, is incomplete without some reference to the play of narratives that 
helps to shape interaction with reality. They all demonstrate, in one way 
or another, that such narratives are an integral part of the creation and 
interpretation of our narrative contexts.  
Such works do not only carry a weighty influence in the construction 
of our realities, they also have the power to disseminate crucial elements 
of these constructions. As Rancière put it,  
 
the unique power of literature finds its source in that zone of 
indeterminacy where former individuations are undone, where 
the eternal dance of atoms composes new figures and intensities 
every moment. (2004, 149) 
 
The literature used in this work is not only there to illustrate points being 
made; in many cases it becomes before a point is being made, it haunts 
them, breaking apart individuations that characterise previous 
assumptions.  
Žižek’s references to G.K. Chesterton, Herman Melville, or Alfred 
Hitchcock reflect one of the ways in which his narratives are constructed. 
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It can highlight the “shit” (the leftover but nevertheless revealing 
substance) of contemporary culture and ideologies, demonstrate the 
intangible nature of our realities, or it can even serve as an illusion which 
covers up another meaning. This strikes at the heart of theological 
investigation; the truth exists in the God emptied into the world rather 
than in metaphysics set apart from symbolic substance of our world. In 
admitting that interpretations are never perfect, an aspect of the purpose 
of the literature throughout this work is to create a zone of paradox or 
uncertainty. 
Two contrasting figures of violence are given prominent positions in 
the unfolding of this thesis: Cormac McCarthy’s Anton Chigurh and Herman 
Melville’s Bartleby. These figures exist in the foundations of the ideas that 
have come to form this work. Standing alongside Biblical figures such as Job 
and Eve, they help to construct the canon of works that have inspired this 
thesis. They are all vital to the matrix from which this work has been 
forged, and they are all significant to the rhetorical cohesion therein. Put 
differently, such works wrought a profound wound without which this thesis 
would not exist. 
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Chapter One 
 
Symbolic Violence in a Divine Economy 
 
1.1 No Country for Old Men 
 
In order to move towards the connection that Žižek makes between 
violence and Paul’s conception of love, we must first examine a particular 
conceptualisation of violence which is traced beyond readily apparent 
explosions of physical violence. This chapter begins with a reflection on 
the violent figure of Anton Chigurh from Cormac McCarthy’s novel No 
Country for Old Men. This narrative acts as an illustration of the nature of 
violence and also acts to advance a theory of the condition of original sin 
within a divine economy. This novel, along Žižek’s Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections, provided the foundations of the theory of violence at play in 
this work. It prompted the question: where is the real violence?  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop this theory of violence that 
goes beyond its physical or material appearance (or what Žižek refers to as 
“subjective” violence).18 Symbolic violence (‘embodied in language’) and 
systemic violence (‘the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth 
functioning of our economic and political systems’) are the ‘objective’ 
forms of violence that lurk in the background; not only as the foundations 
of physical violence but also already acting as violent ruptures in the 
stability of our life-worlds (2008a, 1). These ideas are then advanced in the 
theological context that Žižek roots in the idea of double kenosis. 
Attentive to the narrative of the Book of Job and the letters of Paul, 
Žižek’s theologico-political narrative pulls us away from the spectre of 
ultimate meanings guaranteed in the big Other and towards a divine 
violence that can only be generated in the interconnected actions that 
take place within creation.  
                                                             
18Žižek writes, ‘subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that 
also includes two kinds of objective violence’ (2008a, 1). The opening chapter of Žižek’s 
work provides an overview of objective and subjective forms of violence.  
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1.1.1 Cormac McCarthy and the Nature of Violence 
 
Blood and liquor sprayed and the man’s knees buckled and his 
eyes rolled. The kid had already let go the bottleneck and he 
pitched the second bottle into his right hand in a roadagent’s 
pass before it even reached the floor and he backhanded the 
second bottle across the barman’s skull and crammed the jagged 
remnant into his eye as he went down. (Blood Meridian or The 
Evening Redness in the West) 
 
This chapter opens by situating itself in the violent worlds of Cormac 
McCarthy’s fiction. This might seem to be an unusual starting point for a 
work that weaves its way to the apostle Paul. It might, though, seem less 
peculiar for those familiar with Žižek’s hyperactive theory which is 
interwoven with illustrations from literature and film. The jarring nature of 
McCarthy’s violent fiction is utilised here as a staging post between the 
worlds of Paul and Žižek, providing a context from which we can begin to 
explore the ways in which violence operates.  
McCarthy’s Blood Meridian is written with an imminent brutality that 
makes the reader feel uncomfortable when confronted with its remorseless 
depictions of violence. Of his initial encounter with the novel, Harold 
Bloom recalled, in an interview with Peter Josyph, 'I read about half of it, 
and although I was very impressed, I couldn't go on because I started to 
have nightmares' (Josyph 2010, 78). As difficult as his violent prose might 
be to read, it is entirely appropriate for the subject matter. We should 
feel uneasy when encountering pages of fiction which describe such abuse 
and defilement of the flesh and spirit. It is with this in mind that a theory 
of violence is approached in this work. It is not an easy task to investigate 
the roots of this idea without trivialising the reasons this theory is evoked, 
but it is a task that is vital to this project.  
Essential to Žižek’s work on violence, with a typical blend of insight 
and provocation, is the determination to examine violent forces that are 
hidden within the symbolic structure of reality. He writes: 
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At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are 
acts of crime and terror… But we should learn to step back, to 
disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of the directly 
visible ‘subjective’ violence. (2008a, 1) 
 
Violence is enacted beyond, indeed beneath, the luring horror of physical 
violence. Žižek questions the impulse that we must confront violence 
directly in our thinking. His incitement here is that ‘the overpowering 
horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as 
a lure that prevents us from thinking’ (2008, 3). Yet we provoke the name 
of violence because of its horror and the empathy it elicits for its victims. 
Violence is as such because it gives us nightmares; this, in many cases, 
does compel us to think. The violent world of McCarthy's old west 
portrayed in Blood Meridian is both compelling and horrifying on account 
of its violence. Not simply for its skilful articulation, but also due to the 
way it lures us into thinking of violence in the real world. 
There is little glamour to McCarthy’s portrayals of violence. This type 
of prose has the ability to make us feel at our eye sockets as we read of 
their fragility at the mercy of the jagged edge of a broken bottle. Beyond 
this initial reflex there is a deeper provocation in the way that this 
violence is accepted by the characters of this novel. Such violence does not 
always disturb the world in the way we might expect. It is normalised in 
the zero-level of their existence. As the body is dragged out of sight 
without a wince, and the blood is wiped away like any other spilled drink, 
the question that should haunt us here is: what violence has been 
normalised into our experience of everyday life?  
This journey into the mystery of violence is strikingly relevant to 
recent reflections upon Paul’s writings and legacy. Indeed, one of the 
driving interests in the turn to Paul in recent continental philosophy stems 
from wrestling with questions about the real nature of contemporary 
violence. Embedded in the background of this interest are thinkers with a 
deep unease about violence that is hidden in the political, economic, and 
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social mechanisms that dominate life. There is a perverted parallel here 
with the works of Steven Pinker, and others, who argue that the 
prevalence of coverage of stories reporting instances of violence in the 
media prevents us from realising that the world is becoming less violent 
with every generation.19 Žižek argues, however, that the lure of the horror 
of violent acts prevents us not from seeing that the world is less violent, 
but from seeing the mechanisms of violence hidden from view.  
This provocation should be kept in mind not because it is correct - 
empathy with the victims of violence is a crucial part of thinking - but 
because it draws our attention towards violence that we fail to 
acknowledge. Central to this thesis, and to Žižek’s understanding of 
violence, is this idea that by the time that a physical act of violence occurs 
there have already been violent forces at work. The physical 
manifestation, therefore, is a continuation and re-situation of violence 
which already exists. 
 
1.1.2 The Violence behind Anton Chigurh 
 
This brings us back to violent stories of the past, present, and future told 
by McCarthy. In No Country for Old Men, a tale that breathes a bloody life 
into our literary encounters with violence, McCarthy introduces the figure 
of Anton Chigurh - whose potential for violence does not appear to be 
bound by any ethical or moral horizon. Chigurh is a figure given life in this 
novel as an unrelenting and disturbing force. 
 
Chigurh could see the doubt come into his eyes at this 
bloodstained figure before him but it came too late. He placed 
his hand on the man’s head like a faith healer. The pneumatic 
hiss and click of the plunger sounded like a door closing. The 
man slid soundlessly to the ground, a round hole in his forehead 
                                                             
19 Pinker (2011) warns against moralising the word violence in such a way that it can refer 
to any bad thing. Focussing on violence defined within a strictly physical framework 
(murder, rape, assault, and so on), and through utilising numerous statistics and 
anecdotes, he argues that humankind has become increasingly less violent. 
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from which blood bubbled and ran down into his eyes carrying 
with it his slowly uncoupling world visible to see. Chigurh 
wiped his hand with his handkerchief. I just didn’t want you to 
get blood on the car, he said. (7) 
 
Chigurh’s violence is bare and without any pretence of moral justification. 
It is not a means or an end in-itself, but the coincidence of both. In his 
eyes there is a sign of a force that is not bound to any typical desires. He 
appears to be amoral in nature, with a potential for destruction not bound 
by any conscience. He assumes a role in the service of previous actions; as 
a type of excess beyond the expected consequences of an act. Read in this 
way, it is not a story about a deranged violent individual, but the infinite 
responsibility of the other participants in this world. 
No Country for Old Men follows the story of Llewellyn Moss, who, 
when out hunting near the Rio Grande, encounters the scene of a botched 
drug deal. With every potential witness already riddled with bullet holes, 
all dead apart from one fatally injured man, Moss decides to take the 
money left in the remnants of this chaotic scene. It was an opportunistic 
moment of greed that he knew would have far reaching consequences. In 
that bag, ‘his whole life was sitting there in front of him’ (18). The 
consequences of this act would chase him to his death, and have dire 
repercussions for many others.  
Chigurh, a mercenary hired to retrieve the money, embodies the 
irreducibly violent consequences of Moss’s act. In an explanation of why he 
retired from service, Ed Tom Bell, the local sheriff tasked with tracking 
Chigurh, recalls: 
 
they say the eyes are the windows to the soul. I don't know 
what them eyes was the window to and I'd guess I'd soon as not 
know.… I know he’s real. I have seen his work. I walked in front 
of those eyes once. I won’t do it again. (4) 
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It is Bell who makes the most astute critique of Chigurh in this novel. The 
horror of looking directly into the violence in the eyes of Chigurh destroyed 
the potential for him to continue in his role as law-keeper. He encountered 
a moment of revelation through the contact with those eyes - a moment 
that shocked his whole being and radically changed his situation. He came 
to the realisation that the forces operating behind the violence of Chigurh 
could not be explained away by reducing him to an isolated “evil” subject. 
Although it would be tempting to read this character as merely as an evil 
person making the decision to kill, that is not how Bell understands him. 
Instead he sees him as a reflection of the multiplicity of actions that reveal 
not only the depth of wrongdoing in the world but also bewilderment as to 
the consequences this brings with it.  
Chigurh’s soulless eyes provide a piercing gaze into a world of 
violence. This is what happens when Bell gazes into, and through, 
Chigurh’s eyes. Those eyes of Chigurh reveal the evil in the world with no 
agenda but in the revelation itself. They were a sign of a moral abyss that 
reached fulfilment in Chigurh. Bell muses, ‘you can’t have a dope business 
without dopers. A lot of 'em are well dressed and holdin' down goodpayin' 
jobs too. I said: You might even know some yourself’ (304). This is what 
troubled Bell; it was the actions taken in everyday life, both mundane and 
jarring, that directed this violence. The attempt to put an end to this 
violence by stopping Chigurh became a futile thought for Bell. He came to 
see him as an object bound to a fate created by the world; as Jay Ellis 
describes it, Chigurh ‘brings people to account in a hard cosmos of chance 
and choice' (2011, 101). It was too much for an old sheriff to contend with. 
This was no country for old men.20 
 
1.1.3 The Transgression 
 
[the idea] that violence is enacted by social agents, evil 
individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical 
                                                             
20 McCarthy takes his title from the opening line of Yeats’ poem Sailing to Byzantium. This 
poem reflects Sheriff Bell’s position in the novel; on the bewilderment caused by a world 
he no longer feels fit for.  
  Chapter One   44 
 
crowds…doesn’t it desperately try to distract our attention 
from the true locus of trouble? (Žižek 2008a, 11) 
 
It had somehow become possible for the dusty world of No Country for Old 
Men to facilitate the existence of such a violent figure. The assertion here 
is that the violence - an idea typically associated with disturbance to 
peaceful existence (riots, assaults, military action, and so on) - was 
already operating within what seemed like that nonviolent state. The 
violence that consumes this novel initially occurs through Moss’s taking of 
the bag filled with the money. This is similar to the backdrop behind 
Žižek's interpretation of violence. He explains: 
 
when we perceive something as an act of violence, we measure 
it by a presupposed standard of what the ‘normal’ non-violent 
situation is – and the highest form of violence is the imposition of 
this standard with reference to which some events appear as 
‘violent.’ (2008a, 55) 
 
When Chigurh, posing as a police officer, pulls over the man whose car he 
wishes to procure, he intrudes into his life with a ruthless violation of not 
only the man's physical body but also of the stability of the world around 
him. This was what was produced in the act of unleashing a physical force 
which punctured a hole through the man’s head.  
Daily routine is threatened, disturbed, and violated by such forces. 
Violence rips through the fragile sinews holding together peace and 
stability. This violence, however, already exists at a more elementary level 
of Chigurh’s reality; found in the forces, actions, and decisions that set his 
course. Chigurh’s intrusion only occurs through the displacing of an 
invitation made to him to enter the world. Unnervingly, of course, it is also 
seemingly non-violent or neutral movements, and even decisions made 
with the best moral or ethical will, that set his course. It is precisely this 
amoral violence that is particularly unnerving. Violence already exists in 
that which facilitates Chigurh’s movements, but even more forcefully in 
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those actions, decisions, and structures that traumatically jolt this figure 
into action.  
It is because of this that the greatest act of violence within the 
context of this novel does not belong to Chigurh. The violence must be 
traced further back to Moss’s decision to exploit the violent carnage of the 
failed drug deal and take the blood stained money. It was not an act 
carried out blindly. He knew that the consequences of this act would be 
catastrophic. Yet it was not only the act of greed that sealed this fate, it 
was also bound up in an act of mercy and also one of ignorance (in failing 
to check for an electronic tracer in the bag). While returning in the early 
hours of the following morning with a jug of water for the last remaining 
witness (it is not clear if he even knew what his own intentions were), Moss 
is spotted by some of the people looking to reclaim the money (who have 
already killed the man that Moss felt compelled to return to). The violent 
consequences of his act only materialised because of his return to the 
scene. Moss was a man compelled beyond his own reason; on account of 
both taking the money and his return to check on the wounded man. He is 
divided between what he knows he should not do and what he is compelled 
to do all the same. There is a deeper violence here. A deeper wound that 
is intrinsically tied to Moss’s initial compulsion to take the money. 
In this sense, we are talking about the violence that is all around but 
scarcely acknowledged for how disturbing it is; in the same way as in the 
world of Blood Meridian, where a man can be killed and it is no more 
acknowledged than the spilling of a drink. Moss’s decision is less 
immediately disturbing, perhaps morally dubious and dangerous in the eyes 
of the reader, but does not strike with the immediacy that epitomises 
Chigurh. The crucial element is how this shifting of symbolic substance 
(the money), undoubtedly an act of greed, tears a hole in the fabric of his 
world. Chigurh is not a man with his own being; his actions are controlled 
by others, which begs the question, where are the roots of his violence? He 
is the mercenary par excellence. He only exists as a violent force because 
other subjects decide the course in which his body is propelled.  
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It was the curiosity, greed, and desire of Llewellyn Moss that 
initiated this hiring of Chigurh, yet for all the bodies that Chigurh left in 
his wake, Moss was killed by a Mexican drug gang. There is no deeper 
meaning that could justify this violence or bind it to any ethical or moral 
source. There is no divine justice or testing that reconciles the damage 
wrought in this world. It is the force with which he moves which is the 
most terrifying aspect of his character. There is no reason beyond 
coincidence of temporal and geographical site why many of his victims 
meet with this fate. He decides the fate of a shopkeeper and Carla Jean 
Moss, the wife of Llewellyn, on the toss of a coin; as if, in the absence or 
inconsistency of any other factors, the continuance of their lives must 
depend on something (akin to the chance which any movement of any 
object is accompanied by).  
He acknowledges that it was bad luck that got Carla into this and 
finds it to be fair, in a greatly ironic gesture, to give her this final toss of 
the coin. Chigurh's coin toss serves as a reminder of this lack of cosmic 
justice that he exploits. He makes it clear that there is no tribunal here 
that will make a moral judgement on guilt or innocence. Carla is killed 
because of a promise Chigurh made to her husband: if he did not return 
the money and offer up his life she would die. As if to emphasise the lack 
of justice in this scenario, all Chigurh offers for the hope of her life is the 
chance of a coin toss (a coin toss that replaces Moss’s eventual bargaining 
to save her life). After the coin toss decides her fate, she converses with 
Chigurh. 
 
You make it like it was the coin. But you’re the one. 
It could have gone either way. 
The coin didn’t have no say. It was just you. 
Perhaps. But look at it my way. I got here the same way the coin 
did. (258, emphasis added for Chigurh) 
 
Chigurh’s movement is like that of the coin. Even more unsettling than his 
brutal intrusions of physical violence is this lack of justice that surrounds 
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his actions. He is compelled to kill in the most efficient ways for no kind of 
tangible personal gain. Fellow mercenary Carson Wells attempts to 
explain: ‘[Chigurh] has principles, principles that transcend money or drugs 
or anything like that' (153). There is nothing personal in his violence, no 
subject-in-itself which desires love, vengeance, happiness, or any other 
typical human desire which drives behaviour. He will come to possess the 
money because that is where the actions of others have led him.  
He reveals his nature to Carla Jean before killing her. In explaining 
his apparent ruthlessness he explains, ‘even a nonbeliever might find it 
useful to model himself after God’ (256). He is not the moral God that is 
often imagined in Christianity. He is not impervious to injury or the 
consequences of the actions of others. When violence is used as a force in 
the pursuit of justice or personal gain it is done through a belief that the 
suspension of order is worth such action. Chigurh has no such interests. He 
suspends order simply because he is modelled after an amoral god. This 
draws him towards the figure of Yahweh. We can argue with Yahweh - 
bargain with Him as Abraham did over Sodom and Gomorrah - but in the 
end, as he makes known to Job and his accusers, he is beyond questioning. 
It is with this same force that when God entered Jonah’s life, his life 
ended. The circumstances were not of his making. We know of nothing that 
Jonah did to deserve this call. From that point onwards Jonah could not 
avoid his bad luck, no matter how hard he tried.21 Attempts to run landed 
him in the belly of a fish and attempts to bemoan his luck left him burning 
in the desert beside his destroyed vine. This tale of the profundity of luck 
and the troubling nature of divine “justice” has been told many times. 
Jonah shared the luck of Carla Jean. Chigurh explains the jagged edge of 
this reality: 
 
when I came into your life your life was over. It had a beginning, 
a middle, and an end. This is the end. You can say things could 
have turned out differently. They could have been some other 
                                                             
21 By “luck” here I mean the way in which Martha Nussbaum employs this term: ‘what 
happens to a person by luck will be just what does not happen through his or her own 
agency’ (1986: 3). 
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way. But what does that mean? They are not some other way. 
You’re asking that I second say the world. Do you see? (260) 
 
There is nothing you can do when this force enters your life, except 
perhaps hope that the coin falls in your favour. Being caught up in the 
narrative of some divine (or demonic) figure has no necessary relationship 
with any notion of justice.  
The boy that Ed Tom Bell had sent to the gas-chamber for killing his 
14 year old girlfriend was an anomaly; an empty vessel that no goodness 
could touch. He was a subject capable of such violence out of a simple 
desire to know what it was like to kill. Chigurh was more. A story told 
through the eyes of others and fully dependant on the bearers of those 
eyes. This is why he so often insisted that those he killed should look into 
his eyes. He had no personal desire to kill or not to kill, only to bring things 
to completion. A body of amorality set on a course by the actions of 
others. This should not be reduced to pure determinism; Chigurh does not 
kill Moss, there is always an alternative outcome. The decision, to be taken 
with a great burden of responsibility, takes place in a world of choice and 
chance. The question here relates to how much responsibility Moss has 
over his act of taking the money. Put differently, in what ways do we 
participate in violence?  
 
1.2 Symbolic Violence 
 
Lurking in the depths of No Country for Old Men is symbolic violence 
inherent to language that maintains a profound influence over the world. 
Even beyond the systemic violence that directs Chigurh’s force, there is 
the symbolic violence that creates and manipulates desire. A question at 
the heart of this investigation is: how do we acknowledge and subvert such 
violence? To begin to unpick this question we turn to a typical Žižekian 
provocation. 
When Žižek claims that ‘Gandhi was more violent than Hitler’ (2013, 
122; 2008b, 475), there can be little doubt that he knows the game which 
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he is playing. The insistence on this evaluation of violent force is designed 
to alert the masses of would-be revolutionaries to the power that resides 
in their collective force. He argues:  
 
Hitler staged a spectacle of Revolution so that the capitalist 
order could survive, in contrast to Gandhi, whose movement 
endeavoured to interrupt the basic functions of the British 
colonial state. (2008b, 475) 
 
Gandhi’s violence resisted involvement in physical outbursts of violence 
that would have attempted to destroy the bare life of the enemy. Instead 
he organised the subversion of the signs and systems which continued to 
support the functioning of the enemies of the cause he became caught up 
in. Gandhi’s revolutionary violence, in this sense, revealed the truth of 
British Imperialism: the image of the limit of its power was a masquerade 
that covered up its weaknesses. Gandhi sought to create a radical 
transformation within the Symbolic, while Hitler was merely propelled by 
the hideous underside of a wounded mentality that already existed.  
The problem, as Žižek well knows and as stated precisely by Jacques 
Ellul: ‘put Gandhi into the Russia of 1925 or the Germany of 1933. The 
solution would be simple: after a few days he would be arrested and 
nothing more would be heard of him’ (1969, 15). The situation was not 
dissimilar in the lands which Paul traversed in the century of the Christ-
event. Instead of disappearing, those who were subversive to authority 
were made into public spectacle. These warnings were a display of 
physical strength and a powerful symbol of domination. Žižek is playing 
with a distinctly Christian theme here; he is attempting to turn weakness 
into strength. 
A further problem with Žižek’s claim is that it is undermined by what 
he has written about the nature of violence. The violence carried out 
under the name of Hitler might not have been revolutionary in the same 
way as India’s movement for independence under Gandhi, but the 
extraordinary level of violence required in maintaining the status quo 
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cannot be ignored. His insistence that Hitler only operated reactively 
misses the point of how creative his violence had to be in order to assert 
his ideological dominance. It might have only exploited and upheld what 
already existed within the existing order, but the violence (systemic, 
symbolic, and subjective) that occurred between the early 1930s and mid-
1940s, centred in the Germanic regions and perpetrated under Nazi 
influence, cannot be matched by in terms of its destruction of life, 
twisting of identity, and machinery of control.  
 
1.2.1 Violence as a Work of Love 
 
Therefore it is important to clarify what is meant by claiming that the 
greatest representation of violence in No Country for Old Men is Moss’s 
decision to take the money. It is the chief moment of violent propulsion in 
the context of the novel and its effect on the symbolic and systemic 
mechanisms of its world. Otherwise, Chigurh or Mexican drug cartels could 
lay claim to this dubious honour. In this same way, Gandhi can only be 
considered to be more violent than Hitler in the context of revolutionary 
violence that occurs within the Symbolic Order – that is all (and it is even a 
disputable point in terms of his social attitudes). He managed to introduce 
a little bit of chaos into the existing order, revealing that it was not as 
powerful as it claimed.  
Žižek’s concern is with the forcing of a transformation within the 
Symbolic Order which revolutionises the situation. An idea that constantly 
re-appears in his work is that of the revolutionary who understands 
violence as a ‘work of love’ (2014b, 198). This idea is characterised in 
figures such as Christ and Che Guevara, who preached a connection 
between love and hatred. Citing Luke 14.26, Žižek uses the words of Jesus 
to demonstrate the violent necessity at the heart of a revolutionary 
fidelity: ‘whoever comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife 
and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be my 
disciple.’ Guevara’s belief that ‘a people without hatred cannot vanquish a 
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brutal enemy,’ is coupled with Žižek’s idea that, ‘the true revolutionary is 
guided by strong feelings of love’ (2014b, 198-199).  
At this juncture Žižek draws us towards a figure of violence in 
popular culture: Bane. As the main villain in Christopher Nolan’s The Dark 
Knight Rises (2012), the final of his trilogy of Batman films, Bane, a 
terrorist holding Gotham City to ransom, encapsulates this ‘authentic 
revolutionary love.’ 
 
It is violence as such (the violent gesture of discarding, of 
establishing a difference, of drawing lines of separation) which 
liberates. Freedom is not a blissful neutral state of harmony and 
balance, but the very violent act which disturbs this balance. 
This is why, back to The Dark Knight Rises, the only authentic 
love in the film is that expressed by Bane, the ‘terrorist,’ in 
clear contrast to Batman. (2014b, 200) 
 
Bane, a towering and brutish figure whose face is partly hidden behind a 
breathing apparatus which keeps him alive, is a murderer and a terrorist. 
The dedication to his cause of correcting humanity’s course leads him to 
indiscriminately kill not only the enemies of his cause but also any required 
collateral damage.  
This example further reiterates the problem in Žižek’s comparison 
between Hitler and Gandhi. The “correction” that Bane, inspired by a 
clandestine group called “The League of Shadows,” embarks upon is to 
return the world to a natural balance through disturbing its distortion. 
Violence is the means through which this correction, this return of natural 
order or justice, can occur. This, though, is the very same type of violence 
epitomised in the monstrous figure of Hitler. Despite his will to align 
Batman (Bruce Wayne) with the force that merely attempts to retain the 
existing order by violence if necessary, Bane is no more than a puppet of a 
similar will. He is interested in constructing a new world to replace the old 
world, which nevertheless is trapped within the same constraints. The 
interest is merely in a correction, not a transformation. This is the problem 
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with Žižek’s analysis: how can this type of love be defined in a way that 
avoids the logics of the dedication to Nazism? Žižek is not yet close enough 
to Paul here. As Brigitte Kahl points out, Paul was not interested in merely 
replacing ‘the Kingdom of Caesar with a counter Kingdom of God’ (2010, 
266). Paul’s love was in the service of a cause that would dissolve all such 
power.  
This still leaves us with a problem of the physical brutality that 
defends the symbolic violence behind its force. Ghandi’s revolutionary 
(symbolic) violence was remarkable, yet there have been many other 
nonviolent revolutionaries who have been silenced by physical force or 
swallowed into the mechanisms of a more powerful narrative. Nonviolence 
as an ethical stance has been a vital component of emancipatory 
movements, including in civil rights movements and struggles against 
political oppression. It is not a force that descends from outside, but a 
force involved within the very struggle for emancipation; it separates 
movements which actively seek to damage and destroy property and lives 
from those that participate in struggles where such physical damage is 
rejected in principle. Walter Wink says of Jesus’ direction to turn the other 
cheek, ‘the last thing the master wants is for the slave to assert equality’ 
(2002, 330). An important question is how do we develop this activity 
within this Symbolic frame? Is it possible, as Žižek argues, to participate in 
a nonviolent violence that is physically nonviolent but violent through its 
impact within the Symbolic Order?  
 
1.2.2 The Joker 
 
It should be of no surprise that Žižek chooses the grotesque figure of the 
Joker as the figure of truth in The Dark Knight (2008). The ‘supreme 
villain’ is also the only figure of truth (2011, 59). The resistance to any 
backstory, any reasoning why the Joker appeared as if out of nowhere, 
appeals to Žižek. In referring to the Joker’s mocking of the idea that there 
is some deeper trauma that caused his appearance, Žižek fully identifies 
the Joker with the mask he puts on: ‘there is no “ordinary guy” beneath it, 
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he is a man who is his mask’ (2011, 60). It is this absence of pretence that 
is attractive in the Joker. He is not interested in what a new world may 
look like; instead he only wishes to create chaos.  
In explaining the way in which he understands his role, the Joker tells 
a disfigured Harvey Dent, the District Attorney who was determined to rid 
Gotham City of its organised crime, the idea is to “introduce a little 
anarchy. Upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos. I'm 
an agent of chaos. Oh, and you know the thing about chaos? It's fair.” It is 
here that Žižek locates the (un)truth of the situation. Against Bruce 
Wayne/Batman and police commissioner Jim Gordon, who base their new-
found order on lies (covering up Harvey Dent’s descent into the murderous 
“Two-Face,” hiding the identity of Batman, and so on), the Joker wants to 
reveal the world as it is, without the façade that underpins order.  
The Dark Knight Trilogy illustrates a basic tension in Žižek’s work. 
This tension arises from Žižek’s particular analysis of the idea that, ‘one 
has to accept that the big Other doesn’t exist, and act upon it’ (2008b, 
299). In other words, the big Other, the totality of the Symbolic Order as 
understood by a subject, is not a metaphysically constituted order that 
defines truth. Indeed, it is only in the fleeting moments of chaos that truth 
“as such” can really exist. In this, Žižek creates the image of the ‘ethical 
monster without empathy’ as the true adherent of love (299). Bane acts 
out of a distorted and manipulated love propelling him towards an 
alternative established order. The Joker is demonstrating a purer version 
of this violence; he is a figure of pure anarchy. He simply wants to reveal 
the untruth of the Symbolic Order.  
It is in this sense that Žižek wishes us to see beyond the basic battle 
established by the heroes in Nolan’s Gotham City. The blame for that which 
Bruce Wayne wants to eradicate (crime, wrongdoing, and suffering) is 
pinned on individuals. It is the petty criminals, mob bosses, corrupt 
officials, and so on, that are responsible. Yet, as Žižek points out, the 
uncomfortable reality is that Wayne is a billionaire. The true secret behind 
Batman’s mask is that he is an ‘arms dealer and speculator’ (2014b, 197). 
In this way the films are ‘resuscitating the archetypal Dickensian trope of a 
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good capitalist who engages in financing orphanage homes (Wayne) versus a 
bad greedy capitalist’ (197). It does not question inequality behind crime; 
or, indeed, the likelihood that imprisoning every single criminal and corrupt 
official would simply allow others to rise in their place. The ideology is 
clear: only the morally righteous mega-rich can save the poor and the 
needy.  
There is something equally troubling in Žižek’s analysis. While The 
Dark Knight overplays the significance of the individual in ignorance of 
systemic violence, Žižek’s rhetoric runs the risk of downplaying the sanctity 
of the individual. This is epitomised in The Monstrosity of Christ, where he 
claims that given a particular situation he, ‘would be ready, without any 
moral qualms, to murder someone in cold blood’ (2009a, 302). As an 
example he claims he could murder discreetly the repulsive ‘figure of a 
doctor who helped the actual torturers conduct their business in the most 
efficient way’. In this case he could kill, ‘without a vestige of remorse,’ 
‘knowing that there was little chance of bringing him to legal justice.’ Yet 
what is at stake here is the emphasis on what impact is wrought within the 
Symbolic Order – to not be distracted from that ‘true locus of trouble’ 
(2008a, 11). 
 
1.2.3 Zero-Level Violence 
 
In the introduction to Mark Juergensmeyer’s exploration of Religious 
Violence Terror in the Mind of God, the scene of the aftermath of a 
suicide bombing by a Hamas militant in Jerusalem is described. This 
anarchic scene is contrasted with the almost surreal image of the symbol 
representing a McDonald’s restaurant in the background; bringing the 
religious extremism home as an ‘attack not only on Israel but on normal 
life as most people know it’ (2001, 3). What does it really mean for 
violence to strike normal life as most people know it?  Can we read this 
scene against Žižek’s claim that our tendency to judge violence in a 
situation against a stable, “normal,” understanding of a situation distracts 
us from the violence which exists at the zero-level? In this case there is an 
  Chapter One   55 
 
attempt, through violent rage and terror, to change the co-ordinates of 
the situation in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (or at least to strike out at 
the current situation). In this sense, violence already exists in what is 
perceived as this normal, non-violent level. Even in times of ceasefire the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict is violent within the symbolic and systemic 
mechanisms that sustain the conflict. As well as acting as an escalation of 
violence (and tremendous crimes in-themselves), explosions of physical 
force serve as a reminder of the violence that already exists. It is a 
reminder of that which already humiliates, violates, and sustains hatred. If 
this zero-level violence cannot be acknowledged and subverted can such a 
conflict be resolved (in any way that does not merely resort to an 
unprecedented escalation of physical violence)?  
 It can be easy to ignore the symbols of violence which hang above our 
lives as we look in terror at brutal acts of physical violence.22 This is the 
dangerous but important rhetorical game that Žižek plays with regards to 
violence. It is forcibly made easy to ignore the conflict minerals which 
pervade electronic devices, the inequalities that exist in the 
manufacturing of children’s toys, and the child trafficking involved in the 
production of confectionery. The immediacy of the suffering of others is 
hidden within systems that have little interest in making spectacles of 
these violations of basic human rights. As Stanley Hauerwas puts it, ‘our 
wealth makes us stupid just because it allows us to live in the world 
without learning the pain our wealth creates in our neighbours’ (2002, 
247). Violence which functions systemically relies on the manipulation of 
the signs and symbols that pervade our daily lives, proliferating its smooth 
functioning through attempting to disguise the injustices it produces.  
Jacques Ellul refused to acknowledge what he called ‘the classic 
distinction between violence and force,’ arguing, ‘it must be recognised 
that violence is to be found everywhere and at all times, even where 
people pretend it does not exist’ (1969, 84). Indeed, Žižek is already 
implicitly conjuring a spirit of Ellul in his analysis (who is merely attesting 
                                                             
22 In the case of McDonalds’s restaurants, the often brutal treatment of animals, humans, 
and resources are covered up in a haze of well-produced advertising campaigns.   
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to a tension which has already existed within Christianity). Both make an 
appeal to the idea of the sword which Christ spoke of in Matthew 10.34: 
this violence ‘is not a contention against flesh and blood, but against the 
powers’ (Ellul 1969, 161). 
Ellul promoted a theory of the violence of love - a spiritual violence 
which denounced physical and psychological forms of violence. One cannot 
fail to see a trace of Paul’s force in Ellul’s words; no less so because his 
words make us feel uneasy, dragging us towards death in the path of 
Christ. To fight against injustice means to accept suffering, and to have 
faith in the promise of God to bring about the Kingdom of God (which 
cannot be directly instituted through our own means – there is no replacing 
Caesar with a representative of God). Ellul argues: ‘faith in the 
resurrection – which is the supreme spiritual violence because it is victory 
over the necessity of death – excludes the use of every other violence’ 
(1969, 171). In other words, like Paul, our faith in Christ is a type of 
violence against that which opposes the promises of God. For Ellul this 
means resisting the totalising power of the state and any form of 
participation in its mechanisms; his discourse is one of an anarchist 
Christianity. For Žižek it is a type of materialist communism. The 
connection between the two is found in the weak violence that appears 
from an appeal to Pauline love.  
 
1.2.4 The Symbolic 
 
At the heart of this discussion is the idea of the Symbolic. What draws 
together Moss’s decision to take the money, Gandhi’s nonviolent 
resistance, and the Joker’s attempted anarchy is the way in which the 
world around their action is transformed. Paul’s articulation of the Christ-
event is bound up with a similar transformation of the Symbolic through 
transgressing the very idea of order that was propagated by the governing 
authorities. In order to move further into this question, of determining our 
influence over violent acts, we must look more closely at the relationship 
between the Symbolic and violence.  
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This idea of the Symbolic is perhaps most associated with Lacan’s 
triad of the Imaginary (that which deceives), the Real (the “impossible” 
that is prior to language), and the Symbolic (the net cast over the material 
world that determines perceptions of reality). Essential in this idea is the 
Symbolic Order - the totality of the representation that establishes value. 
Warren Breckman examines the “symbolic turn” in Adventures of 
the Symbolic. Charting this idea primarily through French and post-Marxist 
thought, he explains:  
 
I would propose the term symbolic turn as a better description of 
the loose set of affiliated ideas and approaches that characterise 
a broad range of thinkers who have stressed the 
noncorrespondence of words and things, the nontransparency of 
language, and the power of signs to constitute the things they 
purportedly represent. (2014, 11) 
  
Fundamental to this symbolic turn is the idea that the Real is always 
mediated by the Symbolic in the construction of language. In other words, 
signs and signifiers stand in for the objects, subjects, events, and so on, in 
the creation and manipulation of meaning. One way of relating this would 
be through Nietzsche’s famous assertion: “there are no facts, only 
interpretations.” Alternatively it could be related to the distinction 
between the noumenal (relating to the object-in-itself, its Real substance) 
and the phenomenal (the way in which an object is experienced, the 
Symbolic). Such theories, in their differing positions, converge on the idea 
that signifiers and that which they signify can never be fully reconciled.  
The symbolic turn emerges through Lacan’s Symbolic, Real, 
Imaginary triad, but also in Derrida’s deconstruction and difference 
(deconstruction is the Symbolic, in this sense). Ernst Cassirer, whose work 
revolved around this idea of the Symbolic, understood Symbolic activity as, 
‘the properly human mode of life’ (Breckman 2013, 20). It describes the 
way in which, ‘human beings construct reality through language, art, 
myth, religion, and science’ (Barash 2008, xii). Within perceptions of 
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reality there exist systems of signs and signifiers that allow interpretations 
to be constructed through mediums such as language and art. The way the 
world is deconstructed (through an automatic process) is different for each 
individual. In other words, everyone has their own symbolic universe. 
There are cultural, political, social, and religious markers which have 
a significant bearing on the creation of particular worldviews. The Bible is 
one such influence on symbolic fields of reference; others include the 
works of Plato, Augustine, Hegel, Marx, and Freud. Also, not forgetting, 
The Simpsons, the BBC, social media circles, and so on, which construct 
and manipulate the shaping of worldviews. Such historical and cultural 
artefacts have a profound impact on the construction of symbolic value, as 
do an infinite amount of other sources. The Symbolic Order and 
deconstruction are intrinsically, and sometimes violently, connected. 
Symbolic violence at its most powerful resides in that which we 
automatically process – the violence we do not even realise we participate 
in. 
There is discord between what is encountered and the meaning that 
it is given, and that discord is exploited. Symbolic violence can be situated 
in this exploitation, in the very way that perceptions are twisted. The Real 
represents events and objects outside, or prior to, their interpretation, 
while the Symbolic is created in the act of interpretation and 
manipulation. The tension between the Real and the Symbolic - or even 
what has yet to be realised, or inscribed, into the Symbolic (the Imaginary) 
- provides the space in which the potential for symbolic violence 
originates.  
The world is symbolically constituted. The Symbolic Order represents 
all that is within the symbolic world which is formed around us and 
through us. Meaning and power is formed therein, as Žižek exemplifies it: 
 
when we name gold 'gold,' we violently extract a metal from its 
natural texture, investing into it our dreams of wealth, power, 
spiritual purity and so on, which have nothing to do with the 
immediate reality of gold. (2008a, 52) 
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Breckman elaborates on this point, he writes: ‘even gold, often thought of 
as more ‘real’ than paper species, is already symbolic’ (2013, 21). We are 
bound to the ideas with which such resources are permeated. What the 
case of gold exemplifies is that the link to any intrinsic usefulness does not 
directly equate with the value it is given. Gold is a material which has 
some valuable purposes, including in medicine, but its market value is 
found in the representational nature of its value. The ways in which such 
practical uses are realised are less significant in the market than what 
purposes can be artificially generated. Cultural and historical imprints 
attached to popular consciousness generate a monstrous image of gold that 
goes far beyond its physical practicality. What we might term the link 
between the noumenal and phenomenal in “gold” - that is, the object-in-
itself and the way in which the object is experienced – is essential in 
understanding the way in which symbolic meaning and value is generated.  
This not overwhelmingly useful, albeit shiny, chemical element 
underscores the peculiar and volatile fault lines upon which monetary 
value, and with it the power over life, is based. Badiou, in The Century, 
makes this point, writing: 
 
how long can we accept the fact that what is needed for running 
water, schools, hospitals, and food for all humanity is a sum that 
corresponds to the amount spent by wealthy Western countries 
on perfume in a year? (2001, 8)  
 
The way in which value is attributed is based upon the image it can 
produce within the market economies. What we understand in gold is not 
only its yellow-green appearance or its chemical properties and practical 
usefulness, but to its symbolic value. Political discourses can become 
drawn into narratives that reflect the value of such farcical 
representations. The master-signifier “money,” in this way, has power 
over the processes of democracy. 
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  This creation of a new object out of another subject or object may 
be done with malicious intent, or, on the other hand, its effects on others 
may be completely unintentional. Its dissemination may be a founding 
point of injustice (as is, arguably, the case with “gold,” which only 
becomes malicious in its position within an economy) or it may be far more 
malicious in its intent; for example, the transformation of the Jewish 
subject into the image of “the Jew” that would become an object of 
legitimatised sacrifice. Each, though, originates from a position that is far 
removed from where it moves, tangled in a web from the original sin in 
which this creation derives. 
Žižek argues the consequences of the anti-Semitic image is that it 
becomes no longer possible to ‘distinguish between real Jews and their 
anti-Semitic image: this image overdetermines the way I experience real 
Jews themselves and, therefore, it affects the way Jews experience 
themselves’ (2008a, 57). This example, which is painfully pertinent 
example to Christianity and its relationship with “the Jews,” underlines 
the way in which symbolism inherent to language can have a dangerous 
influence on the Symbolic Order. 
This, in a very concrete way, is something in which we actively 
participate in (knowingly or otherwise). Examples of Symbolic violence are 
as wide ranging as propaganda that creates the image of the immigrant as 
the violent intruder, dolls which portray ethnically “African” males as sub-
human, the legal sanctioning of forced child marriages, and the 
perpetuation of language that marginalises sections of society, but also in 
the ideologies of economics and politics that might not immediately 
appear to have anything to do with what is usually imagined as violent. 
Symbolic violence occurs in the normalisation of that which oppresses 
and violates; political, societal, religious, and cultural pressures help to 
form this force. It also exists in the counter-violence of groups fighting to 
be free from oppression; in the art, language, and narratives created to 
strike out against their oppressors; the lasting impression of the language 
of the protests of May 1968 in France on Badiou’s thought, for example. 
This battle that constantly takes place within the Symbolic.  
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This is the violent tension between the Real, the Imaginary, and the 
Symbolic: between the world prior to interpretation, the world as it affects 
us, and the world as we give it meaning. Language, conventions, laws, and 
even architecture and art weigh upon the Symbolic Order and the potential 
for violence therein. Such artefacts become violent when they create or 
propagate conditions and situations that fuel conflict, division, 
exploitation, or revolutionary action. In the same sense that language can 
bring agreement and understanding, it can also create division and conflict. 
This violence is not merely something that is benign until actualised in a 
physical act – it is already destructing, corroding, and violating. Symbolic 
violence is to the Symbolic what physical violence is to the material world, 
yet they are interconnected, each affecting the other. 
Returning to No Country for Old Men, it is in this same way that there 
is no justification that underpins the violence of Chigurh. His purpose is not 
to direct action through corrective punishment or to test resolve in any 
way; he acts purely on the impulse created by what called him into the 
world (propelled by Moss’s transgression). The explanation of Carla Jean’s 
death is not that she deserved it or that it taught her some sort of lesson. 
She cannot call her fate into question or bargain for her life. All Chigurh 
can offer is the toss of a coin – there is no deeper meaning that can sway 
his hand. He kills Carla for no moral purpose. He brought a conclusion to 
what he saw as a collection of “small things.” Previous actions created the 
potential for Chigurh to strike. This potential could be negated at any 
point but not through any moral logic. Chigurh kills because the 
opportunity has been presented to him by the unfolding of creation. It is in 
this sense that Žižek states: ‘everything, every small thing that is, is a 
miraculous exception; viewed from the proper perspective, every normal 
thing is a monstrosity’ (2009c, 50). Everything given meaning in the 
Symbolic is a miraculous exception. There is no grand scheme holding 
meaning together. It is held together and torn and apart in the unfolding of 
creation. This creation is original sin.  
 
 
  Chapter One   62 
 
1.3 Job and the Divine Economy 
 
This chapter exists between the boundaries of two narratives: one is No 
Country for Old Men, and the other is Job. Herbert Schneidau 
appropriately calls the Book of Job, ‘in many ways the climax of the Old 
Testament’ (1976, 6). There is a move here away from the Hebrew 
Scriptures which signals a shift in the characterisation of Yahweh. The 
narrative moves away from any discernible justification of suffering in 
moral terms (which many of its characters attempt to force onto Job’s 
suffering).  
In this narrative, which has a jarring presence in the Old Testament 
canon between the earlier narratives and the following wisdom books, a 
‘blameless and upright’ (1.1) man called Job endures torment because the 
Lord declared its possibility. The theological explanations of his friends and 
accusers, who express ideas and themes that endure in Christian thought, 
are rejected by the Lord. The Lord, the monstrous yet beautiful Yahweh, 
informs Job that there is no reason for his suffering – at least, none that 
can be inscribed into his symbolic sphere of comprehension. There is no 
justification for the misery that befalls his life that he can understand, and 
he is correct to assert this against the accusations of his theological 
friends. Yahweh explains nothing beyond the fact that He is indeed God. 
Yahweh denies the legitimacy of the attempts to explain his suffering. In 
response to Yahweh’s bewildering but emphatic response (‘out of a 
whirlwind’) to his suffering, Job replies with unquestioning acceptance: ‘I 
know that you can do all things; no purpose of yours can be thwarted’ 
(42.2). Job acknowledges and accepts divine order.  
These categories of chaos and order are essential in Paul’s 
articulation of the Christ-event. Chaos is the nothingness from which 
creation appears; therefore it is only chaos, from a human perspective, 
that exists beyond the Symbolic (or, at least, chaos is what surrounds its 
boundaries). While order is established out of this emptiness, it can only 
ever pretend at divine order; which, from the human perspective, can only 
appear as chaos or mystery. 
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In this way, the end of this story, the epilogue in which Job’s fortunes 
are restored, should also be read as the return to the beginning of its 
narrative. Job once again awaits the destruction of all he knows, and that 
descent into suffering once more. Yet it is in the epilogue that Davis 
Hankins situates a hopeful message within this ‘fragmented and 
heterogeneous’ narrative (2015, 225). In this reading, through grasping a 
type of wisdom that is imminent but not merely human, Job is able to 
‘reorient himself out of an individual and toward a collective struggle’ 
(226). In this way, Hankins argues: ‘the legacy of Job is fundamentally a 
rejection of transcendence that nonetheless does not abandon all 
reference to transcendence’ (6). Job accepts that there is no explanation 
for the calamities that befell him; such is the separation between the 
divine and fallen worlds. He is only tasked continuing in the struggle of the 
collective. 
Žižek returns time and time again to Job, not as a story that re-
affirms sovereign power but one which undercuts it. Job’s refusal to 
accept the explanations of the reasons behind his suffering is met by God 
confirming this lack of truth. Yet it also forces God to reveal His own 
position – he is forced to justify Himself through this rebuke. It is here that 
we should locate the foundations of this divine economy – creation which is 
predicated not on the rule of God’s rule but His participation and 
vulnerability. God’s powerful response to Job is a cover for His impotency. 
God is trapped between forcing His power as a puppet master and 
watching the suffering of his creation knowing that His intervention would 
undermine the whole project of creation.  
Žižek latches onto this point in his Pauline reading of Job: ‘what if 
the horror of being an impotent witness to an event like the Holocaust, in 
which the world falls apart, is divine kenosis at its purest’ (2009b, 268). 
This reading of Yahweh’s reply to Job situates Him as the impotent 
onlooker who testifies to his power and transcendence only as a cover for 
his lack of relevance to Job’s suffering. It is precisely His denial of the 
accusations that situates Him outside of their world. 
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This follows René Girard in treating the prologue of Job with 
suspicion; as a later addition that attempts to make sense of Job’s 
suffering. In Girard’s reading Job is the victim and the scapegoat. His 
community has turned against him; he is ‘a statesman whose career has 
been destroyed’ (1987, 12) and God is powerless to do anything about it 
except restore Job’s fortunes. The ridiculous ending of narrative describes 
the Lord blessing Job with, ‘fourteen thousand sheep, six thousand camels, 
a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand donkeys’ (42.12). The cycle is 
reset and Job is returned to the beginning of the narrative as if nothing 
happened.  
Whether Girard’s particular narrative overlaying to imagine a story of 
a master turned scapegoat is faithful to the original narrative is less 
important than the crux of his point: Job is innocent of the accusations 
charged against him by Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. Girard concludes: ‘Job 
proves that justice does not hold sway in the world’ (1987, 155). The 
ending of Job reiterates this point. The divine attempt to redress the 
balance, after Job accepts that there was no reason for his suffering, only 
reasserts that His power can only appear as impotent. Žižek makes a 
similar point in the documentary The Pervert’s Guide to the Cinema (2006) 
in a theory of the way in which female sexual fantasies are better than 
their male counterparts. The male attempt to physically assert dominance 
is only a sign of weakness; he does not have the influence he actually 
desires. Therefore, in this sense, it is only through his full submission to 
the physical dominance of the female that he has any real power. The 
female now has the power only because it has been gifted to her (at least 
in the mind of the male). 
This is what God achieves in his participation in creation through 
Christ. He takes on the weak position in order to claim a position of power; 
rather like the submissive sexual partner who is only weak because he 
chooses to be weak. It is this choice which ultimately gives him the control 
over the situation – even if it is a perversity. 
Sandor Goodhart’s reading of the Job follows Girard who, he claims, 
understands this story more as a Greek tragedy than holding to the 
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‘scriptural dynamics of the Hebrew Bible’ (2011, 329). Making the 
observation, ‘what the book of Job reveals to us is simply that there is no 
rational way of explaining evil’ (335), Goodhart takes an ethical lesson 
from this narrative: it is not about a God who punishes but instead, ‘a God 
who confers complete responsibility for our own actions… the individual 
who gives up the perspective of a child and assumes upon his shoulders the 
responsibility for full consciousness’ (351). There is an echo here of Paul’s 
words to the Church in Corinth about putting an end to childish ways (1 Cor 
13:11). With such a revelation of truth comes an almost overpowering 
sense of responsibility. Goodhart picks this up, in a similar way to 
Critchley’s Levinasian reading of Paul, when he writes of the message of 
Job: 
 
yes I have to be responsible for what I never did, what I could 
not have done, what I never consented to, what was even 
beyond my power to do. I have to be responsible, in other words, 
infinitely. (2011, 339) 
 
Paul’s God suffered with us in Christ. This was the moment when Paul 
realised the same thing as Job: the God who gives blessing to one and not 
the other is not his God. Ultimately the calamities that befall Job are the 
consequences of creation revealed in double kenosis. As Žižek puts it, ‘God 
doesn’t give what he has, he gives what he is, his very being….his whole 
wealth is already out there, in creation’ (2009a, 59).  
 
1.3.1 The Man Who Was Thursday 
 
This link between a mysterious divine figure, which is both present and 
absent, and the infinite responsibility of the individual in the collective 
brings us to G.K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare. 
This is a story that feeds upon connections between violence and distorted 
perceptions of truth. Set in the early twentieth century, this tale of 
anarchists and secret policemen explores the confusion and angst 
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experienced by those who search for truth in the midst of a world in which 
chaos and order struggle to find a harmonious balance. Gabriel Syme, the 
protagonist experiencing this tumultuous battle between chaos and order, 
is thrown into an adventure where he is both (and neither) an anarchist 
and a policeman at the same time (propelled by a meeting with a poet in 
London’s Saffron Park). The poet and apparent anarchist, Lucian Gregory, 
turns his attention to the straight-laced Syme: 
 
“An artist is identical with an anarchist,” he cried. “You might 
transpose the words anywhere. An artist is an artist. The man 
who throws a bomb is an artist, because he prefers a great 
moment to everything. He sees how more valuable is one burst 
of blazing light, one peal of perfect thunder, than the mere 
common bodies of a few shapeless policemen. An artist 
disregards all governments, abolishes all conventions. The poet 
delights in disorder only. If it not so, the most poetical thing in 
the world would be the Underground Railway.” (6-7) 
 
Syme retorts: “every time a train comes in I feel that it has broken past 
batteries of besiegers, and that man has won a battle against chaos.” (17) 
This is the battle between the forging of the Symbolic and the chaos that 
threatens to interrupt its functioning. 
Recruited by a mysterious figure at Scotland Yard, Syme believes he 
is a secret policeman who has infiltrated a group of anarchists led by the 
equally mysterious figure “Sunday” (Gregory, as it happens, is unknowingly 
part of the same ruse). Each member of the anarchist group is given the 
name of a day of the week. Syme is assigned the name Thursday and 
embarks upon his secret mission to uncover the other members of the 
group and their destructive plans. The twist is that each member believes 
they are on this very same mission, each attempting to uncover the truth 
behind the schemes of the others.  
What they discover is that this truth does not exist. As they traverse 
northern Europe, chasing one another, they are manipulated by the 
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“grotesque yet beautiful” Sunday. Beginning to realise the nature of the 
ruse, their attention turns to this enigmatic leader. Upon tracking him 
down he again disrupts their expectations. Their names are revealed to 
represent the days of creation, with the imperious figure of Sunday as 
creation itself (God at rest). The puppet master pulling the strings is 
revealed as the figurehead of both chaos and order who threw himself into 
His own creation. The frantic search for truth only ends in a mystery which 
is paradoxically reassuring in its reception. The truth, in the end, Syme 
‘could not remember having come to at all,’ yet he felt ‘an unnatural 
buoyancy in his body and a crystal simplicity in his mind’ (114). He does 
not know exactly what it is, but he knows he played his part in it. He 
comes to consciousness as a subject on the other side of the same coin as 
Llewelyn Moss; as part of an interconnected creation between order and 
chaos. 
Summarising what is expressed in this novel is not an easy task. The 
dream-state conclusion will surely perplex anyone who has not experienced 
what Syme and the others experienced. What they discovered was that 
truth cannot be expressed; it can only be experienced, grasped, and 
accepted. The sense of bewildered clarity that Syme feels is only gained 
through accepting his uncertainty. In taking the doubt expressed by 
Chesterton in this novel a step further, this melding of doubt and faith is 
precisely the atheist Christian position that Žižek takes up.  
 
God is no longer the miraculous exception which guarantees 
the normality of the universe, the unexplainable X who enables 
us to explain everything else. On the contrary, He Himself is 
overwhelmed by the over brimming miracle of creation. 
(2009c, 50) 
 
With a striking resonance here with the Book of Job, the search for 
ultimate truth ends in God being God. God’s revelation of truth is also a 
negation of truth. Therefore, ultimately, the search for truth can only take 
us back to the chaos of the created world. Sunday reminds the group of his 
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participation in what he created. Echoing Christ’s challenge to his 
disciples, Chesterton places on the lips of Sunday the words: ‘Can ye drink 
of the cup I drink of’ (114). Even God understood that the truth was only 
that which he participated in. 
Violence, therefore, is forced in the imposition of truth, or natural 
law, which does not realise its own untruth. The Symbolic Order maintains 
violence through assimilating ideas of absolute truth into the reception of 
reality. This, as Syme discovered, belies the “truth” of the situation: 
absolute truth cannot exist in the world as we understand it. Truth can 
only be participated in through the particularity of the situation.  
Žižek argues that by the end of this novel we realise that ‘the highest 
crime is law itself’ (2009c, 41). The “universalised crime,” including 
property itself, goes unnoticed under the law itself. This is what Žižek 
understands as the revelation at the heart of Christianity.  
 
Only by falling into His own creation and wandering around in it 
as an impassive observer can God perceive the horror of His 
creation and the fact that He, the highest law-giver, is Himself 
the supreme criminal. (2014a, 27) 
 
It was only through this participation in the world that Christ reversed the 
violence that is inherent to claims of natural truth (and inherent to “God” 
as such). This is why Christ dies in the lowest place in the order of law - 
the Roman cross. Christ undermines the Roman legal order that aligned 
truth and justice with the highest governing authority. The nature of this 
authority is undermined. Ultimate meaning, the narrative that holds sway 
over even life and death, is only an illusion. No king or emperor has ever 
been a God, and no truth has ever been absolute, but their power is real. 
Here is the difficulty: can the idea of kenosis that Žižek takes from Paul 
ever be more than a trick that occurs within the Symbolic? 
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1.3.2 Philippians 2.6-11: Christ’s Self-emptying 
 
And thus only, “wo Es war, soll Ich werden,” that is, an 
eschatic Adam all  the more beyond old or new for being 
without precedent in the light of that eschatic wording of the 
world and worlding of the word whose kenotic event is called 
the Christ. And who — if it is true that God gave his only Son 
only because he so loved the world — speaks and thus entrusts 
the world with God. (Vahanian 2012, 52) 
 
Gabriel Vahanian’s articulation of kenosis, the flesh becoming Word in the 
‘self-emptying design of the divine into the human’ (2012, 40), puts the 
weight of responsibility onto those who have the ability to participate in 
language. Vahanian puts it this way: 
 
linguists do talk of the primacy of the signifier over the 
signified. Could it be that Paul has already discovered this, 
yet without understanding it as implying any eclipse of the 
Other by the other in terms of which the self comes into its 
own? (2012, 50) 
 
The significance of God is taken away from attempting to break through to 
some true understanding of the signified (God) and given to the signifier 
(Christ), who does not merely reveal God’s nature but reveals that God can 
only be related to through participation in creation. God could only reveal 
himself in His self-emptying of his own divinity through human flesh. In 
Philippians 2.6-11, Paul outlines his ‘master story’ (Gorman 2009, 2). In 
this passage he reveals the underpinning of the messianic narrative that 
has consumed his being.23  
The death of Christ on the cross, the centre point in Paul’s narrative, 
‘repeats Job’s stance, it refuses any deeper “meaning” that obfuscates the 
                                                             
23This work follows the chiasmic structure of the portion of text (see Fisk 2006), verses 9-
11 provide a ‘measure of balance’ to 6-8 (49). These ideas of God and divine economy 
intersect in the idea of Christ on the cross.  
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brutal reality of historical catastrophes’ (Žižek 2009a, 54-55). Christ’s 
emptying out of his divinity, taking on the form of a slave, was taken to a 
point of obedience to the point of execution at the hands of that which he 
created. Christ signifies the God in rags who took on the lowest form in 
order to suffer with His creation. In this we are left with ‘Christ as a weak 
God, a God reduced to a compassionate observer of human misery’ (55). 
God participates in creation through Christ, subverting the law through 
becoming a curse. God submits himself to His creation; retaining his power 
yet changing the way in which that power is understood. The greater point 
of division between Žižek and Paul can be found here. While Žižek sees 
God as doubting His own existence, essentially leading to Christian 
atheism, Paul has no problem with the paradox of the God who gave up his 
power (Paul is a faithful slave of both Yahweh and the Messiah, which he 
summarises in the statement “Christ is Lord”).24 Yet they converge on this 
same point: the power of the divine comes through undermining order 
itself (chaos colliding with order).  
 Philippians 2.6-11 forms the centre of what Paul now understands as 
the nature of the divine economy. Stephen Fowl aligns this passage with, 
‘God’s plan for the world’ (2005, 90) that had been revealed through the 
Christ-event. Paul believed, as with the way in which the Christ-event 
transformed his life, this should ‘lead the Philippians… to adopt a specific 
set of values’ (90). Inherent to these values was the idea that if even 
Christ put the concerns of others first, then that is precisely what his 
followers should do. Fowl writes: 
 
in a world such as our own and Paul’s where power is 
manifested in self-assertion, acquisition, and domination, 
Christ reveals that God’s power, indeed the triune nature, is 
made known to the world in an act of self-emptying. (96) 
 
                                                             
24 Käsemann notes Paul’s disinterest in the works and deeds of the historical Jesus: ‘The 
hymn to Christ in Phil. 2.6ff. contains no direct historical reminiscence, but is a variation 
on the theme of the redeemer who descends from heaven and returns there. The 
scantiness of Paul’s Jesus tradition is surprising in general, but his silence here, where he 
is so deeply engaged, is positively shocking’ (1971, 49). 
  Chapter One   71 
 
Through this self-emptying, ‘Christ is actually displaying the form of God, 
making the glory of God manifest to humans’ (96). Christ was subject to 
the same divine economy Paul espoused in Romans 13 that emphasised the 
importance of becoming a slave for one another. Michael Gorman calls 
Paul’s description of Christ’s self-emptying and self-humbling, ‘a robust 
metaphor for total self-abandonment and self-giving’ (2009, 21). This 
forged a new order in the community of believers.  
 In a move that draws this passage alongside Girard’s Hellenistic 
reading of Job, Bruce Fisk aligns Paul’s idea of kenosis in Philippians with 
the great tales of descent and ascent told in Greek literature. The 
difference in The Odyssey of Christ is that except for Christ, ‘no hero in 
our secular corpus ever chooses to step down into humiliation’ (2006, 65). 
The story of Christ goes beyond that which is told through Job. It is Christ, 
sharing equality with God, who undergoes the suffering and exposure of 
being subjected to the divine economy.  
Stephen Evans relates this movement from privilege to slavery to 
those who entered into the Civil Rights movement in the United States in 
the 50s and 60s. There were those, ‘who gave up positions of privilege and 
power to live in poverty,’ in order to, ‘share in the struggle and participate 
in the demonstrations’ (2006, 6); in other words, to participate in truth.  
 Christ’s death of the cross provided a symbol of his participation in 
the same struggle that the church in Philippi were enduring. The act of 
being crucified was one of humiliation at the hands of Roman Power, but 
the message of the resurrected messiah was this: ‘Rome cannot make 
Christ its victim’ (Fowl 2005, 99). In a play for a type of weak power, Paul 
positions Christ - who Rome failed to make a victim out of - as Lord over 
life and death. As Fowl puts it, ‘these verses account for the nature and 
scope of Christ’s dominion in ways that make it impossible for one also to 
acknowledge Caesar’s claim to dominion’ (2005, 105). What mattered 
within this divine economy was only the imitation of that self-giving and 
self-emptying which Christ had displayed. The love for the neighbour that 
fulfilled the law thus became the centre point of Paul’s life as a follower 
of Christ. 
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Žižek here argues that God ‘comes to share Job’s astonishment at the 
chaotic madness of the created universe’ (2009c, 48). In this sense 
Christianity is an exception among the major world religions as, ‘it enacts 
the reflexive reversal of atheist doubt into God Himself’ (44). Remaining 
after the crucifixion is not the God who is in control; the God that gives 
meaning to events and justifies suffering, in the way that Job’s accusers 
would have it, is dead (indeed, He never existed). Given new life through 
the Holy Spirit, it is the community of believers who now carry the 
ultimate responsibility for the fate of God. Christ’s submission to creation, 
according to Žižek, repeats this stance by denying God the position of 
puppet-master. It is here that the crux of Žižek’s Pauline theology is 
situated. 
 
There is now no way back; all there is, all that “really” exists is 
from now on individuals; there are no Platonic Ideas or 
Substances whose existence is somehow “more real.” What is 
sublated in the move from Son to Holy Spirit is thus God Himself: 
after crucifixion, the death of the incarnated God, the universal 
God returns as a Spirit of the community of believers, that is, He 
is the one who passes from being a transcendent substantial 
Reality to a virtual/ideal entity which exists only as a 
“presupposition” of acting individuals. (2009c, 57)  
 
This does not, however, mean that all resistance moves from totalising 
explanations to individual resistance. Žižek is not positioning this 
participation as situated only particular sites of resistance, but 
emphasising the power of the community of the Holy Spirit. In this he 
acknowledges the death of God only in His return through the collective.  
 Kenosis marks the death of the authoritarian God; this shifts 
authority into the hands of the collective through their interpretations. For 
Vattimo this means ‘the disappearance of a unitary sense of history, 
conceived as objective rationality’ (2004, 52). Instead we are left with a 
living and breathing hermeneutics from which weak authority appears. In 
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Hermeneutic Communism, written jointly by Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, 
a reference is made to a critique of “weak thought” made by Žižek: 
 
the era of big explanations is over, we need "weak thought," 
opposed to all foundationalism, a thought attentive to the 
rhizomatic texture of reality; in politics too, we should no longer 
aim at all-explaining systems and global emancipatory projects; 
the violent imposition of grand solutions should leave room for 
forms of specific resistance and intervention. (Vattimo 2011, 3-
4) 
 
Of course, there is a punchline: ‘...if the reader feels a minimum of 
sympathy with these lines, she should stop reading and cast aside this 
volume.’25 Vattimo and Zabala make their riposte to Žižek's critique 
through a theory of hermeneutic communism. They write: ‘while 
communism motivates the resistance to capitalism’s inequalities, 
hermeneutics intervenes indicating the interpretive nature of truth,’ which 
means 'restricting communism to its social function’ (2011, 4-5).  
In resisting the capitalist ideology inherent to framed democracy, 
Vattimo promotes the idea of an anchor which resists the fanatical dreams 
of vengeance and the will for power that has defined communist 
projects.26 Hermeneutics provides the (non)principle on which a 
specifically social communism can be founded. The disinherited of 
capitalism, or the remnant, can only gain a proper voice after the end of 
metaphysics; the disavowal of the truth claims which underpin power. 
Hermeneutics ‘struggles for conflicts of interpretations’ (2011, 6) which 
attempt to avoid a single interpretation that maintains a dominance over 
the symbolic structure of thought. Alternative visions of the political 
arrangements of the world are often dismissed or called a fantasy, but 
Vattimo and Zabala argue that such visions are possible. 
                                                             
25 See also Žižek 2008b, 1. 
26 They define framed democracies as: ‘a conservative moralized order where the 
democratic is only what legally enters the established order of metaphysics’ (2011, 19) 
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 A theory of love is central to the theory of hermeneutic communism. 
It is here that Vattimo and Zabala make the assertion that, ‘in a 
Nietzschean-Christian style, one could say: now that God is dead and the 
absolute truth is not credible anymore, love for the other is possible and 
necessary’ (2011, 112). Vattimo positions love as the weak force that has 
survived through Christianity to be revealed as its proper legacy – made 
possible in the advent of secularism.  
The only truth revealed to us by Scripture, the one that can 
never be demythologised in the course of time – since it is not an 
experimental, logical, or metaphysical statement but a call to 
practice – is the truth of love, of charity. (2005, 51) 
Vattimo understands this weak thought inherent to this love as the best 
response we have to the violence of framed democracies which creates 
divisions, destroys valuable resources, privatises that which should be 
common, and distorts how value is understood.  
 Paul’s resistance to the world as it was can be situated in between 
the visions of Vattimo and Žižek. Christ’s struggle is not only the solidarity 
of a God with His people, but also a sign of the imminent end of the world 
in its current form. Designed not only to find specific sites of resistance, 
the project of the Christ-event would culminate with the forcing of this 
conclusion. God had been emptied into the world, but this would act as 
the vehicle for His return to absolute sovereignty.  
 
1.3.3 Measure for Measure 
 
The paradox of Paul’s theology is that the sovereign God controlling 
creation is also found as the Messiah suffering at the hands of this creation. 
These seemingly opposing ideas are intertwined in Pauline theology. 
Yahweh and Christ seem like opposing figures, but in Paul’s thought they 
appear as one. For Paul, what occurs in the Christ-event is a re-ordering 
that reveals God’s power in his very weakness. In this twisting of order, the 
burden of responsibility is placed on individuals and communities whose 
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actions have far-reaching consequences. The question remains as to why a 
God would hand himself over to His own creation, what type of game is at 
play here? There is something vital here in the economy of weakness and 
power inherent to the narrative of Job. In response to the situation, 
Yahweh retorts: 
 
“Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook 
    or press down his tongue with a cord? 
 Can you put a rope in his nose 
    or pierce his jaw with a hook? 
 Will he make many pleas to you? 
    Will he speak to you soft words? 
 Will he make a covenant with you 
    to take him for your servant forever?” (Job 41.1-4) 
 
Within Yahweh’s powerful response to Job is a sign of His weakness. There 
is something that His awe-inspiring retort to Job and his accusers, claiming 
ultimate power over all things, cannot disguise: a God who must force His 
creation to do His will undermines the significance of this creation. This 
revelation is crucial to Christianity and key to Paul’s struggle with the 
significance of the Christ-event.  
There is one final caveat to be outlined before leaving this chapter: is 
all this talk of God’s weakness merely a trick? God’s descent into that 
which he has dominion over goes further than that of Duke Vincentio in 
Measure for Measure. The Duke of Vienna disguises himself as a friar in 
order to observe his city from within. He leaves a judge, Angelo, in charge 
while he is away. With the city in his charge, Angelo sentences a young 
man named Claudio to death for having sex with Juliet outside of marriage 
(despite this only being due to a technicality in their marriage). In order to 
free Claudio, his sister Isabella pleads with Angelo. In his lust for Isabella, 
Angelo agrees to spare Claudio’s life in exchange for her virginity. On the 
instruction of the Duke, who is disguised as Friar Lodowick, Mariana (whom 
Angelo rejected marrying due to her dowry being lost) takes Isabella’s 
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place in a “bed trick.” In darkness she sleeps with Angelo, making him 
think it is Isabella. On failing to keep his word, and reiterating his call for 
Claudio’s head, Lodowick arranges the “head trick,” whereby a 
replacement head is presented to Angelo. Eventually Lodowick reveals 
himself to be the Duke, reasserting his rule (which he had not ever really 
given up). The ruler in rags remains a ruler, and only reiterates his rule 
through appearing to give it up.  
Christ takes this trick a stage further. Indeed it is only through taking 
on the form of a slave and humbling himself that his power can take shape. 
Put differently, God can only really have power within the symbolic system 
of representation. It is within this system that power resides. Christ had to 
disrupt the existing order from within its mechanisms of domination.   
It is here that the potential for violence exists. As Chigurh revealed 
as a reflection of the world, the foundations of his violent force are forged 
in the symbolic and systemic excess of creation. The task of preventing this 
violence is in changing the narrative that drives Chigurh. For Paul this 
meant the Messiah had turned the tables on the Symbolic Order. God’s 
power is reasserted within the eschatological “now-time” that had arrived. 
The nature of the divine economy had shifted. Love became the 
revolutionary action that could overturn the dominance of the powers that 
crucified the Lord, but it, all the same, relies on this trick of fiction.  
This brings us to the idea of divine violence; not a sign of God’s 
authority but of participation in the world. This is a divine economy that is 
driven not by the will of a transcendent being, but in the actions of 
individuals within this unstable economy.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Divine Violence 
 
2.1 Yahweh  
 
God bursts into existence as a figure out of the divine; as an articulation of 
the unknowable Real. The pivotal moment in the Pauline narrative comes 
through His descent into creation through Christ. God’s intervention in 
Biblical texts so often appears as a violent force, whether physically 
destructive or through a reshaping of the situation it encounters. This is 
usually typified as an expression of events that have spun rapidly out of 
control; of God failing to turn back His wrath. Signifying an ‘irruption of 
the Real in the Symbolic’ (Pound 2008, 39), divine violence disturbs the 
truth of the situation in which it is generated.27 This chapter seeks to draw 
a distinction between the divine and fallen worlds in much the same way 
as Žižek follows Lacan in marking out the separation between the Real and 
the Symbolic. 
Divine violence is not understood here as a divine being executing 
wrath out of His own free will, and also not as the intervention of a god 
guaranteeing historical consistency and movement towards an end point in 
history. Instead, divine violence signifies a moment when the Symbolic 
substance of truth ceases to be replicated. It is a blinding light or a gaping 
hole that appears, without warning, in the fabric of the Symbolic Order 
(revealing its pretence at truth). This violence, found in the foundations of 
transformative events, creates raw points of rupture which allows the 
possibility of a new experience of truth to unfold in the community faithful 
to its appearance. Created out of an excess over and above the 
nothingness (static, controlled knowledge) found in the void, it intervenes 
in the revelation that something else exists beyond the fixed state of 
                                                             
27 Marcus Pound (2008) gives a critical overview of Žižek’s theory of divine violence. He 
makes the important distinction that this is not a divine force simply intervening from the 
outside, but a force that is forged from within the Symbolic. 
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knowledge which holds us in its trance, violently disturbing dominant 
understandings of history.28 
Let us suppose, then, that there exists an excess which is 
unaccountable in the expectations of the narratives that shape our 
symbolic fields. One way in which this excess presents itself is through this 
divine “pure” violence; amoral, without personal fidelity, without desire. 
Such violence is formed in an excess created by a culmination of activity 
within the Symbolic. Signified here is the absence of the big Other; the 
absence of ultimate meaning. It is a reminder of the instability inherent to 
all power. As such, divine violence is a constant feature of history which 
becomes dramatized in theologico-political narratives. As a rupture in 
norms that hold worldviews together, it emerges out of an accumulation of 
actions and occurrences. When its appearance has passed, history, often 
violently, is reclaimed from its grasp in the form of law-creating “mythic” 
violence. It is divine violence which Žižek looks to as the force which might 
reveal the symbolic and systemic violence inherent to dominant systems of 
political and economic control; and it is Paul who lurks in the background 
of his interpretation of this force.  
 
2.1.1 Paul’s Yahweh: The Hardening of Pharaoh’s Heart 
 
At midnight the LORD struck down all the firstborn in the land of 
Egypt, from the firstborn of Pharaoh who sat on his throne to the 
firstborn of the prisoner who was in the dungeon, and all the 
firstborn of the livestock.  Pharaoh arose in the night, he and all 
his officials and all the Egyptians; and there was a loud cry in 
Egypt, for there was not a house without someone dead. (Ex. 
12.29-30) 
 
                                                             
28 It is in this sense that Badiou identifies nothingness with both nihilism and the death 
drive (1993:34). Nothingness, in this sense, is found in the empty language that resists the 
transformation of a situation. He sets the revelation of truth against the desire for 
nothingness that blocks the ‘possibility of the impossible’ that founds ‘an ethics of truth’ 
(39).  
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In the story of the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt, Yahweh makes a numbers 
of ruthless and downright vicious interventions. Not only does He kill the 
entirety of Egypt’s first born, He hardens Pharaoh’s heart to ensure this 
cruel act of terror will transpire. Paul refers to this troubling story in his 
letter to a group of Christ’s followers in Rome. 
 
What then are we to say? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no 
means! For he says to Moses, 
 
“I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, 
and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.”  
 
So it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who 
shows mercy. For the scripture says to Pharaoh, “I have raised 
you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so that 
my name may be proclaimed in all the earth.” So then he has 
mercy on whomever he chooses, and he hardens the heart of 
whomever he chooses. (Rom. 9.14-18) 
 
There is an echo of Job’s God in Paul’s letter. As he puts it, ‘who indeed 
are you, a human being, to argue with God?’ (Rom. 9.20). Paul is not 
explaining that we are merely chess pieces of a god who is playing a game, 
but rather that this divine power is beyond our ability to wield. It is 
mysterious, complex, and at times even vicious. Yet this positioning of 
divine power beyond our comprehension was also a stinging riposte to the 
Roman authorities who directly aligned themselves with such power. They, 
like Pharaoh, did not have the power that they claimed. This did not mean 
that Paul believed the world to be devoid of divine power; rather, as he 
said to the church in Philippi, ‘it is God who is at work in you’ (Phil. 2.13).  
Paul and many of his contemporaries were bound up in questions 
about the nature of divine power. There was a weight of captivity upon 
those who aligned themselves in the service of God’s plan for creation. 
God in all His might, however, had not freed them from successive rule 
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under foreign powers. These questions, which are embedded in the 
histories of the Hebrew Scriptures, were vital for Paul. This was a story 
told and re-told through the Hebraic traditions: humankind’s susceptibility 
to the power of sin had halted the fulfilment of God’s promises (Rom. 
15.7-13). Paul’s self-proclaimed former zeal for the traditions of his 
ancestors indicates his own motivation to adhere to God’s plan for creation 
(Gal. 1.14). His call to follow Christ ushered in a radical new direction in 
this plan as an apostle of Christ to the Gentiles. The impact of his collision 
with the event of Christ’s death and resurrection altered the contexts and 
scope of his mission, but it did not alter its central thrust: playing his part 
in the reconciliation of man with God. Put differently, Paul’s active role 
was in the subversion of the powers that would seek to put God’s people, 
and purposes, under captivity (2 Cor. 10.3-6).  
The claim here is that Paul’s Jewish-messianic vision was rooted in a 
form of theologico-political disappointment. This disappointment led Paul 
to promote a weak messianic violence that was epitomised in the 
proclamation of Christ as Lord - the crucified slave and Yahweh as part of 
the same body, radically shifting the dynamics of theologico-political 
power.  
What did not disappoint Paul were his own attempts to follow the law 
- in which he was without flaw (Phil. 3.6). Instead, it originated in 
creation’s deviation from God’s purposes. From Pharisaic Jew to apostle of 
Christ, Paul perceived a frustration building in the divine sphere. The 
revelation of Christ, with its welcoming of the Gentiles into the fold, 
declared that the time for God’s plan to be fulfilled had arrived. It began 
in the influences of Jewish communities and sects that were entrenched in 
disappointment; in particular for Paul, the Pharisaic tradition which acted 
with an acute awareness of the responsibility of protecting God’s promises 
through the law. This promise, as revealed through Abraham, was being 
held captive and distorted by forces with little concern or interest in His 
law or its purposes.   
Paul’s mission, we can only assume, also ends in some measure of 
disappointment, in imprisonment and execution in Rome without any 
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longer carrying expectations of his mission being fulfilled before his death. 
He is a peculiar hero of continental thought in both his immediate context 
and in his image as the founder of Christianity; a failure in his own 
mission, only to be resurrected as the hero of a religious monster.29 Buried 
somewhere in this textual rubble, Badiou and Žižek are among those who 
believe they have found a revolutionary figure who not only survives the 
monster of Christianity but undercuts many of its pronouncements. 
Furthermore, far from being connected only to religious concerns, Neil 
Elliot echoes Jacob Taubes claims that Paul’s letters were ‘a declaration 
of war on Caesar’ (Elliot 2008, 61).30 Paul’s language becomes, in this 
context, that of resistance to the rulers and powers who stood in the way 
of the fulfilment of God’s law (Rom. 8.38-39).  
A message which was central to Paul’s ministry, and one which has 
always been emblematic of Christian causes, is that Christ came not as the 
war leader or violent rebel; instead, this Messiah, through his resurrection, 
after a public execution, subverted the idea that the Roman Empire had 
the monopoly of power over life and death. This was a messianic figure 
who attempted to radically transform the theologico-political situation, 
not through brute force but through physically peaceful means. With this 
messianic proclamation, Paul disturbed the political framework of the 
Roman Empire. Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection had revealed to Paul 
the foolishness of a worldly wisdom that proclaimed a partiality on the 
part of God. No ruler could ever claim equality with God, only Christ, who 
died as a slave on the cross, demonstrating this power through the 
resurrection. The Christ-event created a rupture in the reality of those 
who became entangled in its unfolding. It is this rupture that removes, 
even for a moment, the semblance of the Symbolic Order, and Paul’s 
articulation of this Event makes him a vital figure for thinkers such as 
Žižek and Badiou. 
                                                             
29 Robert Orlando’s documentary A Polite Bribe (2013) creates this type of portrayal of 
Paul (as a failure who died believing that he was just that) and plays on this theme of 
being resurrected as a hero of Christianity.  
30 Taubes aligns his reading of Romans with a ‘political declaration of war on Caesar’ 
(1993:16) while Elliot makes this declaration more explicitly with Paul himself.  
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This is crucial to the way in which Paul emphasises the importance of 
the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ; a de-legitimising and defeating 
of a sign of a power (the Roman cross) that represented the captivity of 
God’s promises. Kenosis is an important device in the transvaluation of 
values propelled by Paul’s articulation of the messianic rupture in the 
Symbolic Order; if God is emptied out onto the cross then this has 
significant implications for the understanding of the nature of power. What 
is being fought for in the Pauline legacy is a continuing narrative which 
highlights the radical potentiality exemplified in the idea of God, the 
ultimate source of authority, taking the form of a slave in order to 
pronounce judgement through the signification of the cross; a symbol of 
power for those who merely claim ultimate authority. This is precisely the 
point of divine violence: it exposes the weakness of those who claim 
power. This work, however, was not complete. Paul determined that it 
was the work of the community of believers that, through the Holy Spirit, 
participated in the service of this power through faith and hope in its 
unfolding truth.  
In order to work our way to Paul’s articulation of the Christ-event, 
and the reading of this in recent philosophy, we must first seek to 
understand the divine force at work in the background. This begins with 
Yahweh.  
 
2.1.2 The Violence of Yahweh 
 
In appealing to divine (pure) violence (die göttliche reine gewalt), Walter 
Benjamin evokes Yahweh’s intervention against Korah and his company in 
Numbers 16.1-35. Korah led a group of Levites who threatened to revolt 
against Moses for leading them into the wilderness with, thus far false, 
promises of a land of milk and honey (16.13-14). In response to their 
opposition they were annihilated by God; ‘the ground split apart’ 
swallowing ‘all those associated with Korah’ and they ‘went down alive 
into Sheol’ (16.31-33). God strikes without warning and annihilates the 
‘privileged Levites’ (Benjamin 1921, 297).  
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This enigmatic theory of violence, as described in his essay Critique 
of Violence (Zur Kritik der Gewalt), begins with Yahweh. This 
temperamental figure is a troubling choice as a role model for 
revolutionary violence. Yahweh presents a problem through His narrow 
frame for identifying injustice (which essentially revolves around 
circumcised men). With only sporadic and infrequent exceptions, justice 
for marginalised groups (such as women or slaves) can often appear as less 
important than Israel maintaining its relationship with God.  
It is with caution that Benjamin’s troubling text should be 
approached. At stake here, though, is a way of understanding the 
responsibility for violence that is extended to its very limit. This 
responsibility extends even to the divine itself; as Simon Critchley would 
put it: an infinite demand.31 
 Benjamin’s peculiar appeal to the violent act of a god whose 
judgement came upon the company of Korah is not an appeal to Yahweh 
Himself but to the power of this violent act to expiate the guilt of mere 
life (1921, 297). It is a story that warns of the consequences of challenging 
the mechanisms of divine sovereignty. The particular means of this 
violence is what interests Benjamin here. This means, the annihilation of 
the company of Korah through sending them directly into Sheol, is a 
bloodless violence which strikes from outside of the law; annihilating them 
but also removing the condemnation of law. The ambiguity surrounding this 
idea is centred on the idea that while its occurrence is assured, it is 
difficult to determine when this expiating power ‘has been realised in 
particular cases’ (1921, 300).  
 Writing on the subject of God’s judgement on Korah, James Martel 
argues that rather than a judgement being made upon those associated 
with Korah, there is a demonstration of the falsehood of the idolatry of 
sovereignty.  
 
                                                             
31See Critchley (2007; 2012) and his idea of an infinite demand that places upon an 
individual an ethical imperative to serve the Other which is impossible to fulfil.  
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God does not reveal ‘truth’ but simply undermines untruth. 
God’s action serves as a kind of messianic undoing of the 
fetishism of divinity. In the absence of such a fetish, another 
relationship with reality becomes possible (although far from 
certain), one that acknowledges the absence of truth, God’s 
aporia in the world. (2012, 12) 
 
The vital point here is that in the action against Korah and his company 
Yahweh creates ‘something new’ (Num. 16.30). God struck from outside of 
the existing order. Žižek takes this from Benjamin’s description of this idea 
in imagining a revolutionary violence that is a sign of a world ‘out of joint’ 
(2008a, 169). Tensions in the collective weight of human action create a 
rupture through which access is given to the Real (which is outside of our 
horizon of language and understanding) and therefore not accounted for 
within the Symbolic Order. The consequences of this rupture are felt in the 
attempts to suture the contents of this irruption from the Real back into 
the Symbolic.  
In the narrative of Numbers, this leads to what takes place beyond 
this example in Benjamin’s short account of divine violence. After the 
annihilation of the ‘two hundred fifty’ in the company of Korah, Yahweh 
sends a plague which kills a further ‘fourteen thousand seven hundred’ 
(Num. 16.47). The people did not believe this was an act of God; instead 
they rebelled against Moses and against Aaron, saying: “You have killed the 
people of the Lord” (16.41). The questioning of Yahweh’s faith in Moses 
and Aaron was met with further violence in the form of a plague. The 
divine violence that had initially invaded the situation might have only 
expiated the guilt of mere life, but the violence that followed sent death 
and judgement upon that life. This is the temperamental relationship 
between the divine and the human, or between the Real and the Symbolic. 
There are no guarantees over what the repercussions of an intrusion from 
the Real will have in the Symbolic. In other words, if such a powerful 
rupture is created in the apparent stability of the Symbolic Order it will 
expose a power vacuum with no guarantees over how it will be filled.  
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This is a recurring theme with the figure of Yahweh. Walter 
Brueggemann examines the troubling violence of God in the narrative of 
Joshua 11; a text which, among other such passages found in the Hebrew 
Bible, can be ‘an embarrassment,’ ‘morally repulsive,’ and ‘theologically 
problematic’ (2009, 11). Brueggemann’s approach to this text attempts to 
justify Yahweh’s intervention in the situation. In his reading, Yahweh 
struck out only against the injustice and inequality inherent to the 
situation. Yahweh creates the power vacuum wherein the potential for a 
brutal massacre is made possible. In this sense, ‘the Word of Yahweh… 
created new historical, social possibilities for Israel’ (31) through the 
destruction of the horses and chariots (facilitating the attack of Joshua’s 
forces). Horses and chariots ‘reflect the strength and monopoly of arms’ 
(15) held by the monarchies that claim sovereign power of their land and 
people. Yahweh acts against state power itself in the overturning of 
inequality inherent to the way that it dominates the balance of power.  
Brueggemann advances Israel as an ‘ancient peasant nation’ (64) 
that was faced with a hostile system of monarchies led by the Hazor King. 
This violent moment, among many in Israel’s Biblical narrative, saw them 
destroy their enemies; ‘they did not leave any who breathed’ and ‘burned 
Hazor with fire’ (Jos. 11.11). The focus in Brueggemann’s reading is on the 
temperate nature of Yahweh’s promise: that the horses would be 
hamstrung and the chariots burned - ‘only violent against weapons’ (23). 
This divine sanction coincides with ‘justice and liberation against an 
oppressive adversary’ (23). The crux of the matter then, for Brueggemann, 
is that:  
 
it is not a summons to violence (though its practice might be 
construed so) but only a permit that Joshua’s community is 
entitled to dream, hope, and imagine freedom and is entitled to 
act upon that dream, hope, and imagination. (24)  
 
The point here is that, ‘except for Yahweh’s permit and mandate in v.6, 
all action in the narrative is left to Joshua’ (29). Yahweh allows for the 
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possibility of the destruction of the power of the alliance of kings brought 
together by Jabin King of Hazor, but the destruction is carried out by 
Joshua and his forces.  
In this same way, leading the assault on Jericho, Joshua's army did 
not directly cause its walls to collapse and Yahweh did not massacre those 
inside. It was their fidelity to God's instruction which prompted the walls 
to be destroyed and deliver victory. It was Joshua’s strength of arms within 
those crumbled walls that dictated the nature of that victory. The divine 
aspect of the violence was enacted by Yahweh alone, while the rest 
belonged to Joshua and his army.32 God’s violent interventions in the fallen 
world are caused by the activities of humans, and the consequences of 
these interventions are in the hands of humans. The idea of divine violence 
which Benjamin evokes does not refer merely to this relationship, but to 
those specific moments when, in a moment, the divine figure appears with 
a ‘pure immediate violence’ (1921, 300) that transforms a situation in a 
way that could not have been anticipated.   
 
2.2 Walter Benjamin’s Bloodless Violence 
 
In what Simon Critchley calls an already ‘massively over-interpreted essay’ 
(2012, 213), Benjamin’s Critique of Violence seeks to find a way past the 
deadlock inherent to the cycle of law creating and law preserving violence. 
In this essay, mythic violence (a law-making and preserving violence which 
always bends towards power) is confronted by divine violence (a law-
destroying violence with no interest in power itself). Benjamin posits law 
and violence as mutual guarantors that can only be disrupted by the pure 
immediate violence of the divine. It is this type of pure violence that Žižek 
connects to Paul’s work of love, which Žižek reads as Paul moving beyond 
his own deadlock with regards to the law.  
                                                             
32 Not all examples of “divine” violence are accounted for in this way in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. The divine figure plays a much more active role in the killing of the Egyptian 
first born (Ex. 12.29-31) and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19.24-29). Not 
just contained to the Hebrew Bible, in the narrative of Acts Ananias and Sapphira are 
caused them to fall down and die because of their deceit towards God (Acts 5.1-11). 
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Benjamin’s formulation of divine violence (a “bloodless violence” 
which, with a revolutionary spirit, pulls the emergency brakes on the 
locomotive of history) has weighed heavily upon the way in which violence 
in revolutionary action has been theorised in continental philosophy. This 
divine violence, or as Agamben puts it, ‘“pure” or “divine,” and, in the 
human sphere, “revolutionary”' (2005a, 150), creates a rupture that allows 
a move beyond that which had been previously anticipated within the 
Symbolic Order.  
 
If mythical violence is law-making, divine violence is law 
destroying; if the former sets the boundaries, the latter 
boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once 
guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former 
threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter 
is lethal without spilling blood. (1921, 150-151) 
 
He gives an example of this as a violent political force in Sorel’s 
articulation of the general strike. “Pure” in that it makes no demand on 
the ends; it is defined by its withdrawal from the cycle of law preserving 
and creating behaviour. Its violence is wrought in its impact on the 
stability of the Symbolic Order; not through its own imagined means or 
ends but in exposing the already established violent systems to their 
untruth. 
It is here that one of the many dangers of Benjamin’s text arises. It 
places faith in the idea that the Symbolic Order can be transgressed, with 
no guarantees over what the consequences of this move might entail; as 
Žižek puts it, ‘there is no guaranteeing its divine nature, the risk of 
reading and assuming it as divine is fully the subject’s own’ (2008a, 169). 
In this sense, the general strike should not necessarily be interpreted as an 
act of divine violence, but simply as the potential for a clearing of the way 
which would allow something different to emerge. In other words, 
attempting to disrupt the Symbolic Order in such a way that its pretence of 
truth collapses (at least for a moment).  
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Critique of Violence begins by examining the relationship between 
natural law (which focuses on using whatever violence necessary to 
achieve justified ends) and positive law (which judges the legality of the 
means). Benjamin describes natural law as such: 
 
according to this view (for which the terrorism of the French 
Revolution provided an ideological foundation), violence is a 
product of nature, as it were a raw material, the use of which is 
in no way problematical, unless force is misused for unjust ends. 
(1921, 133) 
 
The French Revolution repeats what occurs in the destruction of the 
Amalekites in 1 Sam. 15. God told Saul: ‘kill both man and woman, child 
and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey’ (15.3). This violence was 
justified by revenge and the necessity to ‘utterly destroy’ (15.3) an 
obstacle to a greater purpose. The total destruction of the Amalek people 
was justified in the purpose it served (without any problems with regards 
to its morality).  
The other side of the coin is positive law, which: ‘can judge all 
evolving law only in criticising its means’ (135). Positive law is found in our 
everyday lives as legalities judge what kind of path we can choose to 
achieve the ends that we desire. For example, justice may be found in the 
punishment of a murderer, but how this justice is wrought depends on the 
legal process. It determines what force can be exerted: under the Geneva 
Convention (1949; 1977) it is illegal to torture information from the 
captured terror subject, therefore other means must be found (to take a 
popular example) to achieve the goal of retrieving information pertinent to 
a potential terror attack. Positive law ties the ends to the means, 
overriding notions of universality with the particular statutes of the law. In 
this there is the law as given through Moses; “You shall not kill” might be a 
guiding principle, but the specific laws on capital punishment or in times of 
war, for example, determine where exactly this principle can be put aside.  
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Natural and positive law are by no means exclusive. They are part of 
the same ends/means system of law. Benjamin asserts that: 
 
both schools meet in a common basic dogma: just ends can be 
attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends. 
Natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to "justify" 
the means, positive law to "guarantee" the justness of the ends 
through the justification of the means. (1921, 135) 
 
The detention camp at Guantanamo Bay provides a recent example of the 
overlapping of the two; a site where positive law is replaced, at some 
point, by natural law when it is deemed necessary in the means/end cycle. 
Both seek sovereignty over means and ends, and use law-making and law-
preserving violence to establish and maintain this power. This distinction is 
again blurred in the police force, which can preserve the law through 
breaking its specific commands; thus law making and preserving violence 
can become conflated in the police. They remained tied to positive law in 
the restricting how they can act, but are given a measure of responsibility 
of deciding when one bleeds over into the other. Riots and unrest in the 
United States sparked by the killing of a black man by police in Ferguson 
(August, 2014) demonstrate some of the tension caused by this overlapping 
of natural and positive law.  
This problem is situated in the deadlock that is caused by natural and 
positive law; neither is capable of radically altering the situation outside 
of the realms of law. As demonstrated in protests over police shootings 
around the world in recent years, the problem is not merely rooted in the 
practices of the police, as if a slight adjustment of policy might be the 
answer. The violence in the truth of the situation must be exposed for the 
monstrosity that it is. The political and economic inequalities, attitudes 
towards guns, race, and crime, and the selfish culture at the heart of 
politico-economic structures remain locked within a narrative that rioters 
and protesters are both trapped in - and desperate to break free from. In 
this sense, revolutionary action cannot avoid the issue of sovereignty. 
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Divine violence is the force which descends from outside of this cycle of 
law-making and law-preserving violence; where a “pure means” disrupts 
this relationship between violence and law. The mythical violence of 
power-making is confronted by a divine violence that destroys power “as 
such.”  
 
2.2.1 The Real 
 
Embroiled in the theory of this force is the question of what action it 
might legitimate. It is with this caution that Derrida approached 
Benjamin’s essay. Derrida, perhaps the foremost critic of Benjamin’s 
essay, called it a dangerous text which was ‘haunted in advance’ by the 
Final Solution; warning specifically against its idea of ‘annihilation’ (2002, 
298). His fear with this text, the facet which he finds ‘perhaps almost 
unbearable,’ is the ‘temptation to think the Holocaust as an 
uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence’ due to its ‘annihilating, 
expiatory and bloodless nature’ (298). Just as those who entered the death 
camps were destroyed completely, leaving only in an ash cloud of smoke, 
Derrida fears that the Final Solution could be interpreted as, ‘an expiation 
and an indecipherable signature of the just and violent anger of God’ 
(298); a God in which ‘authority, justice, power, and violence are all one’ 
(293). There is a danger in this idea in that if it is understood as violence 
against an illegitimate other, it becomes a nonviolent violence only in the 
sense that those who are the targets cannot be considered legitimate 
victims of violence. As Derrida suggests, this text leaves us open to the 
temptation of interpreting such violence (gewalt) as the ‘just and violent 
anger of God’ (298). There is an ambiguity to this text in its understanding 
of human rights and the value of life. This ambiguity continues to haunt 
Benjamin’s text.  
Pivotal here is the denial that an occurrence such as the Holocaust 
can be accounted for as a Truth-Event. As with Žižek’s discussions of 
Gandhi, the argument is that nothing was transformed in the Symbolic in 
order to align an eventual force like divine violence with its mechanisms of 
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dominance over the historical narrative. Yet there remains ambiguity in 
Žižek’s readings about exactly what would constitute an event of divine 
violence.  
Another prominent example of this ambiguity comes in the form of 
terror attacks. Žižek argues that the atrocities perpetrated on September 
11th 2001, which indiscriminately took the lives of many people, cannot 
lay claim to being an act of divine violence. It was its antithesis: an 
attempt to force the consequences of a particular set of beliefs onto those 
who were perceived to be its enemy. Unlike with religious terrorism, 
participants in divine violence can make no claim to be enacting God’s will 
and make no claim to a deeper meaning in a grander scheme of history. 
There is no guarantee of eternal glory or God’s victory in divine violence. 
The violent crimes of 9/11 were deliberate actions which served only to 
reinforce and heighten tensions that already existed. They attempted to 
replace the empty site of the Real with a sovereign source of authority.  
Rancière also argues against the idea of something of the Real 
breaking through in this attack. He claims that ‘if a symbolic rupture 
occurred it had already been accomplished’ (2010, 104). In this line of 
argument he defines a Symbolic Event as ‘the name for any event that 
strikes a blow to the existing regime of relations between the Symbolic and 
the Real’ (97). Following this he asserts that no symbolic rupture or event 
occurred on this day because nothing was altered in the Symbolic by means 
of a disruption of that which was already anticipated; the Symbolic was 
instead amplified and reinforced. By this Rancière means that the towers 
were merely representations of the Symbolic Order, which already resided 
in the American people. It was a crime against steel, glass, and people – 
but it was not a successful attack on the heart of the Symbolic Order. If 
the attackers believed that they were attacking the symbolisation of the 
power of the United States, they were only partly correct; that 
symbolisation not only exists in towers but in the people themselves (this is 
why the attack was a startling failure on ideological grounds).  
This breaking of resistance to the idea that a foreign attack on US soil 
could exist outside of fantasy only served to reinforce and heighten the 
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tensions that already existed. It was not a sign of God’s anger against the 
United States, in line with the thought of either Islamic or Christian 
extremists, nor did it represent a break in the Symbolic Order. Yet this 
example shows the tenuous grounds on which divine violence stands.  
 
2.2.2 Žižek’s Divine Violence 
 
 
In order to further examine this enigmatic theory of violence, we will look 
more closely at the way in which this Benjaminian divine violence has 
become crucial to Žižek’s diagnosis of potential forms of resistance to the 
domination of regimes underpinned by capitalism. Žižek gives divine 
violence the ‘minimal definition’ of ‘the counter-violence to the excess of 
violence that pertains to state power’ (2008b, 483). He identifies divine 
violence with that which is created in the tension between the objective 
(symbolic and systemic) violence inherent to the Symbolic Order and the 
way in which those caught up in its mechanisms react to its presence. He 
describes this force as ‘the direct subjectivization of (or, rather, the direct 
subjective reaction to) this objective violence’ (481). In this sense, and as 
will be discussed later in the chapter through Bartleby the Scrivener, the 
inherent instability of the objective violence associated with state power, 
for example, is forced to reveal the very untruth which underpins its 
domination.  
Divine violence arrives at a moment when a situation can no longer 
tolerate itself. It creates a rupture in the symbolic structure of 
governance, allowing access to a new set of truths through the 
disintegration of the symbolic domain maintained in the previous order. 
Žižek describes divine violence as, 'the terrifying point of the direct 
intervention of the noumenal into the phenomenal' (2008b, 486). In 
Badiou’s language, this is the violence inherent to the emergence of an 
Event. Žižek describes the crux of the idea as such: 
 
couldn’t the entire history of humanity be seen as a growing 
normalisation of injustice, entailing the nameless and faceless 
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suffering of millions? Somewhere, in the sphere of the ‘divine,’ 
perhaps these injustices are not forgotten. They are 
accumulated, the wrongs are registered, the tension grows more 
and more unbearable, till divine violence explodes in a 
retaliatory destructive rage. (2008a, 152) 
 
There remains, however, a measure of ambiguity relating to the way in 
which Žižek envisions divine violence. Central to the criticisms about the 
working of this theory of violence into his work is that it either legitimises 
reactionary violence or it encourages inaction while waiting for some 
catastrophic event that will never arrive.33 Its relation to a “decision” has 
been criticised by Marcus Pound, who argues that Žižek becomes 
‘complicit in the very mechanism he criticises’ (2008, 41) – the sacrificial 
logics of sacred violence.34  
In explaining the way divine violence relates to ‘positively existing 
historical phenomena’ (2008a, 167), Žižek exemplifies the Revolutionary 
Terror of 1792-94 and the Red Terror of 1919, as well as the destruction 
wrought by looters from the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Such occurrences 
signify actions with no regards for the legality of means and no thought for 
the ends that it might bring. Put differently, ‘those outside the structured 
social field strike ‘blindly,’ demanding and enacting immediate 
justice/vengeance’ (171). It is here that we have the real problem with 
Žižek’s articulation of divine violence: it links too closely with the 
deliberate acts of individuals, while at the same time dehumanising their 
                                                             
33 This is seen especially in discussions with Simon Critchley. See Žižek (2008b) and 
Critchley (2012). 
34 The crux of Pound’s criticism, in his (Very) Critical Introduction to Žižek, is that he 
remains 'locked into the very retributive system he is critical of' through evoking the idea 
of violence linked to a retributive divine force (2008, 40). He adds that divine violence 
should be refused on the basis that divinity, as understood through the Gospels, should be 
identified as peace-making; that, following René Girard, the link between violence and 
the sacred should be refuted. He argues that an appeal to the 'retributive God' of the Old 
Testament is an appeal to a preferred violence; this remains tied to a sacrificial logic in 
which violence is enacted upon the guilty. Pound affirms here that Christ is not the 
sacrifice intended to appease a wrathful God, but a sign of the breaking of the link 
between violence and the sacred. His criticism of Žižek is that he fails to fully break this 
connection; therefore, without actually sanctioning acts of violence, he argues that Žižek 
remains tied to an appeal to the Old Testament God of wrath. 
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involvement.35 It attempts to detach agents with the immediate reasons 
that they carry out such violence. In essence, it could be argued, that he 
attempts to cover up instances of mythical, law-making, violence by 
attaching a greater significance to them.  
The truly novel thing in the explosion of violence in Rio was the 
interruption in the constructed socio-economic reality that kept the worlds 
of the wealthy suburbs and the poor favelas distinct from each other. The 
point here is not to align divine violence directly with the actions of the 
rioters, but with the situation which created the possibility for such 
violence to occur. The lootings and riots were not an act of divine violence 
but a sign of its presence - that the situation was no longer tolerable. It is 
in these moments, when the Symbolic Order can no longer tolerate itself, 
that divine violence (this tear in reality) can be exploited in a myriad of 
ways.  
It is in this sense that divine violence is ‘the domain within which 
killing is neither an expression of personal pathology… nor a crime… nor a 
sacred sacrifice. It is neither aesthetic, nor ethical, nor religious’ (Žižek 
2008a, 168). It is in this regard that Žižek states that ‘there are no 
objective criteria enabling us to identify an act of violence as divine’ 
(169). It is a theory which is defined by its volatility; amoral in nature and 
defined by its lack of cover by the big Other. A force that is destructive to 
power itself, with no expressed demands, Žižek identifies a wide range of 
situations through which it might be present: ‘non-violent protests… 
through individual killings to organised or spontaneous violent rebellions 
and war proper’ (2008b, 483).  
Divine violence, according to Žižek, ‘is a decision (to kill, to risk or 
lose one’s own life) made in solitude, with no cover in the big Other. It is 
extra-moral, it is not “immoral”’ (2008a, 171). This decision, which comes 
into existence from a position which is beyond good and evil, is made 
without an idea of the potential consequences. This is what separates 
                                                             
35 As Jamil Khader points out, he is 'invoking colonial representations of Third World 
barbaric thugs and hooligans who are not capable of mounting an effective act of 
resistance to the system itself' (2013, 165). In this case, Žižek’s language describing those 
who descended from the favelas ‘like Biblical locusts' (2008b, 162), creates an impression 
of a primal force that dehumanises those involved. 
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Žižek’s theory of divine violence from terrorist crimes that are given 
justifications through some reference to a greater meaning. There is an 
important qualification about this decision (that Žižek perhaps fails to 
emphasise). Divine violence occurs beyond the reach of what any individual 
can anticipate. In this regard he is correct in associating it with striking 
blindly; it is an act of faith. In the same way that Joshua marched his army 
around the walls of Jericho, he can make an appeal to the divine but the 
intervention of Yahweh is completely beyond his ability to guarantee. 
Žižek draws upon Christ’s abandonment on the cross described in 
Matthew’s gospel to exemplify this lack of cover for our actions under the 
big Other - ‘Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?’ (27.46). He characterises divine 
violence in the very death of God.  
 
we humans are left with no higher power watching over us, only 
the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the fate of 
divine creation, and thus for God himself. (2008a, 157) 
 
Thus, divine violence is not a sign of God’s strength but of His ‘own 
impotence’ (170). This does not mean that the “divine” is absent - it has 
been replaced by the Real. This is why Žižek identifies himself as a 
Christian atheist; it is that we feel the overwhelming presence of God in 
that moment of decision. Put differently, with there being no God 
watching over us the responsibility is transferred to us. Divine violence 
occurs through the imminent presence of God in its relationship with the 
burden of responsibility; not as a decision to act in God’s stead, but as a 
consequence of the failure of the powers that create and perpetuate 
objective violence to be able to disguise this violence any longer.  
 The problem, as Žižek admits himself without fully elaborating on the 
consequences, is that mythic violence always overcomes divine violence. 
The ruthless intrusion of divine violence upon the truth as perpetuated by 
the objective violence of capitalism in Brazil, or the powerful monarchy in 
late seventeenth century France or twentieth century Russia, is followed 
by a play for power underpinned by the law-creating mythic violence; or, 
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as Žižek acknowledges, ‘from Leninist divine violence to Stalinist mythic 
violence’ (2008b, 471). This paradoxical presence of God in the absence of 
sovereignty has far reaching consequences. Instances of divine violence 
contain the potential to expose injustice and end terror, but they can also 
create terror in a way which only serves to create more injustice and 
suffering. The point here is that this violence occurs in a tearing of the 
Symbolic Order, an order which is represented in language, art, and other 
forms of symbolism. Divine violence, therefore, is wrought on this level 
rather than the effect which it makes physically possible. To understand 
this we will now look at the violence inherent to language.  
 
2.3 Divine and Fallen Language 
 
Žižek makes a distinction between mythic and divine violence in their 
relationship with language: mythic violence is ‘a language-forming 
violence’ while divine violence is ‘language destroying twisting of language 
in order to enable a trans-symbolic real of a Truth to transpire in it’ 
(2013b, 11).  The relationship between divine and fallen language in this 
sense is between fallen language which creates our understanding of the 
world and divine language which reveals the untruth of fallen language. 
Žižek describes this violent potential intrinsic to language as such: 
 
language, not primitive egotistic interests, is the first and 
greatest divider, it is because of language that we and our 
neighbours “live in different worlds” even when we live on the 
same street. What this means is that verbal violence is not a 
secondary distortion, but the ultimate resort of every specifically 
human violence. (2013b, 2) 
 
There is significant power in the ability that language has in shaping the 
Symbolic. Imperfect and premised on inevitable manipulations and 
betrayals, language gives life to what is experienced. It is fundamental to 
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forces which create or facilitate suffering, violation, and destruction as 
much as it is to reconciliation and liberation.  
It is in language that we find the representation at the core of divine 
violence. In a criticism of Benjamin’s description of divine violence, Hent 
De Vries argues that its inability to transcend language makes it futile:  
 
Neither divine nor proletarian violence can hope to situate itself 
comfortably beyond the fundamental undecidability that it – 
now and then, for a moment only – seems to interrupt. (2001, 
283) 
 
When this fleeting moment of rupture in the Symbolic is over, it cannot 
prevent ‘a (possible) perversion which inscribes nonviolent violence in the 
order from which it appeared to break away’ (283). It is assimilated into 
the narrative of the prevailing order. There are two points here: we should 
affirm that these moments do exist, even if for a moment, and we should 
acknowledge that it can only be understood, inscribed into language, in a 
deviation and betrayal of what it uncovers. Divine violence is only the site 
from which such deviations become possible.   
The tension here is in the theological dimension of divine violence. An 
attempt to capture this force is akin to attempting to speak in a divine 
language or conjure a divine miracle. Simply put, it is beyond our capacity. 
This, however, does not make divine violence impossible. As with an Event 
- and here we are getting to the theological dimension of the turn to Paul - 
it is a matter of faith. In an Event, truth is not simply given in totality but 
revealed through a procedure in which it will thereafter exist in the 
unfolding of commitment to its interpretation. The Event of Christ’s death 
and resurrection presents a striking example of this. It can only be 
considered as a Truth-Event as long as there are those committed to its 
appearance as such; and those with faith can only claim that it was possible 
through some sense of divine rupture in the static nature of knowledge.  
Drawing upon Rosenzweig’s ‘yea’ in The Star of Redemption, De Vries 
accounts for this nature of truth that is indebted to language for its 
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existence. He writes, ‘(the ‘yea’) gives every word in the sentence the 
right to exist,’ it is similar to the ‘I think’ which ‘accompanies all 
representations’ (2001, 262).  The ‘yea’ is the pre-marker to every word, 
which gives it the right to exist but also marks the possibility, or 
inevitability, of its ‘betrayal or perversion’ (262). It calls for a second yes 
to reaffirm the legitimacy of the first (or the absence of the second yes to 
deny it). This brings De Vries to Benjamin’s interpretation of language, and 
the gap between divine language and fallen language. Divine violence is 
akin to the perfect language which reveals the frailty of fallen language. It 
is the destructive appearance of a revelation of untruth.  
Benjamin’s assertion here that the things of nature ‘have no proper 
names, except in God’ (2001, 330) echoes Karl Barth’s views on the 
division between the perfect meaning of words in relation to God and the 
meanings of words that we are capable of understanding. This is a 
distinction between the endless ‘play of signifiers’ (Ward 1995, 16) 
inherent to human language and the type of truth which is communicated 
through the trinity.36 Barth makes a distinction between the meanings of 
words as related to God compared with the use strictly in the human 
sphere. In this way divine language belongs to the category of revelation 
as understood in this theological tradition. It was Barth’s view that the 
language given to Adam by God was perfect. It related objects to thoughts 
to words in a perfect way. However, humankind after the fall is no longer 
able to make the true connection between the three. 
 This approach to language begins in paradox, as Graham Ward puts 
it, Barth’s insight is ‘the dialectical necessity of assuming that words name 
while also countering such an assumption’ (1995, 5). Language, then, 
insists that we participate in perpetual hermeneutic activity. Barth states 
two routes of participation: through attempts at self-mastery or 
participation in God’s truth as communicated through the Trinity. Ward 
surmises that Barth understood ‘the latter reveals the former to be an 
idol, or, in terms of linguistics, the endless play of signifiers’ (16). For 
Barth this means that the proper knowledge we have access to is revealed 
                                                             
36 Graham Ward (1995) provides an overview of Barth’s relationship with language.  
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in both the absence and presence of God. In Derridean terms, the meaning 
is absent in the word itself but becomes present in its différance. Words 
relate to the Word by the very means of their imperfection. We glimpse at 
the divine through the Bible but even that is obfuscated by the very words 
which grant its possibility of meaning. Through the Christ-event, as Ward 
puts it, there is ‘a rupture of meaning that places everything in question 
by being other than meaning’ (24). Or, as Barth would have put it, we 
cannot fully know God but we can participate in His truth. God is the 
subject, so although we are faced with the object of his revelation it does 
not depend on our subjective input, God can only be known as the object-
in-Himself – the perfect subject. In this Barth reveals a paradox; how can 
we know the nature of God without creating God for ourselves? Barth’s 
answer is in God’s Word, but even that is deeply embroiled in that paradox 
intrinsic to the nature of language. 
Barth understood what is at stake in the way words are constructed 
and manipulated. In his commentary on Paul’s epistle to the Romans, he 
wrote: 
 
We must not give the word ‘God’ the value of a clearly defined, 
metaphysical entity. What will it profit us if a formal fidelity to 
the meaning of a word is purchased at the cost of complete 
infidelity to the Word? (1933, 484) 
 
Barth perceived that the fragility of human language struggled to 
articulate the divine, but at the same time is the very means of revelation 
from God. This is the interplay between the Real and the Symbolic (or the 
divine and the fallen). We are all bound to a horizon of language, but we 
are not bound rigidly to a static horizon. The aim of talk about God for 
Barth is strive to restore words to their proper usage (or, at least, 
demonstrate their absence from their source). Barth wrote, ‘when we 
apply them (words) to God they are not alienated from their original 
object and therefore from their truth, on the contrary, restored to it’ 
(1940, 229). God, through His Son and the Holy Spirit, reveals the truth of 
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His nature to humankind in a way we can understand but also 
misunderstand. Through God’s revelation, Barth explains: 
 
we are definitely active as the receivers of images, and the 
creators of counter-images. Our viewing as such is certainly 
capable of receiving images of the divine. And our conceiving as 
such is capable of creating idolatrous pictures. (1940, 182) 
 
Divine violence works in this way, yet the Pauline revelation is that we 
also have an influence over the divine (or the situation in which the divine 
shatters through the Symbolic). This revelation does not allow us to 
glimpse at the truth of the object that our word names, instead, it reveals 
only the foolishness of our own truth. Divine violence, then, is a 
description of the consequence of both the absence and presence of God.  
It is the presence of truth working in the absence of its absoluteness. 
Barth’s interjection here is crucial. Divine violence is created in the 
tension between the Symbolic Order and those who search for an 
alternative. Language is the basic marker of this tension. 
Words cannot exist without being manipulated or misunderstood; 
they are inarticulate signs and signifiers of a fallen world. The law, as a 
prominent sign of the Symbolic Order, manipulates language, binding us to 
its forces. Divine violence, in theory, is this ‘nonviolent violence (which) 
interrupts the represental power of language’ (De Vries 2001, 281). It 
forces truth whereby the law, based on mythical foundations, has falsely 
claimed the privilege of being truth; therefore, the ‘writing and re-writing 
of the law can only be confronted with a (divine) unwriting’ (281). This is 
what Žižek sees as being at stake in divine violence: the unwriting, or 
uncoupling, of the truth of systems and structures which uses a mechanical 
type of violence to assert its dominance. What divine violence reveals is 
the very absence of the absolute in the Symbolic Order. The question that 
we now must turn to is: how does this force come into being? 
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2.3.1 Bartleby the Scrivener 
 
Imagine my surprise, nay, my consternation, when, without 
moving from his privacy, Bartleby, in a singularly mild, firm 
voice, replied, ‘I would prefer not to.’ (Melville, 10) 
 
Divine language is beyond the reach of our understanding but appears, akin 
to the messages of the Greek God Hermes, in the form of flawed human 
language. If divine language is that which only has the potential to come 
into being, then fallen (human) language is that which has come into 
actuality. Clayton Crockett relates the idea of divine violence to 
Agamben’s idea of potentiality in this way; the restoration of 
‘impotentiality’ (2011, 56), put differently, power being returned to the 
divine through the force of divine violence damaging the legitimacy of 
temporal sovereignty. 
This brings us to a tale that has entranced continental philosophy: 
Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener. This is the story of a character 
famed for a single spoken line of resistance. What Deleuze named ‘the 
formula’ (1998, 70), Bartleby’s enigmatic phrase "I would prefer not to," 
holds a bewildering spell over the lawyer who hired Bartleby (as it also 
does for Deleuze, as well as others such as Agamben, Žižek, and Rancière 
who have attempted to interpret this interjection). Žižek uses Bartelby as 
an example of divine violence; as a character that is destructive without 
spilling blood, radically changing the situation he finds himself in.  
In hiring Bartleby without references, the lawyer took a risk in his 
new choice of scribe. This gamble appeared to pay off as 'at first, Bartleby 
did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long famished for something 
to  copy’ (9). Agamben likens this act of the scribe to that of creation. The 
ink forever marks the paper from a connection of sources tracing back 
through the pen, the hand, and the mind back to the divine (1999b, 249). 
To the astonishment of this Wall Street lawyer, on the third day, upon 
receiving an order to help in a ‘small affair,’ Bartleby, ‘in a singularly 
mild, firm voice, replied, "I would prefer not to"'(10). So it was to be that 
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the copier was to cease copying, and in turn to cease to do anything out of 
his own will apart from utter: "I would prefer not to." This disarming stroke 
becomes the very essence of Bartleby as he no longer contributes to the 
world beyond the effects of what this utterance represents. He does not 
leave the office. And when the lawyer moves office, he squats there until 
he is sent to prison. He then dies of starvation, leaving the lawyer to 
ponder what this force was which upset his world.  
Bartleby, according to Agamben, ‘transforms every potentiality into 
an impotentiality’ (1999a, 245). In his refusal to copy he returns words 
from the edge of their realisation back to their origin in the divine. 
Agamben understands every potentiality as something which also has the 
potential not to be. As soon as something is actualised it loses this 
potential not to be. If Bartleby had rejected the lawyer’s instruction 
directly, then he would be denying the potential of that occurrence; but 
instead he negates his own will for the thing to be or not to be by 
preferring not to actualise or prevent anything. He negates all things 
(including any reasoning behind the negation itself) returning them to 
where they came. In this sense, ‘the formula emancipates potentiality 
(potius, from potis, which means “more powerful”) from its connection to 
a “reason” (ratio) and its subordination to Being’ (Agamben 1999b, 258). It 
may appear as if Bartleby simply rejects all potential to be, but by refusing 
to engage with any sense of his own will he leaves the instructions in a 
state of potentiality.  
Žižek invokes something similar to this idea of impotentiality in his 
reading of Bartleby. He provides a model for the disengagement with the 
system a subject is caught up in. Unless there is a complete disengagement 
from systems and structures being opposed, the destruction and division 
created by capitalism will only deepen until its inevitable point of 
catastrophe. The potential solution is to not actively fight the corruption 
of injustice in the mechanisms of systemic violence but to prefer not to 
engage – to refuse to enter into participation within the system at all. This 
is the path to violently exposing the truth of how the system operates, and 
how it uses its active opposition to sustain its normal functioning. Through 
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this there remains a potential to see what might not be as well as what 
might be; that first there needs to be an understanding of the truth of the 
situation before anything new can be created thereafter. The obvious 
problem with Žižek’s analysis is the unpredictability of the consequences 
of such a radical withdrawal; indeed, it only meant death for Bartleby.  
Bartleby’s death occurs in a place where he is almost completely 
forgotten, with only the lawyer left to inscribe something of his final days 
into history. In a similar way, Paul also, we can be quite confident, dies in 
an almost forgotten place. His death in Rome marked the end and the 
defeat of his own mission as he understood it. He relied on others to 
remember his message of self-sacrifice for his cause. Those who Žižek 
holds up as examples of revolutionary figures, from Marx to Lenin and Paul 
to Guevara, end their life mission in this position - they are reliant on 
others to continue their work. 
 
2.3.2 I Would Prefer Not to… 
 
"I would prefer not to" frames a novel form of resistance to the systemic 
violence of capitalism by calling upon a force to disrupt that which is 
transfigured into actuality. It is a provocation to those who work to end 
injustice: either continue in that system or radically withdraw from its 
mechanisms. In response to criticism by Critchley, Žižek defends his 
understanding of the link between Bartleby and divine violence.  
 
When I write "sometimes, doing nothing is the most violent thing 
to do," is it not clear that, for me, the Bartlebian gesture of 
"preferring not to" do anything and the "divine violence" [...] are 
themselves sometimes one and the same thing? If only 
sometimes, then when? Only when, as I repeat over and over 
again, our activity supports the functioning of the power 
apparatus, or helps it reproduce itself - in this context, our 
"doing nothing," our refusal to participate, can deal a blow to 
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the power structure, radically de-legitimising it, preventing its 
normal function. (2008b, 474) 
 
Bartleby's disarming utterance, within the limits of his own power, opens 
the potential for his copying not to be. He throws the world around him 
into chaos because his actions were not anticipated within the lawyer’s 
worldview. The passive refusal to act inside the expectations of the 
lawyer’s world caused a rupture in its ability to remain stable. It could no 
longer reproduce the conditions required for its smooth functioning. Of 
course, the lawyer managed to finally find a way beyond Bartleby’s 
immediate influence, but not without a trace of his influence remaining.  
The lawyer’s interpretation of Bartleby’s condition is always slightly 
off the mark. After Bartleby’s death, all the lawyer can do is attempt to 
incorporate this influence back into his symbolic universe; which can only 
continue when Bartleby is given meaning that makes sense within this 
world. The lawyer reveals what he knew ‘one little item of rumour. …how 
true it is I cannot now tell’ (34). What he had heard was that Bartelby 
worked at a dead letters office. In the lawyer’s imagination, Bartelby, ‘a 
man by nature and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness’ (35), was 
brought to death by sorting and burning these letters that were supposed 
to provide ‘pardon for those who died despairing; hope for those who died 
unhoping; good tidings for those who died stifled by unrelieved calamities’ 
(35). In this interpretation of a life that was beyond his reckoning, the 
lawyer ultimately finds humanity in Bartelby. Whether true or not, and 
despite the tenuous nature of the rumour, Bartleby becomes re-inscribed 
into the lawyer’s symbolic world.  
This is the deeper issue with Žižek’s radical, and indeed 
uncomfortable, call to withdraw from participation in the mechanisms that 
support the reproduction of capitalism: how will such actions be re-
inscribed into the Symbolic Order? In a statement that exemplifies the 
difficultly in this unplugging, Žižek states: 
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"I would prefer not to" is not primarily "I would prefer not to 
participate in the market economy, in capitalist competition for 
profiteering," but - much more problematically for some - "I 
would prefer not to give to charity to support a black orphan in 
Africa, engage in the struggle to prevent oil-drilling in a wildlife 
swamp, send books to educate our liberal-feminist-spirited 
women in Afghanistan.” (2006, 383) 
 
This action is motivated from a desire not to fall into the trap of 
participating in violence from a non-violent stance. It is with this issue in 
mind that Žižek argues that 'the "means" we use to achieve emancipatory 
goals have themselves to display these goals, have to already be their 
manifestation' (2006, 486). The greater problem is how to ensure that 
these goals are inscribed back into the prevailing narrative after the 
revolutionary moment has faded.  
By ceasing to write, Bartleby refused to continue his participation in 
the reproduction of the situation. His non-preference caused an abrupt end 
to the lawyer’s normal situation; more than this, it revealed that what 
held this situation together was not as strong as he might have assumed. 
No more writing occurred. Žižek argues this not only serves to expose the 
(symbolic) mechanisms of power but also to help form a perpetual 
foundation of a new order: 
 
Bartleby's attitude is not merely the first, preparatory, stage for 
the second, more "constructive," work of forming a new 
alternative order; it is the very source and background of this 
order, its permanent foundation. (2006, 382) 
 
Yet this alternative order, it should not be forgotten, only exists in the 
lawyer’s interpretation of Bartleby’s behaviour. It would have been a 
different tale altogether if the lawyer, showing no patience with Bartleby, 
had him removed immediately upon not fulfilling his duties, never to be 
heard of again. Bartleby relies on the lawyer being an essentially good 
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ethical agent. He plays the game initiated by Bartleby’s withdrawal. As 
with the lawyer’s case, initially at least, authority turns out to be an 
illusion that becomes de-legitimised once the truth of their empty core is 
revealed. In this sense the lawyer is, for a time, rendered impotent.  
This is the same caution that Jacques Ellul related to Gandhi (as 
noted in chapter one). Even if, as Žižek argues, Gandhi did more to 
revolutionise his situation than Hitler, through using a nonviolent violence 
to reveal the impotence of his opponents, it relied on the British being 
bound to the limits of their own authority. In short, they could not have 
simply arrested Gandhi and made sure he did not return. Many other 
empires, including the British in an earlier era, would have simply crushed 
such resistance with no thought other than it being a small roadblock on 
their march of progress. This is what makes the mechanisms leaving terror-
suspects to be forgotten in places such as Guantanamo Bay so terrifying. 
To deny the very voice of those resisting is a violent act. The brutal 
violence enacted on groups such as Jews and homosexuals by Nazi forces 
were not bound by moral or ethical injunctions to treat such groups with 
dignity. Without the compliance of the lawyer, Bartleby would have had no 
such force in this context.  
 
2.4 Potentiality 
 
In what way, then, is it possible to participate in this radical disavowal of 
the world as it is, without simply being overcome by other forces? Is this 
not the very question at work in Paul’s letter to the Romans? In what sense 
does the new theologico-political idea of radical disavowal of the world 
through Christ meet with Bartleby’s withdrawal from his world? It is 
located precisely in its potential to create a radical shift in the prevailing 
narrative. 
According to Deleuze, Bartleby’s formula is ‘ravaging, devastating, 
and leaves nothing in its wake’ (1998, 70). He interprets Bartleby as a 
‘pure outsider’ (73) with no social role, who invented a new logic of 
preference which completely blocks the lawyer’s authority: 
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Bartleby is the man without references, without possessions, 
without properties, without qualities, without particularities: he 
is too smooth for anyone to be able to hang any particularity on 
him. Without future or past, he is instantaneous. (74) 
 
Bartleby, through a refusal of the world, works his way outside of the 
Symbolic. Deleuze completes his essay on Bartleby by announcing that he is 
a ‘new Christ or brother to us all’ (90). Christ, like Bartleby, is concerned 
with potentiality – the forcing, at any cost, of what exists beyond the 
Symbolic Order. He testifies to the effect of the individual on the 
collective.  
 
2.4.1 Agamben and Potentiality 
 
Agamben calls attention to Bartleby’s formula as being, ‘a barely disguised 
citation from Romans 7:10’ (1999b, 269). That which was meant to bring 
life (the act of writing), instead brought death. Bartleby’s renunciation of 
copying is also a renunciation of the law; in this he returns potentiality 
back to its place in creation. He does not attempt to create anything apart 
from potential itself; like Christ, he came ‘[not] to redeem what was, but 
to save what was not’ (Agamben 1999b, 270). This requires a pure violence 
which violates and destroys what was to be actualised, and returns it to 
the position of absolute potentiality.  
Divine violence, as Rancière says of Deleuze’s interpretation of 
Bartleby’s formula: 
 
shatters not just the hierarchies of a world but also what 
supports them: the connections between the causes and effects 
we expect from that world, between the behaviours and motives 
we attribute to them and the means we have to modify them. 
(2004, 146-147) 
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This is where both the potential for emancipatory movements and 
explosions of physical violence are situated in divine violence. It creates 
the possibility for something new to occur by creating a roadblock in the 
current systemic and symbolic mechanisms which dictate the existing 
order. This is where Agamben thinks of this force more acutely than Žižek; 
“I would prefer not to” as the potential for something not to be, nothing 
more than this.   
For Agamben, Bartleby 'dwells so obstinately in the abyss of 
potentiality and does not seem to have the slightest intentions of leaving 
it' (1999b, 254). Potentiality is the essence of divine violence; the 
potential for something to be or not to be created by the unplugging from 
the current state of history. Agamben clarifies this idea: 'as the scribe who 
has stopped writing, Bartleby is the extreme figure of the Nothing from 
which all creation derives' (1999b, 253). There is no clear intent from 
Agamben to define Bartleby as an example of divine violence; yet it is this 
“Nothing” that is at the heart of divine violence. The creation from a 
space of nothingness is the act of divine violence which allows the 
potentiality of creation or non-creation; it gives possibility to something 
new as it prevents the smooth functioning of the old.  
The potential to be or not to be is the kind of weak power that Paul 
aligns with the Christ-event. To be or not to be a subject of Christ was the 
ultimate question of identity for Paul. This bypassed and superseded the 
existing categories of identity (male/female, Greek/Jew, slave/free) even 
if it could not destroy their temporal meaning. The rupture in the event of 
truth experienced by Paul in Damascus halted his current life and revealed 
a new potential through breaking the existing order (Gal. 1.17). Deleuze 
describes the operation of Bartleby in similar terms. 
 
There is nothing particular or general about Bartleby: he is an 
original. Originals are beings of Primary Nature, but they are 
inseparable from the world or from secondary nature, where 
they exert their effect: they reveal its emptiness, the 
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imperfection of laws, the mediocrity of particular creatures... 
the world as masquerade. (1998, 83) 
 
It is no wonder that Paul remains a significant figure in this discussion. The 
revolutionary turn in Paul’s narrative created the potential for a 
transvaluation of values in the wake of a kairotic moment that announced 
the messianic era. The meaning of weakness and strength moved to a 
space of perpetual re-examination. Paul’s understanding of Christ is that of 
the figure which, through a continuing faithfulness to a divine violence, 
disrupts the mechanisms of the current order and opens space in which 
there is a potential for something new. 
Establishing a space of potentiality (or a place of perpetual 
paradox), is this not the very thing which is really at stake for Žižek in 
Bartleby and Paul? And is this not also the thing at stake for Gianni 
Vattimo, the creation of a space in which the potential of hermeneutics 
dictates the organisation of politics? There is a spectre of Nietzsche and 
the violent disruption of truth here (despite the tension between 
understandings of truth as such in Žižek and Vattimo). Of interest is an 
action which is neither violent nor non-violent, it is violent and non-violent 
at the same time. This is the crux of the potentiality inherent in the divine 
violence of Bartleby; he does not positively act, but acts through this non-
action.  
 
2.4.2 Critchley and the Commandment 
 
Despite criticising Žižek’s examples of divine violence, Simon Critchley is a 
helpful interlocutor in moving beyond the deadlock that holds this idea in 
a perilous state between impotent disavowal and targetless destruction 
(between Bartleby’s death and targetless riots). Taking a different view of 
Gandhi’s resistance, he adds, ‘what defines Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance 
is not inactivity or passivity, as Žižek suggests, but a stubbornly persistent 
and hugely imaginative activism’ (2012, 241). Critchley disputes the claim 
that Bartleby is a figure of divine violence. Rather than sitting around and 
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waiting, he believes that it is ‘engaging in a series of preferred actions’ 
(241) that can bring about radical change. What Critchley’s position lacks, 
however, is the violence that creates the possibility for decisions taken 
beyond the control of the existing order.  
There is a facet of Critchley’s interpretation of divine violence that 
allows us to clarify that this deadlock is merely a part of the amoral nature 
of divine violence. What specifically interests Critchley is Benjamin’s 
interpretation of the commandment not to kill. From this he understands 
that violence is sometimes necessary, if not justified. Indeed, all we have 
now is ‘the folly of a plumb line of non-violence’ (2012, 226). In getting to 
what he understands as the crux of what we should take from Benjamin’s 
essay, he explains that, ‘when we wrestle with the commandment in 
solitude and decide not to follow it, then the responsibility falls on us’ 
(219). He summarises: ‘this law destroying act is divine violence; violence 
against violence’ (219). Non-violence is the aim but it cannot be the 
principle as ‘we cannot expect a radical change in the state of human 
beings in the world if we exclude violence as a matter of principle’ (240). 
As Benjamin describes the commandment: 
 
it exists not as a criterion of judgement, but as a guideline for 
the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with 
it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on the 
responsibility of ignoring it. (1921, 298) 
 
While this could be read as being roughly in line with Žižek’s basic reading 
of divine violence, Critchley distances himself from this idea, preferring 
instead to focus on non-violent activity. He argues that rather than waiting 
for a profound moment of divine violence, we must work tirelessly towards 
a better world (and this sometimes means violent action, but the 
responsibility falls on us). 
What Critchley fails to address, however, is the gap between what 
might cause an irruption of the Real in the Symbolic and the subsequent 
consequences of this break. While rioting or revolutionary terror might 
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announce the appearance of divine violence, the two are not one and the 
same (if they were, then the violence would not be divine but merely 
human - and by that very nature either law-preserving or law-
making/breaking violence). Against Pound's claim that it is not that Žižek's 
theory should be adjusted but refused (2008, 47), it is precisely an 
adjustment or clarification that his interpretation of divine violence 
requires. Divine violence should not be considered as our action, but what 
our action makes possible (or impossible) in its impact on the tension 
between the Symbolic and the Real. 
Critchley connects divine violence with his idea of the infinite 
demand; of our endless responsibility towards the Other. In this sense, 
through the glimpse of something which stands apart from the law, we 
strive to replace the function of law and its violent resolution with an ethic 
of love. Divine violence, then, is that which we must take infinite 
responsibility for.  
 
“God” is the first anarchist, calling us into a struggle with the 
mythic violence of the law, the state, and politics by allowing us 
to glimpse something that stands apart, an infinite demand that 
cannot be fulfilled, that divides the subjectivity that tries to 
follow it. (Critchley 2012, 220) 
 
It is divine violence which tears down the curtain to reveal the empty 
centre of the law; that God does not reside in the Holy of Holies and that 
this responsibility is thrown back onto us. Critchley argues: ‘divine violence 
is violence against violence that releases the subject from its 
(de)formation by law’ (217). Rather than connect divine violence simply 
with a decision to take responsibility beyond the dimensions of the law, 
divine violence is our responsibility, in Žižek’s words, ‘for God Himself’ 
(2008a, 157). In this sense it is precisely about the potentiality that is 
found in chaos. It is here that the connection with Critchley is situated: 
divine violence, like the Christ-event, is invested in anarchy. 
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This is why Clayton Crockett aligns divine violence with a ‘weak 
messianic power' (2013, 59). This violence without violence ‘disrupts 
sovereign power... including the power of divinity itself,’ and therefore 
‘opposes sovereign power and its teleology' (59). Understood in this way, 
divine violence is that which disrupts power, and its symbolic support, 
through the absence of divine sovereignty and its guarantees of truth. 
James Martel makes this link between divine violence with this type of 
anarchism; moments where sovereignty is stripped of its power. He 
explains that the Biblical narratives describe the rule of the Levites and 
the Hebrew Kings, 'except during periodic (but regular) eruptions of divine 
violence’ (2012, 142-143). These anarchist moments reveal the volatility of 
sovereign, or, put differently, the fragility of the symbolic underpinning of 
power.  
 
2.4.3 Bartleby and Chigurh 
 
Bartleby denies those within his sphere of influence the ability to actualise 
anything out of his potential. Chigurh, conversely, actualises the potential 
of the events which surround him; but at all times remains a figure bound 
by the chance of a coin. These figures are connected by the reality that 
they have no influence without first being hired. They are not the same, 
but they are of the same literary type: the divine figure that has 
descended into creation. They violently rupture the structures of the 
worlds they descend into. They are invited into the world, hired for some 
purpose, and while it may appear at first that they will simply carry out 
their duties, they will exceed the boundaries of the imagination of those 
who hired them. Christ is also of this type; created out of the conditions of 
the Jewish subject in that period, he subverted the logics of power 
inherent to his situation. These figures are a product of the worlds they 
disrupt; invited into those worlds as mercenary, scribe, or rabbi. They 
characterise the appearance of divine intervention; the violence which 
appears as if by accident, but always out of the conditions in which they 
were brought forth.  
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Bartleby and Chigurh are expressions of a divine force only insofar as 
they are expressions of the absence of God’s immediate presence. 
Bartleby’s work as a scribe, the act of writing which defers back to the 
divine, is ceaselessly marked by its separation from its origin in God. When 
Bartleby ceased writing, a motion which is marked by being overwhelmed 
by the work of the scribe, he revealed this absence – an outpouring of 
meaning in the absence of a connection to the absolute. Chigurh, in a very 
different way, recreates the act of the scribe – forever directed and 
compelled by other forces. This is precisely what Sherriff Bell saw in 
Chigurh’s eyes; that which he could not fully comprehend. These stories 
are linked to that of Job. The attempt by Job’s comforters and accusers to 
explain his suffering was an attempt to tame the forces of the divine; an 
attempt which God firmly refuted. This is one of the reasons why it is 
useful to explain the figure of God through fiction. Such literature, like 
God, dwells in paradox – between the absoluteness of his truth and the 
irreconcilable gap created from that truth as soon as the writing process 
begins.  
This brings us to Paul and his meeting with Christ’s rupture in the 
world. Paul’s realisation was that he dwelt within messianic time, which 
Agamben describes as ‘a zone of absolute indispensability between 
immanence and transcendence, between this world and the future world’ 
(2005, 25). In other words, like Bartleby, Paul ‘dwells so obstinately in the 
abyss of potentiality’ (1999b, 254). The law, as the primary block to the 
potential of salvation and justice for the Gentiles, is removed. For Paul, 
the activity of the time that had arrived was to be focussed on the 
fulfilment of the law through love in order to serve God’s potential in 
creation.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Divine Violence and Love in Romans 13 
 
3.1 The Roman Empire 
 
The Real and the Symbolic share a symbiotic relationship. The Real 
becomes known through the Symbolic, while the Symbolic can only exist 
because of the Real, yet one always betrays the other to a lesser or 
greater degree. This, in basic terms, describes the relationship between 
the material universe and the creation of meaning. This relationship is 
mediated through a divine economy that is directed by every little thing 
that exists. With divine violence, the tension created between the two, as 
mediated in the divine economy, becomes unbearable. Despite this 
volatility, the two rely on each other. Their boundaries and connections 
are constantly shifting. The tension and creativity that define their 
relationship exist together in one body, enclosed in a mutual relationship. 
It is here that Paul's importance really emerges. It was in this way that 
Paul dramatically describes the relationship between the human and the 
divine: God is only known through his working in creation, while creation 
relies on God to justify its existence. The relationship is bound to a body 
where the fate of both is played out. To put this in Paul's language, it is 
the body of Christ that carries the power of God.  
Paul’s context was heavily influenced by life within the boundaries of 
the Roman Empire.37 Dominant portrayals of the Roman Empire project an 
image of widespread violence: wars of conquest and control, criminals and 
slaves killed for sport, and capital punishment on public display are sewn 
together into these narratives. Popular imagination of this empire is one 
that contains the most brutal violence. 
                                                             
37 This insight is at the heart of the Jacob Taubes turn to Paul. Recent works by Brigitte 
Kahl, L.l. Welborn, Neil Elliot, and Davina Lopez have constructed convincing arguments 
for the influence of the Roman Empire over Paul’s life and works.  
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This is not a reputation gained without reason. Indeed, it is easy to 
discern why, in the stories we tell about past empires at least, the 
reputation of the Roman Empire is one that ‘remains extraordinary for the 
scale and method of its violence’ (Kyle 2012, 1). This empire, like most 
others, was based on the fundamental premise of expansion. This meant 
conquering by any means necessary.  
Violent men know the nature of such empires; they are not merely 
practical, a means by which to survive, they decide who is closest to god. 
Cormac McCarthy knew this in writing Blood Meridian. “The Judge” 
inhabits a brutal imagining of the old west, but he could very well exist in 
an imagining of the Roman Empire in the first century CE. In a crucial 
juncture of the novel, the Judge, a figure of unmitigated violence, smiled 
and said: ‘men are born for games. Nothing else. Every child knows that 
play is nobler than work.’ He explains the highest nature of this: ‘War is 
the ultimate game because war is at last a forcing of the unity of 
existence. War is god’ (249). War, ‘the truest form of divination’ (249), is 
at all times a concern for an emperor; whether wars of expansion or the 
war to maintain stability within the borders of the empire.38  
A short time after the probable date of Paul’s death in Rome, and 
only a small number of years after writing his most famous letter to the 
members of the Christ sect that lived there, a great fire devastated much 
of the city. In the burning heat of the summer the centre of the empire 
was reduced to rubble. The displacement of people, especially the poor, 
and the destruction of the mechanisms that allowed people to make a 
living had created anger on a level that the usual appeasements could not 
manage.39 Rumours of his weakness, or perhaps even his guilt, 
accompanied the anger that was directed towards Nero. A scapegoat was 
required to take the brunt of the blame for the fire. Step forward the 
group that Tacitus described as ‘the detested of the human race’ (Faulkner 
                                                             
38 Claudius, who reigned as Emperor during 13 years of Paul’s mission, firmly believed in 
the centrality of the principle of expansion to his rule.  
39 In Rome, ‘free circuses, like free bread, brought stability’ (Faulkner 2002, 22). 
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2002, 24): the followers of Christ.40 Some were burned as torches to light 
Nero’s gardens and others were sentenced to a bloody fate in sporting 
spectacles. The ruling authorities brought great wrath upon this group in 
order to maintain their power.  
Paul, in writing his infamous passage on governing authorities in 
Romans 13.1-7, was either tremendously wrong about the nature of ruling 
authorities or had some other purpose in sending a message that appears 
to give divine authority to those who use the most cruel violence as a 
means of punishment. 41 
In the decade before the anti-Christ-sect pogrom intensified following 
the great fire, a violent end at the hands of the Roman Empire was also the 
most likely outcome for Paul. Many slaves of Christ had their life snuffed 
out in this manner. There was no overturning of the powers, no Parousia in 
their lifetime, and no Kingdom of God to replace the Roman Empire. The 
messianic vocation, as Paul envisioned it, ended in the Roman Empire once 
again asserting its dominance over a maligned group within its borders. The 
idea of revolutionary love that Badiou, Žižek, and many other disparate 
voices in recent continental philosophy have taken from Paul was a 
spectacular failure in his own lifetime. He died in Rome with his mission 
incomplete. His story would be commandeered by an early Christian 
movement which would obscure his message of the revolutionary labour of 
love inherent to the time which had heralded by the Christ-event.  
Christianity emerged from the ashes of the mission to the Gentiles 
propelled by Paul and the remnants of the Jewish messianic movement 
organised around Peter in Jerusalem. The merging of their narratives, as 
shown in the Lukan story told in the Acts of the Apostles, allowed the 
                                                             
40Faulkner describes this group as ‘socially marginal’ with ‘odd’ practices, who drew old 
prejudices that were held for ‘the East, the Greeks, and the Semites’ (2002, 24). 
41 Mark Nanos gives an alternative interpretation of Rom. 13, relating it ‘not with the 
state, empire, or any other such organization of secular government’ but instead with 
‘the obligation of Christians, especially Christian gentiles associating with the synagogues 
of Rome’ (1996, 291). The Gentile followers must pay their respect and taxes to the local 
synagogues they are connected to, whilst remembering that their responsibility was not to 
the law but to love the neighbour.  This interpretation is a reminder of how remote we 
are to Paul’s context, and how subtle shifts in the understanding of context can create 
significant consequences. Yet it seems more convincing, given the context of the passage 
(particularly the immediately preceding 12.9-21), that Paul is referring to greater power 
mechanisms than the local Synagogues.  
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Christ-cults to survive. Richard Horsley emphasises the volatility of a 
context moulded in the midst of Jewish revolts. 
 
It would appear obvious that any discussion of violence in the 
New Testament or in Jewish society in the late second temple 
times must begin by recognising the realities of structural 
violence and the escalating spiral of violence in Roman 
dominated Jewish Palestine. (1993, 29) 
 
The failure of the Jewish revolts is testament to the true strength of the 
Roman Empire at that time. Such revolts were doomed to fail not merely 
because of the physical strength of the Imperial army, but because of the 
systemic and symbolic stranglehold it exerted over much of the populace. 
The siege of Jerusalem demonstrated the totality of this power. It 
controlled resources, it controlled large parts of the population, and it 
controlled the narrative of stability and the walls collapsed.  
In amongst the chaos of the conditions under siege, as food 
increasingly grew scarce, Jerusalem became consumed with explosions of 
violence internal to its walls. Josephus, influenced by his own ‘outrage’ at 
the rebels, even notes an instance of cannibalism (Rudich 2015, 304-305). 
According to Josephus, the consequences of the response of power from 
the Roman authorities were stark: ‘the roofs were filled with women and 
dying babies; the alleys with the corpses of the old; children and youths 
swollen, reeling like ghosts in the marketplace, fell whenever suffering 
overcame them’ (304-305).  
It is out of such feelings of disappointment, outrage, fear, and hope 
that the texts of the New Testament evolve; the Gospels and Acts create 
narratives that attempt to find a meaningful future for the good news of 
Jesus Christ. It is in light of this atmosphere created under the Roman 
Empire that Neil Elliot claims: ‘the passion narratives provide a 
sophisticated cover-up for the political nature of Jesus’ death’ (1995, 100). 
The vision of Paul’s campaign is distorted, its revolutionary fervour, indeed 
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rage, displaced onto new targets. Paul becomes buried in a new 
narrative.42 
The question, then, is what does Paul’s revolutionary idea of love 
have to offer contemporary political revolutionary projects? The answer 
can be found in a reclaiming of the narrative of Romans 13: Paul’s belief in 
the revolutionary weak violence of love. 
This work has so far begun to develop a theory around the impact of 
actions within an interconnected, divine, economy. Within this economy, 
absent of divine sovereignty, symbolic violence resides at the zero-level. 
Therein, divine violence exposes, even for a moment, its distortion of 
truth. This theory will now form the backdrop, and an essential part of the 
context, of an interpretation of the crucial passage that revolves around 
Romans 13.  
In this passage Paul describes his approach to dealing with the 
authorities (1-7), the ethic that the community of believers must adopt in 
order to fulfil the law (8-10), and the Messianic “now-time” that frames 
this context of their actions (11-14). In essence, it summarises Paul’s belief 
in the revolutionary violence inherent to the unfolding truth of the Christ-
event. This chapter examines the violent context that Paul was writing in, 
the importance of understanding Christ’s resurrection in this context, and 
what this rupture signifies in Paul’s comprehension of time. It is within this 
context that the connection between love and violence in the divine 
economy in Paul’s narrative is uncovered. The Christ-event creates a 
violent rupture in the Symbolic Order; a rupture which Paul enjoins us to 
continue to participate in. The violence of the Christ-event is pitted 
against that of the powers. We will begin this chapter with an archetypal 
villain of early Christianity: Nero. 
 
3.1.1 Nero 
 
Maintaining the Roman army was the biggest expense of the state in the 
time that Paul lived. Nero, emperor in the decade after Paul wrote his 
                                                             
42 Ward Blanton 
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letter to the Romans, however, was more interested in immersing himself 
in a more immediate world of violence. He believed the power of his 
personality to be such that he did not require the same strength of arms as 
his predecessors. Nero appears in the literature written about him as a 
lavishly violent character. Such was his passion for violence and his will for 
attention, he was said to have engaged in brawls in the streets of Rome 
while in disguise (Beacham 1999, 201). In addressing the issue of how we 
have come to imagine this Emperor, Edward Champlin writes in his 
biography on Nero: 
 
We all know about Nero. Nero was the emperor of Rome from AD 
54 to 68. Nero murdered his mother, and Nero fiddled while 
Rome burned. Nero also slept with his mother. Nero married and 
executed one stepsister, executed his other stepsister, raped 
and murdered his stepbrother. In fact, he executed or murdered 
most of his close relatives. He kicked his pregnant wife to death. 
He castrated and then married a freedman. He married another 
freedman, this time playing the bride. He raped a Vestal virgin. 
He melted down the household gods of Rome for their case 
value. After incinerating the city in 64, he built over much of 
downtown Rome with his own vast Xanadu, the Golden House. He 
fixed the blame for the great fire on the Christians, some of 
whom were hung up as human torches to light his gardens at 
night. (2003, 1) 
 
Nero, as his reputation goes, was a self-obsessed masochist who revelled in 
his own depravity. There is something else here, though, that Champlin 
urges the reader to remember: ‘much of what he did resonated far more 
with contemporary social attitudes than our hostile sources would have us 
believe’ (236). In part this has to do with a normalisation of violence; the 
stitching of violence into the very fabric of society that hides the ferocity 
which would later be excavated from its symbolic rubble. A power of 
symbolic and systemic violence is that it normalises what might otherwise 
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be considered extreme. Despite some embellishments and fabrications that 
have found its way into the figure of Nero, he represents the disturbed 
centre of the fervently violent world that Paul inhabited.  
The systemic violence that was embedded in the functioning of the 
Roman Empire that was maintained by structures and symbolism (which 
ensured incredibly violent zero-level worldviews) would have been an ever-
present part of life without necessarily being a jolting or disturbing force 
in the daily life of its inhabitants. The threat of violence and death was an 
ever-present reality.43 The Roman Empire had enormous power over life 
and death, not only because of its strength of arms but also because of its 
far reaching social, political, and geographical control. In a time of high 
infant mortality rates, unsanitary urban areas, and violence as sport, the 
idea of death had an imminent presence. In politics, culture, and in war, 
the Roman Empire had the power to improve living conditions or make 
them worse, to crush rebellions, and to make examples of rebels.44  
Its claim of power of life and death was intrinsic to its existence.45 In 
his description of the oppressive conditions of first century Palestine, Neil 
Elliot draws a comparison between the regime of terror perpetrated by the 
Roman Empire and the brutal efficiency of the death camps of the Nazi 
regime. He writes: ‘the Nazi death camp at Treblinka, where 840,000 Jews 
were gassed to death, was operated by some thirty German officers and 
perhaps 100 Ukrainians’ (1995, 99). With the same type of control, the 
Roman Empire was able to maintain its power over troublesome outlying 
regions. The highly visible and common sight of the criminals and trouble 
makers crucified on the outskirts of towns displayed an image of power 
which betrayed the truth of their real power (which existed in the twisting 
of truth). There was not the required number of soldiers to send to every 
part of the empire to maintain control through brute force.  
                                                             
43 Valarie M. Hope characterises this as a looming threat that ‘could be close up and 
personal’ (2009, 17). Her work on death in the Roman Empire begins in emphasising this 
imminent threat in cities that ‘were dirty, polluted, and violent’ (17). 
44 In the face of brutal spectacles, ‘crowd reactions were ones more of pleasure than 
revulsion, amusement rather than terror’ (Rudich 2015, 55). 
45 The power of death was ‘one of the empire’s most threatening weapons’ (Punt 2011, 
58). 
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Through the maintenance of social hierarchies, imperial propaganda, 
and, where needed, the awe of terror, the empire could maintain enough 
peace to prevent enough regions from revolting at once. Within this 
structure, military reserves could then be sent to where and when they 
were needed to quell larger disorder. Yet the centre of its power, and the 
centre of its violence, was in the dominance it held over life and death in 
the image it projected. This physical violence coupled with symbolic and 
systemic control was epitomised in the image of the crucified slave.  
Despite its sizeable and expensive army, the Roman powers could not 
afford to be constantly at war in all corners of its domain. It could not, 
through brute force alone, maintain its control over powers at its borders 
(from the Parthian Empire to the tribes of northern Europe) while also 
asserting dominance within. Tolerance for local customs was necessary for 
peace, but it also had to assert its dominance over those customs. Davina 
C. Lopez argues that the symbolism of Roman dominance would have had a 
profound impact on Paul. Imagery of the conquering Romans was prevalent 
in art throughout the region.46 The Roman eagle placed above the Temple 
in Jerusalem was a powerful symbol of tolerance of local customs mixed 
with ultimate power over them (which created a particular tension with 
many Jewish groups). This was the world of theologico-political tension 
that Paul lived in. The Roman Empire was defined by strength and 
depravity that Paul would come to so vehemently oppose, and, as the final 
insult, it claimed the ultimate power of life and death.  
 
3.1.2 The Crucifixion of the Jewish Messiah 
 
The movements that would become Christianity developed out of this 
context of Roman dominance. Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, in examining 
                                                             
46 Lopez argues: ‘ethnic stereotyping through gender constructs served the purpose of 
historicizing and legitimating hierarchical relations of conquest and assimilation on 
patriarchal terms’ (2008, 32). The use of public art displaying the glorious Roman solider 
and the defeated sub-human image of the barbarian would have been an influential 
reminder of who held power.  
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violence in Christianity, characterises a violent aspect of this context as 
such: 
 
Messianic fantasies came crashing down as Roman Soldiers 
slaughtered Jews, burned cities, and lined roads with crosses on 
which decaying corpses became food for birds and wild animals 
and served to discourage future rebellions. (2003, 67) 
 
The ingrained nature of this violence, which displayed a disregard for the 
bodies of those of lowly status, was a dominant force over life in the 
region. The greatest violence of this collection of structures, crafted to 
disguise the lack of direct physical force to control all the entire breadth 
of the empire, was weighted against those of the lowest status. The bodies 
of slaves and the political enemies rotting together on crosses epitomised 
this power over life. The greatest power, then, was maintained through 
this manipulation of reality (backed up by their strength of arms). This 
manipulation that occurs within the symbolic landscape has been one of 
the hallmarks of empires for thousands of years. Yet something miraculous 
would appear out of this context – a messianic figure would claim victory 
through dying on the symbol which defined power. 
The story of Jesus Christ, a crucified rebel, has left a footprint on 
history that is scarcely rivalled. The violence of the Roman Empire left a 
deep-seated imprint on the story of Christ; indeed, it made it possible. 
Outside of Judea, crucifixions were seen as a form of ‘exposure to the 
elements of the beasts’ (Kyle 1998, 169). Throughout the empire, ‘to 
prolong the message of deterrence, corpses were simply left to suffer 
excarnation via animals and decay’ (169). The fragility and miracle of the 
Christ-event only exists in the history of Judaism and its regard for the 
body. What if Christ, hanging there among other rebels and criminalised 
slaves, was left on the cross? Would it be unpalatable to the Christian 
imagination to see the saviour decay on a cross, while his flesh rotted 
away into inexistence? The final act upon the body of Christ, the spear in 
the side, should perhaps be seen as an act of mercy; more specifically, a 
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Jewish act of mercy. Mel Gibson’s Passion of the Christ (2004) attempts to 
frame Christ’s crucifixion as an act of extraordinary physical violence, yet 
the real spectre of violence that haunts this scene is that this was only an 
ordinary act of violence in this context. It is the operation of Christ within 
this ordinary sphere of violence that is crucial here.  
It was this violence that Paul countered in his interpretation of the 
Christ-event. In following Jacob Taubes to insist, ‘the Epistle to the 
Romans is a political theology, a political declaration of war on the Caesar’ 
(2008, 61), Neil Elliot argues that this was a text that drew battle lines 
between those in the labour of God’s plans, and those in the way (61). 
Elliot writes: 
 
the letter is not a treatise on how wicked human beings can be 
saved; to the contrary, as we shall see, it begins by driving a 
rhetorical wedge between the justice of God and the false 
claims of mortals who pretend at justice, but deserve God’s 
wrath instead (62). 
 
Paul’s messianic vocation was one greatly at odds with the ideology of the 
Roman Empire, and in this letter he was writing to those at the centre of 
its depravity. Paul opposed what Rome stood for in his lifetime, as Neil 
Faulkner summarises, Rome ‘was the New Babylon: the mother of whores 
and every obscenity, a black hole of corruption at the centre of the world’ 
(2002, 23). This did not mean, however, that Paul saw value in new earthly 
authorities to replace the current incumbents.47 In the tradition of Jewish 
apocalypticism the very point was that neither the rulers nor any of the 
alternatives provided a solution to the theologico-political impasse that 
had occurred. This is the revelation that struck Paul in the Christ-event; as 
he put it: ‘God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that 
are not, to reduce to nothing things that are’ (1 Cor. 1.28).  
                                                             
47 As Richard Kearney puts it, the radical nature of Paul’s message ‘lies in reversing the 
ontological dunamis of power in favour of an eschatological dunamis of possibility’ (2009, 
142). 
  Chapter Three  124 
 
This is the criticism that Paul casts against many Israelites; they are 
not yet willing to become nothing and align themselves with what is low 
and despised. For Paul, what many failed to see was that revolution only 
comes through God’s grace; not through taking up arms, or building 
temples, or making sacrifices, or seeking to rule as a human authority. The 
only revolutionary power belongs to the fulfilling of the law through the 
work of love and the faith of what God can do with that fidelity to His 
promises.  
Paul’s faith in the specific nature of the Christ-event showed that he 
not only opposed the Roman Empire, he also opposed the way that some 
Jews (including himself) had previously attempted to resist its power. 
Elliot, in disputing facets of Badiou’s assumptions about Paul, especially his 
understand of the resurrection as functioning as a fable (Badiou 2003, 4), 
writes that: 
 
it is even more important for us to recognise that the 
fundamental ideological requirements of Roman imperialism 
are directly opposed in Paul’s representation of the body of 
the crucified and risen Christ in the world. (2010, 144) 
 
The Roman Empire is undermined by Christ defeating death through the 
very mechanisms which the empire chose to crush resistance within its 
tributary states. The key here, and what Badiou misses, is that we should 
situate Paul within a Pharisaic and apocalyptic tradition which understood 
the significance of physical resurrection. Resurrection after crucifixion 
gave Christ victory over the Roman Empire in a way that subverted its 
particular imperial logics. Paul is inscribing the actuality of resurrection 
into Roman imperial logics by using the marginalised figure of the slave as 
the authority which overcomes that which would posit itself as absolute 
authority.  
The Messiah resurrected from a humiliating death was the world-
shattering aspect of the Christ-event for Paul. Its rupturing of the Symbolic 
revealed the fragile mechanisms that held together structures and systems 
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of authority. Elliot is not far away from this theory of divine violence when 
he writes: 
 
within an apocalyptic logic that if a crucified man is 
resurrected, there is neither slave nor free person, since 
resurrection means a divine intervention that ruptures the very 
system of significations that oppose slave and free, man and 
woman. (2010, 148)  
 
Paul’s Lord claimed victory from the humiliating site of the cross, ‘a 
stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles’ (1 Cor. 1.23). The 
Christ-event transformed how Paul understood divine logics of power in the 
moment that had arrived.   
 
3.2 Romans 13 
 
In Chapter One we saw the way in which Žižek uses the Book of Job and 
the idea of double kenosis, taken from Paul in Philippians 2, to establish 
the basis for a materialist theology. Crucial to this is the positioning of 
Paul as a terror to authority. In sum, Paul understands God as humbling 
Himself at the hands of His own creation; the foolish God triumphs over 
even the strongest authority in an overturning of the way in which power is 
understood. So how then do we incorporate 'the reef that threatens to 
capsize every Christian liberative project' (Elliot 1995, 217)?  
Romans 13 is a dangerous text which reinforces the looming presence 
of the wrath of God in Paul’s letters. To think about Paul in the context of 
this passage requires that we acknowledge, as Blanton puts it, ‘the 
experience of realising that we may not turn out to be who we thought we 
were’ (2013a, 195). This experience of our words saying more than we 
intended to say, or not realising the contexts they might reach, should not 
be forgotten in our readings of Paul. His inconstancies and missteps are 
symptomatic of a writer who, like the rest of us, was human, and who, we 
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should not forget, was wrong about many things in his immediate 
interpretation of the consequences of the Christ-event.48  
Indeed, Žižek’s interest in Paul is bound up with this struggle of the 
subject. Paul was not simply proclaiming truth but participating in it; as 
Žižek puts it, ‘universal truth is accessible only from a partial, engaged 
subjective position. Therein resides Paul’s communism’ (2013a, 184). 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the rhetoric of Romans 13. This passage 
represents Paul’s disavowal of physical violence and his acceptance of 
divine violence. This was Paul’s call to revolution through love; his centre-
piece on the weak violence of love. Brigitte Kahl explains this force of love 
in relation to Paul’s letter to Galatia: ‘love is the driving power that 
throws the combat square into an irreversible spin of messianic 
“revolution” (2010, 265-266). This is a love which exists in relationship 
with divine wrath.  
 
3.2.1 Romans 13.1-7: Paul and the Wrath of God 
 
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for 
there is no authority except from God, and those authorities 
that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever 
resists authority resists what God has appointed, and those 
who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to 
good conduct, but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the 
authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive its 
approval; for it is God’s servant for your good. But if you do 
what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not 
bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute 
wrath on the wrongdoer.  Therefore one must be subject, not 
only because of wrath but also because of conscience. For the 
same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s 
servants, busy with this very thing. Pay to all what is due 
                                                             
48As John Gager puts it, ‘the problem, of course, is that the entirety of Paul’s God-time 
scheme soon became obsolete. In a word, he was wrong’ (2000, 151). 
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them—taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom 
revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honour to 
whom honour is due. 
 
The wrath of God is a major theme of the epistle to the Romans. Paul 
refers to this wrath throughout his letter (1.18, 2.5, 3.5, 5.9, 9.22, 12.19), 
but at no point have its interpretations been more troubling than in 
relation to that opening passage of Romans 13. Romans 13.1-7 has done 
more than any other passage in Paul’s letters to destabilise the idea of an 
anti-imperial Pauline message. This passage, and its surrounding chapters, 
epitomise the sometimes stupefying nature of Biblical texts. Placed in the 
middle of the letter’s love-inspired crescendo, this dangerous text appears 
to attribute divinely sanctioned legitimisation to governing authorities. 
Authorities that were implicated, by Paul himself, not only in the 
persecution of followers of Christ but also in the execution of Christ 
himself. As he put it, ‘none of the rulers of this age understood this; for if 
they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory’ (1 Cor. 2.6-8). It 
seems unlikely that Paul would not have aligned the death of Christ on a 
Roman cross with the mechanisms of Roman authority, yet it remains 
difficult to determine exactly what power Paul believed the ruling 
authorities had been given by God.49 
Romans 13.1-10 presents perhaps the greatest paradox of his letters. 
If 13.8-10 is the confirmation of the various discourses in the turn to Paul 
that centre on this idea of love towards the neighbour, then 13.1-7 is the 
very passage that threatens to uncouple these assertions through the 
return of the sovereign God who is master of all fate. The nature of the 
                                                             
49Richard Cassidy offers an alternative interpretation to Rom. 13. He argues that Paul 
would have, at the time of writing Rom. 13, had a 'sunny estimation of the Roman 
authorities' (2001, 35). He argues that Paul would have found the current administration 
in Rome to be relatively favourable for the purposes of his mission. By the time of writing 
Philemon, however, Paul shows no defence of the imperial power he was imprisoned 
under. He goes on to argue that Paul surely would have adjusted his message in Rom 13.1-
7 if he had been afforded the opportunity (204). He argues that a “Philippian” reading 
would change 13.1 and 13.6, essentially rendering void the rest of the passage. This 
argument rests on a Romans-Philemon sequence of Paul’s letter writing which seems 
unlikely.  
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divine economy here, as we shall see, is that the authority of rulers is 
merely a fact that is undercut, made ethically irrelevant, in the demand to 
fulfil the law through love.  
The idea that Paul was justifying the moral goodness of any governing 
authority should be rejected. Paul was not suggesting, in moral terms, that 
Christ, dying a rebel’s death on the cross, was a victim of the ‘servants of 
God’ given authority to ‘execute wrath on the wrongdoer’ (Rom. 13.4). 
Yet he was not denying this nature of the divine economy. Read in relation 
to Philippians 2.6-8, God took on the form of a slave and humbled himself 
to his own agents of wrath by becoming obedient to execution on their 
symbol of authority. This is indicative of the divine economy that Paul calls 
the Romans to participate in. Paul was not reflecting their moral 
uprightness, but the reality of the situation. It was, after all, governing 
authorities (local and state) that imprisoned Paul and persecuted many 
other followers of Christ.  
While Paul writes of the mystery of how God’s sovereignty works 
(Rom. 9.18), he also expresses a belief that everyone has the choice to 
participate in God’s plan out of their own will (Rom. 10.4). Paul appears to 
have had no problem with the paradox contained in the distance between 
the actions of the governing authorities and the instructions given to the 
followers of Christ. The failure to understand this acceptance of the 
paradox of the divine economy turns this passage into a dangerous text; 
one that, despite all logic (whose side is God on?), has justified the actions 
of nation states in war. Paul simply does not account for how state power 
is constructed.50 51 The absolute horror of the mass-produced death at 
concentration camps in 20th century Europe, or in the ethnic cleansings 
that have devastated Rwanda, Congo, and Sudan in the past two decades 
cannot be reduced to the will of a God and a people of bad conduct. Paul 
is not acutely enough aware of the absence of God in the world. 
                                                             
50Katherine Grieb makes this point that it would come to be ironic that Paul’s ‘warning 
that authority “does not wear the sword in vain” should have functioned for so many 
centuries as the warrant for unquestioning obedience of Christians to the state’ (2002, 
126) 
51Ernst Käsemann notes this problem in Paul: ‘the problem of political force does not 
come into view’ (1980, 359).  
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3.2.2 Paul’s Ambiguous Rhetoric  
 
Neil Elliot is a strong advocate that Paul could not have believed 
these words as any sort of metaphysical declaration; he writes, 'the 
language of submission and fear that appears here is a startling exception 
to the rhetoric of the rest of the letter'. (2008, 153). Elizabeth Schüssler-
Fiorenza responds to Neil Elliot’s defence of Paul in Romans 13.1-7 by 
cautioning that ‘instead of revalorizing Paul’s rhetoric, one must theorize 
and develop a critical biblical rhetorical inquiry that would help to prevent 
scholarly identification with Paul and the exegetical re-inscription of Paul’s 
rhetoric of othering’ (2000, 53). This means finding the ‘voices within Paul’ 
rather than the ‘master Paul’ (53). To what extent should we seek to 
defend Paul’s rhetoric in our creation of Pauline voices? 
This was a typical message in Paul’s corpus of work: practical advice 
for living in the end times which was laced with theological justification. 
Despite its immediately jarring presence between the end of Rom. 12 and 
Rom. 13.8, there is little reason to dismiss verses 1-7 as a later 
interpolation.52 Indeed, it can be interpreted as a crucial part of the 
subversive nature of the passage. As Robert Jewett describes, the ‘variety 
of imperial and local offices’ (2007, 788) that Paul is referencing must rely 
on God for their authority. It was ‘not Mars or Jupiter, as in the Roman 
Civic cult’ (2007, 789), or even from the Emperor himself; instead, ‘no 
matter what Roman officials may claim as their authority, it really comes 
from the God of the Jewish and Christian faith’ (789).53 In this sense, the 
passage remains closely aligned with the general theme of God’s authority 
that is maintained through the letter; indeed, ‘it is not as if the word of 
God has failed’ (9.6). The source of all power and authority is not found in 
                                                             
52Jewett cites a strong connection between obligation in 13.7 and 13.8, as well as no 
distinctive change in style or tone in his conclusion, ‘it remains highly likely that 13:1-7 is 
an authentic and original portion of Paul’s letter’ (2007, 784). 
53As N.T. Wright points out, ‘this passage actually represents a severe demotion of the 
rulers’ (2005, 78). 
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the governing authorities, but in God alone. This is a subversive message to 
the structure of the authority that the Roman authorities assumed.  
Jewett draws Paul’s reasoning for writing this passage towards the 
practical reason that he was writing his letter: the Spanish mission. He 
argues that this passage is ‘missional rather than theoretical,’ and Paul 
simply ‘overlooks aspects of governmental behaviour in times past in order 
to appeal to the groups of believers within the imperial bureaucracy whose 
cooperation was perceived to be vital’ (794). With this in mind, he later 
adds that Paul’s articulation of the Roman tax authorities as being 
‘ministers of God… remains a breathtaking claim’ (800). It was this 
taxation (enforced with a complex system of dominance over life itself) 
that helped to underpin Roman rule.  
James Dunn defends Paul’s rhetoric in this passage, noting Paul might 
have been defending Christian merchants against problems surrounding 
unrest to do with taxes. He proposes that this rhetoric may have been 
designed to guard against a ‘well-developed system of spies and informers’ 
that would have caused trouble for them in their ‘defenceless position’ 
(1998, 675).   
Douglas Harink argues that Paul is explaining that the community 
following Christ must live with ‘readiness to suffer at the hands of enemies 
rather than repay with violence’ (2003, 143). This is a reflection on the 
community of believers, not the ruling authorities; he points out, 
‘subordination is significantly different from obedience’ (144). The 
argument here is that this is practical advice, as Kathy Ehrensperger 
argues: 
 
They have no option but to submit to this power – any other 
behaviour would come close to suicidal activity. […] It is actually 
submission to a dominating power – not voluntarily but by force. 
(173) 
 
These small communities would have had little option but to submit to the 
authorities. Significantly, though, such authority is only given by God and 
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their rule is ‘doomed to pass away’ (1 Cor. 1.8) due to the unfolding of the 
Christ-event.  
It could be, as Elliot puts it, ‘Paul intentionally characterises the 
Roman authorities in such slavishly deferential terms that his audience 
must have recognised his remarks as ironic’ (1995, 154). The defence of 
Paul’s rhetoric on practical terms does not deal with the idea that this 
passage undermines the structures of political order. If it is designed to 
allow Christians to escape trouble, it does not manage to do this without 
maintaining that his God has authority over even Caesar himself. The 
governing authorities might not have been as pleased with this passage as a 
surface reading might suggest.54 As Elliot goes on to point out, 'If Paul's goal 
is purely pragmatic isn't his praise of the rulers effusive?' (1995, 220).  
Seyoon Kim, in countering Elliot’s anti-imperial readings of Paul, 
describes Romans 7 as ‘the Achilles heel for all anti-imperial readings of 
Paul' (2008, 36). Calling Elliot’s grasp of the theme of the letter 
‘unconvincing, and at times arbitrary’ (39), Kim argues, ‘it is clear that 
Paul preferred the Roman order of justice, in spite of all their 
imperfection, to chaos and anarchy’ (42-43). Accusing the anti-imperial 
readings of Elliot and N.T. Wright of appearing to ‘defy elementary logic in 
relation to Romans 13,’ Kim settles on a reading that simply testifies to 
Paul’s Jewish understanding of order under a ruling authority. Elliot (2008, 
55), however, argues that even the enemies of God were described as 
carrying his authority, including the Assyrians (Isaiah 10.5) and King 
Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon (Jeremiah 27.6). 
We cannot be certain what Paul preferred in practical terms. Even if 
he did prefer the brutality and order of Roman rule to the potential chaos 
of the alternatives, in theologico-political terms Paul shows no preference. 
This is why Paul is at great pains to point out to those in Rome that he is 
not spreading a message of partiality. Using the example of the barriers 
that Christ broke down between Jew and Gentile, he explains that in 
                                                             
54 Sylvia Keesmaat describes Paul’s claim that the authorities ruled by the sword as ‘a slap 
in the face for a ruler who thought he ruled by persuasion and reason’ (2012, 60).  
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reducing the things that are (1 Cor. 1.28), God no longer showed any 
partiality in these terms. 
 
There will be anguish and distress for everyone who does evil, 
the Jew first and also the Greek, but glory and honour and 
peace for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also the 
Greek. For God shows no partiality. (Rom 2.9-11) 
 
This was not a partiality that only extended to the gap between Jews and 
Gentiles. It is the ‘doers of the law that will be justified’ (2.13); in the 
messianic period that has arrived, Paul makes it clear that being the ruling 
authorities has no real significance in this regard.  
Yet it would be misleading to follow John Milbank’s claim that Paul 
'simply bypassed empire and did something else' (2010, 72). The type of 
Christian anarchism promoted by Jacques Ellul is closer to Paul’s thinking; 
where state mechanisms are subverted rather than merely ignored in order 
to fulfil the promises of God. God’s victory over the powers is only possible 
through their subversion. In this sense Paul was troubled by empire; he had 
the same concerns that had been prevalent throughout the history of 
Israel. N.T. Wright’s basic premise in understanding this passage is that ‘it 
is a classic piece of writing about how to live wisely under alien rule’ 
(2005, 103). He goes on to make three important points: that Paul is 
dissuading private vengeance, that the governing authorities cannot 
themselves claim ‘divine honours,’ and that life under foreign rule could 
only now be understood within the eschatological framework of the now-
time. What ties these points together is the crux of the passage; whatever 
else might be going on within the divine economy, the only debt that 
remains outstanding is the debt of love to the neighbour. We should not, 
however, forget the violence imbedded in this message. Paul’s rhetoric 
was undoubtedly violent.  
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3.2.3 Romans 13. 8-10: A Divine Economy based on Love 
 
Owe no one anything, except to love one another; for the one 
who loves another has fulfilled the law. The commandments, 
“You shall not commit adultery; You shall not murder; You 
shall not steal; You shall not covet”; and any other 
commandment, are summed up in this word, “Love your 
neighbour as yourself.” Love does no wrong to a neighbour; 
therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law. Besides this, you 
know what time it is, how it is now the moment for you to 
wake from sleep. 
 
In his response to the relevance of the turn to Paul in continental 
philosophy, Larry L. Welborn addresses the lack of attention that has been 
given to Romans 13.8-14. He contends that there is a wariness surrounding 
the potential legitimacy that Paul gives to governing authorities in Rom. 
13.1-7; but in doing so there is something crucial that is missed in Paul’s 
theologico-political worldview. The point here is twofold: 13.1-7 does not 
enjoin obedience to the governing authorities and 13.8-14 denotes the 
active resistance that is compelled by the Messianic moment. As Welborn 
puts it: 
 
in sum, the traditional interpretations of Romans 13:1-7 as a 
Pauline preachment of submission to the authorities and the 
conventional assumption that Paul’s eschatology was static and 
that he continued to await the Second Coming are the two rams 
whose blood must fill the trench, if the spirit of Paul’s most 
intense formulation of the demands and conditions of messianic 
life in Romans 13:8-14 is to rise and speak to us. (2015, xvi) 
 
The assertion here is that Paul, as his campaign matured, became more 
and more active in his participation in the labour of messianic time. It was 
not enough simply to wait for time to come to an end, as if there was 
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nothing required on the part of those who were faithful to the Christ-
event. Instead it was in the activity compelled by the command to fulfil 
the law through love to the neighbour that Paul wished to define the 
activity of messianic time. 
 This theological viewpoint became particularly relevant within Paul’s 
apocalyptic framework. What had changed, what Paul makes clear in his 
positioning of God above Caesar, was that the coming wrath places 
everyone, from emperor to slave, directly under God’s imminent 
judgement. Being ‘God’s subject for your good’ was not a sign that the 
authorities were aligned with God’s ethical or moral judgement, nor was it 
a sign that they were beyond God’s wrath. Christ’s death and resurrection 
in the body of a man revealed that God is also subject to this divine 
economy. Revealed for Paul was that now all were responsible within this 
divine economy; Jew, Greek, slave, and free all shared in the 
responsibility over their place in God’s plan. This is the foundation of 
Pauline universalism; the shared responsibility for the fate of the whole of 
creation. What occurred in the now-time would determine the 
particularities of the coming judgement (Rom. 2.6).  
 The revelation in the Christ-event that the weak will shame the 
strong provides a reinterpretation of the honour system that this empire 
prided itself on. The only way then to gain influence, to gain honour, was 
to love one another. This was, for Paul, what God demonstrated on the 
cross. If the way to displace the powers and release the world from its 
current captivity was to directly take on those powers through physical 
force, then Christ would not have been crucified. Victory over the power 
of death was displayed through Christ’s own submission to the powers. 
Christ became a victim of the “good sword” of the governing authorities to 
show that the real power, the foolishness overcoming wisdom, was 
situated outside of the power structures of the authorities.  
 This is what Žižek referred to in one of his earlier writings as, 
‘perhaps the greatest ethical revolution in the history of mankind: the 
moment when the subject refuses the allocated role of the victim’ (1992: 
65). This is why kenosis begins with Job. Job makes a break from the 
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ideological pressures of this world through negating the very existence of 
the big Other (the explanations of his accusers). He has no interest in 
playing their game of scapegoating and sacrifice. This is Job’s symbolic 
suicide that would be repeated by God Himself through Christ.  
 Paul’s repeats a claim evident throughout the Scriptures. One way or 
another, their actions relate to the divine. For Paul this was defined for 
the Gentiles in their love for the neighbour. There is an echo here of the 
opening of the tradition of prophetic writings under the name Isaiah. The 
Israelites are asked: ‘why do you seek further beatings? Why do you 
continue to rebel?’ (1.5). While aliens devour their land the Israelites do 
not adjust their behaviour (1.7). Instead, they offer sacrifices to God so 
that he would allow them to continue in their ways without the attacks of 
their enemies. The Lord replies: ‘bringing offerings is futile, incense is an 
abomination to me’ (1.13); and in the crescendo of a pattern not dissimilar 
to Romans 13, the Lord instructs the Israelites: 
 
Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean; 
remove the evil of your doings 
from before my eyes; 
cease to do evil, 
learn to do good; 
seek justice, 
rescue the oppressed, 
defend the orphan, 
plead for the widow. (Is. 16-17) 
 
Do not rebel, do not bother with rituals, but instead love your neighbour. 
Paul’s message is clear: ‘vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord’ 
(12.19). Paul was warning this community in Rome about revolting against 
the ruling authorities, because it was by fulfilling the law through love for 
the neighbour that they would heap burning coals on the heads of those 
who opposed this plan for creation (12.20).  
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 Christ’s death on the cross, and the hardship Paul and the 
communities that he corresponded with had experienced, confirmed that 
there was no guarantee in their action. The agents of wrath among the 
ruling elite did not fulfil the law through their actions – this was only 
possible through the debt of love to the neighbour. This passage should be 
read alongside the Book of Job as well as this opening passage of Isaiah: 
get on with the business of fulfilling the law instead of worrying about the 
particularities of divine action. 
 
3.2.4 Romans 13.11-14: The Now-Time 
 
Besides this, you know what time it is, how it is now the moment 
for you to wake from sleep. For salvation is nearer to us now 
than when we became believers; the night is far gone, the day is 
near. Let us then lay aside the works of darkness and put on the 
armour of light;  let us live honourably as in the day, not in 
revelling and drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, 
not in quarrelling and jealousy.  Instead, put on the Lord Jesus 
Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires. 
 
Read alongside Paul’s claim that ‘rulers of this age are doomed to perish’ 
(1 Cor. 2.6), it becomes difficult to read Romans 13 as any sort of 
endorsement of the existing order. The fulfilling of the law and the 
perishing of the rulers are inextricably linked. Karl Barth cuts through the 
rhetoric to articulate Paul’s message: ‘real revolution comes from God and 
not from human revolt’ (1933, 485). Is this not precisely what Paul means 
when he wrote, ‘it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who 
shows mercy’ (Rom 9.16)? This does not, however, mean that our activity 
is meaningless. On the contrary, Paul emphasises that it is only through 
love that we can participate in this grace that God has afforded to His 
creation. 
In his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, a far more politically 
charged work than some of his later theology would become, Barth 
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positions love as ‘the essentially revolutionary action’ (1933, 498). He 
explains: 
 
Love is that denial and demolition of the existing order which 
no revolt can bring about. […] Love is the destruction of 
everything that is – like God: the end of all hierarchies and 
authorities and intermediaries, because, in every particular 
man and also in the ‘Many,’ it addresses itself, without fear of 
contradiction – to the One. (496) 
 
This represents a twisting of Žižek’s Bartlebian withdrawal in the service of 
divine violence. What Barth had already perceived in Paul was that love 
serves this divine force in a way that, if pushed to its limits, the existing 
order would no longer be able to tolerate. In short, when we live in full 
subjectivity to Christ through our debt of love to the neighbour we deny the 
potential for the powers to continue to operate. Barth acknowledges the 
astonishing and impossible nature of this love and its power to deny the 
truth of the existing order.  
This is what makes Žižek and Barth interesting theological partners; 
even if it would have been an antagonistic relationship. Their work on Paul 
is heavily invested in the way in which love might transform the theologico-
political coordinates of the situation through making the conditions for the 
existing order intolerable. The idea put forward by Paul, as awkward and 
dangerous as his rhetoric can be, is that the law is fulfilled not through 
directly challenging the governing authorities but through an absolute 
fidelity to this absolute of love.  
Taking up arms or throwing petrol bombs can all too easily be 
inscribed back into the dominant narrative of the authorities, facilitating 
the spiral of violence in the quelling of those who are merely 
“troublemakers.” Allowing such power to destroy itself by denying its 
ability to reproduce the conditions for its survival is the point being drawn 
out in such narratives. The transformation of the narrative, and with it the 
possibility for radical change, is situated, according to both Barth and 
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Žižek, in a Pauline theory of love. The problem with Paul’s specific 
example is that it is so mercilessly trapped within an eschatological 
context. There is no other strategy for overturning the powers. In Paul, in 
Barth, and in Žižek we have different examples of trying to imagine what 
seems impossible – the overturning of the dominant narrative and its ability 
to continue to reproduce its power.  
Barth maintains the revolutionary nature of Paul’s letter, and its 
relevance beyond its initial context. The stress here is on a very different 
type of revolt from that which was to unfold in Palestine in the decades 
following Paul’s death. He warns that ‘it is not for us to arm ourselves for 
action with the standard of the measurement of God – as though He acted 
through us’ (1933, 485). Instead the responsibility placed on our shoulders 
is a debt of love. Paul does not want the members of the church to create 
trouble in the streets.55 What would the point of Christ’s crucifixion have 
been if God wanted His people to take up arms? Paul remained enamoured 
with the specific logics of the Christ-event and its nonviolent violence. It 
was this indirect approach which formed the basis of Barth’s idea of 
resistance to Hitler’s administration. 
Paul informs the Gentiles, whom he is corresponding with somewhere 
in Galatia, that all those ‘who rely on the works of the law are under a 
curse’ (3.10). In this letter Paul puts forward a passionate case to this 
community that followers of Christ should not conform to traditions and 
rules related to Jewish law. In his letter written some time later to a small 
Gentile community of Christ-cult followers in Rome, Paul clarifies another 
important issue. This Gentile shunning of Jewish traditions did not mean 
the end of the Law. On the contrary, it meant that the Gentiles must fulfil 
the law in a different manner. The law is fulfilled through a fidelity to 
loving the neighbour. Paul’s awkward juxtaposing of the fulfilment of the 
law through love with a warning to submit to governing authorities 
reinforces this message: let nothing get in the way of the vital work in the 
body of Christ. Read in this way, Christ becoming a curse was not an attack 
                                                             
55 Elliot picks up on this point. Paul is attempting 'to impel them rather toward mutual 
compassion and striving for the common good' (1995: .223). 
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on the law itself but an attack on anything that stood in the way of its 
fulfilment. Paul’s warning was stark: the rules and the taxes of the 
governing authorities are meaningless in light of the Christ-event, the only 
debt that truly matters is the debt owed to your neighbour.  
Paul’s identification with slavery in the service of Christ made it clear 
that he believed authority was situated in Christ as Lord. As Sylvia 
Keesmaat puts it, ‘“Paul, a slave of Jesus Christ.” Just imagine how this 
would have sounded in the context of an empire governed by status and a 
culture governed by an honour/shame dynamic’ (2012, 52).The community 
of believers were bound together in equality under Christ. 
The consequence of this was a new community with a new set of 
values. Katherine Grieb follows Elliot to succinctly make this point. 
 
The solemn eschatological warning that concludes chapter 13 
serves, among other things, to destabilize the apparent facticity 
of the reigning Roman Empire and to describe the alternative 
community that wears “weapons of light” (13:12) because it 
belongs to the coming Day of the Lord and not to the present 
time of darkness. (2002, 60) 
 
Romans 13.8-10 undercuts the initial verses of this chapter, and this is 
brought to completion in verses 11-14. Paul brings us straight back to his 
preceding words: ‘Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with 
good’ (12.21). The appetite to gratify the desires of the flesh, which was 
epitomised in a figure like Nero, was what Paul criticised in Rome. His 
response to Rome was a part of the way in which Paul attempted to 
radically transform the way that the followers of Christ understood the 
violence of the existing order and how to oppose this violence. Paul, like 
the Gospel writers, wanted to distance himself from the idea of opposing 
the governing authorities through withholding taxes or physical revolt; only 
love, to reiterate this point, has the power to ‘heap burning coals on their 
heads’ (12.20). As Theodore Jennings puts it, the message was clear: ‘“let 
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them have their damned money”’ (2013, 193). For, as Paul put it himself, 
‘the night is far gone; the day is near’ (13.12). 
 
3.3 Divine Violence and Love  
 
Barth comes to the idea that to love one another means: ‘no debts! 
Paraphrased, this means non-resistance!’ (1933, 492). Subjection negates 
the possibility of opposing evil with evil, while love provides the possibility 
of protesting against the evil in the world. Barth argues: 
 
Love of one another ought to be undertaken as the protest 
against the course of the world…we remember that human 
conduct is positively ethical when it is not conformed to this 
world. (492-3) 
 
In Paul’s view, the act of resistance in the form of withholding taxes would 
have only added to the spiral of violence without the potentiality for 
something truly novel to appear. Barth reads Paul here as affirming that 
‘love is the good work by which the evil is overcome’ (496). The 
responsibility inherent to the works of love is infinite. In other words, 
creation was given responsibility over Christ – and he was nailed to a cross. 
Paul describes to the church in Philippi the way in which love requires the 
members to think others better than themselves, taking Christ as the 
ultimate example (2.3). This is a divine economy based on a law of love. 
It is here that we should situate continuing the weak violent 
potential of the Christ-event. This weak violent potential, a “militant 
weakness” as Kenneth Reinhard calls it, is at the core of Žižek’s 
materialist readings of Christianity (and Paul in particular). It is essential 
to Žižek’s (now famous) claim that ‘to become a true dialectical 
materialist, one should go through the Christian experience’ (2003, 6). 
Reinhard, following Benjamin’s understanding of political theology, 
understands this crucial aspect of Romans 13. He writes, ‘the profane 
world of politics hastens the coming of the messianic era not by aspiring to 
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emulate it, but by intensifying its own profanity, and thereby speeding its 
fall’ (2013, 457). This is along the same lines as the argument that Žižek 
employs with regards to Bartleby and divine violence. It is through letting 
the powers reveal their own monstrosity, exposed in the dissolution of 
certain power mechanisms (in the case of the Roman Empire, its power 
over life and death), that its end is hastened. We need something that is 
more violent, more perverse, in order to expose the powers which impinge 
on our potential to act as ethical agents.  
The death of God is not simply the rise of the secular. Rather, ‘it is 
the profane, not the “secular,” that hastens the coming of the messianic 
world’ (Reinhard 2013, 464). This is how we should read Christ’s death: as 
the profane Event that allows the possibility of a transvaluation of values. 
Reinhard sees the importance of this profanation in thinking of neighbour 
love beyond its inception into secularity. It is here that we might: 
 
rescue neighbour love from the banalization of secularism, 
where it functions at best as a platitude of ethical reason, the 
empty universal par excellence, or at worst as an ideological 
cloak for institutional indifference and social cruelty. (2013, 465) 
 
It is not enough to attempt to live ethically within the violent boundaries 
of global capitalism, we must violently hasten the demise of the social, 
political, cultural, and economic structures which define their control.  
 
3.3.1 Foolish Power 
 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen relates Romans 13.1-7 to a passage of text a 
contemporary of Paul, the Stoic philosopher Seneca. In writing to Nero 
about his authority, Seneca explains about the nature of power. Engberg-
Pedersen writes: 
 
for our purposes, the important elements in the description 
Seneca gives of Nero’s power are the following three. Nero has 
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been chosen (electus) to serve on earth as vicar of the gods. 
Nero is the sovereign judge (arbiter) of life and death, good 
things and bad things, for all his subjects, namely, all ‘peoples’ 
(populi), ‘cities’ (urbes) and ‘nations’ (nationes); all such things 
fall within his jurisdiction (mea iuris dictio est). In particular, 
those many thousand swords (gladii) which Nero’s peace 
restrains ‘will be drawn at my nod’. (2013, 167) 
 
As Seneca showed, there was a general belief in a ‘just, divinely installed 
leader’ (2013, 169).56 Paul’s precise point, being written for the specific 
purpose of instructing on the payment of taxes, is that the people should 
strive to do what is good. Paul uses the motif of the just ruler to instruct 
the followers of Christ to pay their taxes, but he follows it up with a 
clarification. Even though this is accepted logic, there is something greater 
that supersedes it: you might owe taxes to the state, but all that really 
matters is the fulfilment of the law through love. Engberg-Pedersen puts it 
this way: 
 
bringing in again agape from ch. 12, Paul is here offering a more 
comprehensive view of his believers’ politics, one that 
supplements the univocal reading of 13.1-7 and calls for a double 
or ‘bifocal’ reading of that passage: X—and also not-X, but Y.’ 
(2013, 167) 
 
Following Taubes and Agamben, Engberg-Pedersen argues that much 
of the recent work on this passage converges on the idea of living “as if 
not.”  
 
In other words, do it ‘as if not.’ Or: do it, but without paying 
any special attention to it. That is not what matters. By 
contrast, fulfil your obligation to love. Or rather: try to fulfil it, 
                                                             
56 The interesting connection between Seneca and Paul is in the way that Seneca attempts 
to temper Nero’s behaviour through appealing to a Stoic mastery of the passions (similar 
to Paul’s tract in romans 7).  
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always and everywhere. For that is what matters. And that kind 
of life precisely belongs with the eschaton. (2013, 168) 
 
Paul is comfortable with the idea, as Elliot puts it, that ‘God is 
simultaneously the source of the world’s coming liberation, and the one 
who imposed the present subjection’ (153).57 Paul’s theological outlook 
was radically different to contemporary Christian discourses which create a 
consistent theological story through the New Testament. Why the 
authorities have been given power is of little concern; give respect to 
authority knowing that they have no authority, for all that matters is the 
fulfilment of the law. The cracks in their authority cannot be interrupted 
by physical force - it is only God’s force that can make the powers pass 
away. It is through the act of faith in striving to fulfil the law through love 
that the divine power can disrupt the power of the governing authorities.  
Paul was not challenging the authority of the rulers or questioning 
why they have been given such power. In his own words, ‘who indeed are 
you, a human being, to argue with God?’ (Rom 9.20). Paul is challenging 
the significance of authority; he is challenging the very conditions and 
assumptions of the world that he was thrown into. This is precisely what 
Christ had done by humbling himself through his death on a cross. 
In Richard Horsley’s political reading of the epistles, Paul’s mission 
had proclaimed the triumph of the ‘antithesis of the epitome of 
aristocratic virtue and values standard in Greco-Roman rhetoric,’ he gave 
credit to the ‘weak, foolish, poor, lowly, and despised, rather than 
powerful, wise, wealthy, noble, honoured and compelled by necessity’ 
(2000, 90).58 Jeremy Punt, in a similar vein, argues that Paul’s rhetoric 
attempted to, ‘advocate a shift in the power balance from Greco-Roman 
upper-class ideology to a Jewish-apocalyptic, turning-the-tables ideology, 
that is, a shift from the Roman Empire to God’s empire’ (2011, 60). Paul 
                                                             
57Stanley Stowers argues that, for Paul, ‘God hides and reveals truths as history unfolds in 
ways that suit his inscrutable purposes’ (2013, 173).  
58Horsley argues that ‘Paul employs the standard deliberative rhetoric of unity and 
concord to advocate disunity and discord in the polis of Corinth’ (2000, 74). Paul knew the 
power inherent to his language. 
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challenged the theological basis of Roman hierarchical power – without 
ever advocating resistance to its power on its own terms.59 
Paul subverts the symbolic underpinning of order through his fidelity 
to a Messiah who claimed victory through the experience of a humiliating 
death at the hands of the ruling authorities. As Žižek puts it, ‘the idea that 
God Himself could die in pain on a cross…violates the conventional 
expectations of what befits a god’ (2011, 107). Davina Lopez places this 
idea within the context of the Roman Empire. This was not an attack on 
the idea of the God in Paul’s own background; this was a critique of the 
power of Rome. She writes: 
 
positioning the God of Israel as the only and most powerful god, 
the benefactor and law-giver, who guaranteed certain destruction 
of Roman-configured peace and security, constitutes the political 
view of Paul. […] Paul, then, is nothing without his observations 
on the crucified Christ in relation to his Roman imperial context. 
(2008, 123) 
 
Paul’s rhetorical shifting of power carried an inherent violence. These 
rulers are doomed to perish, and while the community of believers have no 
power of their own to physically force this end, they are active 
participants in the revelation of the Christ-event which undermines the 
empire’s claim to power.  
As a follower of Paul, writing under his name, would later write in a 
letter to a community of believers in Ephesus: 
 
For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but 
against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic 
                                                             
59Gordon Zerbe argues that Paul is parodying imperial rhetoric through the language he 
uses: ‘Paul’s usage of ekklesia is linked to the language of political assemblies of 
Hellenistic city-states and the corporate identity of Israel’s past, while evangelion 
(gospel, good news) finds its closest counterpart in the rhetoric proclaiming the 
deliverance brought by the imperial order’ (2011, 69). 
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powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of 
evil in the heavenly places. (Eph. 6.12) 
 
Furthermore, as another part of this movement would put it, his death on 
the cross Christ ‘disarmed the rulers and authorities and made a public 
example of them, triumphing over them in it’ (Col. 2.15). This is not a 
movement without an enemy, and this enemy is not merely supernatural – 
it is the power embedded in the structure of political authority.  
Lopez takes this line of argument further. It was not only the case 
that God was declaring the victory of His weakness over their strength, it 
was that Paul was now aligning himself with the workings of this weakness. 
More than a theological move, it was wrought out of a commitment to his 
Jewish heritage. The ideas of love, faithfulness, and the ultimate authority 
of God do not signify a break from Paul’s Jewish roots, but rather indicate 
their transformation in the messianic era that had been initiated through 
the Christ-event. This was the fulfilment of a set of beliefs concerned with 
a love for the neighbour (Lev. 19.18), consideration for the poor, and 
desire for justice. Lopez argues: 
 
Paul appears more conscious of the particularity of his 
Jewishness, as well as his commonalities with members of other 
nations throughout the Roman Empire. In other words, Paul 
comes to consciousness as a marginalised person. (2008, 137) 
 
Paul’s life was determined within the bounds of the Roman Empire. His 
mission was shaped within its context. He held the uncomfortable position 
of being a citizen of the empire which wished to hold his God captive by 
declaring their power as the ultimate authority. Timothy Marquis (2013) 
links Paul’s entire mission with the new possibilities of travel within the 
boundaries of the Roman Empire. The empire itself was crucial in creating 
the conditions for not only the Christ-event but also the movements it 
created.   
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This Messianic power now resided in the community that carried the 
Holy Spirit through the now-time. Bruno Blumenfeld puts it this way: 
 
Paul’s reiteration of the theology of power is excessive. God is not 
just the source of authority – of the king’s legitimacy – but alone is 
ruler. Kings like commons partake in power through Christ. (2001, 
282) 
 
Human authority is levelled. It would be presumptuous, though, to 
interpret a “politics of the multitude” in this reading of Paul’s theology (in 
the way which Hardt and Negri envisage such power). Blumenfeld reads 
Paul as being socially conservative. In his reading this was not the people 
finding themselves outside of the sovereign domain, only the 
reorganisation of its significance. The practical implications of Paul’s 
undermining of authority are always tempered by his belief that there is 
simply no necessity for a temporal theologico-political revolution to occur.  
Paul’s rhetoric challenged the ultimate power of the empire and its 
structures of control without ever directly challenging its temporal rule (in 
its own terms, at least). The apocalyptic Jew would have very little need 
to directly challenge the temporal powers in this way, apart from when 
they, in Paul’s case, blocked the message of salvation to the Gentiles.  
It is here that we can situate the various readings of Paul in 
continental philosophy that have created tensions with historical-critical 
readings of the apostle. How do we read Paul outside of his own 
boundaries in a way which does not simply make him into an example that 
has been cut too far from its own situation? It is in this sense that Paul has 
been positioned not in opposition to Nietzsche, but as another thinker 
concerned with uncovering a genealogy of morality; as Critchley puts it, 
‘Paul is trouble,’ adding that ‘Nietzsche’s call for a revaluation of values is 
based on a sheer jealousy of Paul’s achievement in bringing about such a 
revaluation’ (2012, 155-156). To be clear, the visions of the worlds 
imagined in their respective projects were radically different; it was the 
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mode of transforming that truth of the situation in which they find 
similarity. There is a divine violence at the heart of each of their projects. 
There are not only similarities in the type of project Paul and 
Nietzsche respectively embarked upon, but also similarities in the ways in 
which their respective projects have been twisted, betrayed, and used for 
purposes far beyond a reasonable diagnosis of their intentions. They have 
both, at certain points, become buried under interpretations that betrayed 
their intentions. Badiou argues, ‘if Nietzsche is so violent towards Paul, it 
is because he is his rival far more than his opponent’ (2003, 61). They both 
sought to usurp the Symbolic Order; not by the force of arms but through 
undermining its claims to truth. Ultimately this is why Paul is of such 
interest, and why Romans 13 is crucial in this context. Paul, bound up in a 
messianic moment when truth had been shattered, positions love as the 
force that allows the community of Gentiles believers to continue to 
participate in this fracturing of truth. Not as the means to an end, but in 
the very conflation of means and ends that marks the messianic era.  
 
3.3.2 Love as Authentic Terror 
 
This shattering of worldviews is inherent to the power of love. Wes 
Anderson’s film Moonrise Kingdom tells the story of two adolescents who 
fall in love. There is no logic to their love and very little tangible reason 
for it. Their eyes meet on the edges of a peculiar little island community. 
In their common dysfunction they form a fidelity to their love for each 
other. It is an example of what Badiou means when he writes, ‘what is 
universal is that all love suggests a new experience of truth about what it 
is to be two and not one’ (2012, 39). Their love is impractical, 
uncomfortable, and quite perverse. It is, however, also quite admirable 
and beautiful. It is pure and emphatic but it is also violent, like a storm to 
all around them (which is physically manifested in the film). Even though 
Paul was not talking about romantic love, it is this handing over of oneself 
to the other, of the creation of new subjectivity, which characterises the 
centre of his theory of love.  
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Badiou explains of this type of love, ‘the process of love isn’t always 
peaceful. It can bring violent argument, genuine anguish and separations 
we may or may not overcome’ (2012, 61). For Badiou, the process of 
fidelity to an Event is quite like falling in love. It is the love of the Event 
that ties the subject to its unfolding truth. A new way in which reality is 
experienced exists in the foundations of this love. It is a mutually 
embraced slavery in that they are now dependant on one another for their 
truth to continue to exist. 
In Badiou’s language, love names an unknown unobjectal maxim. In 
other words, it is tied to the fidelity of a subject; to an Event and can only 
be experienced as the highest form of dedication to the unfolding of its 
truth. It cannot be tied to morality and ethics from a position outside of 
the particularity of the situation. This is not simply a love for something, 
nor is it simply an abstract term for compassion, but a common property 
revealed in its universal application. Badiou writes, 'Paul is in no way a 
theoretician of oblatory love, through which one would forget oneself in 
devotion to the Other' (2003, 89-90).60 It is more immediate than that. His 
devotion to Christ and to God can only be participated in through his love 
for the neighbour.  
Paul is not an exponent of romantic love, a love which is reducible to 
moral absolutes, or a love that is identical to charity. There are, though, 
facets of each of these in Paul’s dedication to love that is tied to his 
encounter with the Christ-event. In the idea of love, Paul names a generic 
nonlaw which allows for a fulfilment of the requirements of law in order 
for the gentiles to attain a measure of liberation from the constraints of 
law as Paul had understood it. Badiou understands love as being positioned 
as a common maxim which reaches all people, replacing the Jewish 
specific dictates of law. For Paul, at the very least, it was the maxim 
which allowed the promises bound to the law to be released to all.  
                                                             
60The emotion of love experience is a by-product of our action, not the cause or the goal. 
It is ‘something we receive as a form of undeserved grace’ (Žižek 2011, 107).  
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It is this impossible demand of love that is particularly striking. Terry 
Eagleton says of the Christian value of love towards the neighbour: ‘far 
from being delightfully undemanding, this is well-nigh impossible’ (2003, 
167). Here we find a compassion which is ‘ruthlessly impersonal’ (167). 
This is the decisive gap here between Eagleton and ethics aligned most 
closely with Levinas. The face of the neighbour is not enough for us to 
show love towards them; we struggle to love ourselves enough, as opposed 
to ‘pampering oneself, thinking highly of oneself, being brutally self-
interested and the like’ (167). In this understanding of love towards the 
neighbour, ‘generosity, for example, becomes a public obligation’ and 
‘non-reciprocity becomes a matter of routine’ (168). This is the 
impossible, yet potentially transformative, understanding of being 
compelled by love for the neighbour. It is also an understanding of 
Christian love that takes us into dangerous territory. We are approaching, 
in Žižek and Paul, that which opposes the heart of contemporary values: 
love as revolutionary terror and love as slavery.  
Is there a connection between terror as a work of love and the love 
which, for Paul, fulfils the law? Does Paul, as Taubes imagines, make a 
‘declaration of war’ upon the Roman Empire? Paul’s understanding of the 
new order declared through the Christ-event is inherently violent. As Žižek 
puts it:  
 
our reproach to the fundamentalist terrorists, whether Islamist 
or Christian, should be precisely that they are not terroristic in 
the right way, that they shirk from authentic terror as the work 
of love (2011, 117). 
 
This love, which violently cuts through petty self-indulgence, is 
crucial to revolutionary action. Žižek writes: 
 
For the price of a couple of cappuccinos, you can continue in 
your ignorant and pleasurable life, not only not feeling any guilt, 
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but even feeling good for having participated in the struggle 
against suffering! (2011, 117) 
He goes on to quote Oscar Wilde, ‘charity degrades and demoralises…it is 
immoral to use private property in order to alleviate the horrible evils 
that result from the institution of private property’ (118). The subject 
tied to love must instead be a subject that does not shirk from this 
authentic terror. It is precisely this challenge to the Symbolic Order which 
makes these terms so appealing to Žižek. In order to challenge the basic 
assumptions that allow an oppressive system to continue, the complex set 
of ideas that form the zero-level of its function, they need to be 
subverted. This is where he follows Paul down the route of a foolishness 
that defeats wisdom. He explains: 
 
Christianity madly insists on the impossible. Love, especially in 
its Christian form, is definitely not wise. […] We should take the 
term “wisdom” literally here: it is wisdom (in the sense of a 
“realistic” acceptance of the way things are) that Paul is 
challenging (2011, 116).  
 
While Paul’s context is radically different to Žižek’s, it is the shattering of 
the “way things are” that aligns their approach. Paul, epitomised in 
Romans 13, throws all his weight behind the foolish power of love for the 
neighbour; the impossible defeat of the governing authorities through a 
combination of compliance and subversion of their power.  
In the same way that Žižek sees Bartleby’s disarming gesture “I would 
prefer not to” as the foundation of a new order, Paul saw love of the 
neighbour as this new foundation (2011, 117). He explains, ‘love is the 
force of this universal link which, in an emancipatory collective, connects 
people directly, in their singularity, by-passing their particular hierarchical 
determinations’ (117). What makes Žižek distinctive here is his focus 
primarily on the theologico-political dimension of Love. This love is not 
merely found in an emotion or commitment to a new set of rules, but in the 
dedication to the participation in an Event and the truth it reveals. The 
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consequences of this are revealed in the divine violence which it, by very 
nature, becomes linked with. Indeed, this is not a force which connects all 
people after its call has been heard. As Žižek puts it: 
 
the universal proposition "I love you all" acquires the level of 
actual existence, only if "there is at least one of whom I hate" - 
a thesis abundantly confirmed by the fact that universal love for 
humanity has always led to the hatred of the (actually existing) 
exception, the enemies of humanity. (2010, 100). 
 
We have entered the properly universal sphere in which without violence, 
even if a weak violence, there is no revolution.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Slave of Christ 
 
4.1 Re-imagining Paul 
 
Re-imaginings of Paul, developed out of the turn to this apostle in 
continental philosophy, have sought to find new ways of challenging 
perceptions of political power. Taubes constructed an image of Paul as a 
radical Jew who directly challenged the authority of the Roman Empire 
and local rulers. Critchley sees something in the Pauline message which 
helps us respond to our political disappointment. Žižek draws Paul’s 
message directly into his political theory of divine violence. It is surprising, 
then, that little is made of Paul’s formulation of the subject of Christ that 
emerges as a direct response to the Roman authorities (it is Agamben who 
comes closest to realising its importance). Paul’s conception of the slave 
of Christ directly challenged Roman imperial order and its claims of power 
over life; it is the subject tied to the labour of love which works in the 
service of divine violence.  
Paul’s idea of subjectivity has been read in different ways in the turn 
to Paul. Badiou utilises Paul’s articulation of the Christ-event as an 
example of a universal address that cuts across the significance of all 
identities by showing that differences can co-exist in the struggle of a 
common cause. Agamben, contrastingly, argues for a Jewish reading of 
Paul that announces a re-ordering and release of proper possibility in 
messianic time; through which a remnant is created to carry the potential 
of Christ-event through this era. These readings develop different ways of 
understanding the rupture in time experienced by Paul, and revolve 
around an idea central to the Pauline epistles: the hierarchies of temporal 
power are rendered irrelevant in the call of the Christ-event to fulfil the 
law through love for the neighbour. While both draw Paul into their own 
narrative a bit too far, they also both provide useful interpretations of 
Paul’s subjectivity. 
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Romans chapter 13 demonstrates Paul’s comprehension of the 
divine economy that imagines real power in the hands of the community of 
believers. The practical structures of society remained in place; they had 
not been obliterated by the Christ-event, but their meaning had been 
transformed. The new calling at the heart of this shift in theologico-
political focus is embodied in Paul’s self-identification as Paul, a slave of 
Christ. This vocation cuts across all social statuses and obligations (1 Cor. 
7.29-31); as Agamben discerns, the Christ-event compels us to live “as 
not” – Jew as not Jew, Gentile as not Gentile, slave as not slave.  
The consequence of Paul’s conception of fidelity to the Christ-event 
was the call to live as a slave of Christ. What this meant for the body of 
this movement was that political power, as the world conceived it, would 
not be taken. The true power already resided in the foolishness of God as 
played out through the fidelity of the slaves of Christ. Or, to put this 
identity in different terms, the militant of Christ dedicated to weak 
violence.  
 
4.2 Alain Badiou and Saint Paula 
 
Paula’s come here among us like provocation (The Incident at 
Antioch, 47) 
 
Badiou wrote The Incident at Antioch: A Tragedy in Three Acts during the 
1980s over three drafts. Charting the revolutionary activities of the 
overthrowing of a State in crisis, the play frames Badiou’s political and 
philosophical thought within an unnamed city at an unspecified historical 
time. Its situation resonates with the events surrounding the 1871 Paris 
Commune (the short-lived bloody rise to power of a socialist government in 
France) and the events of May 1968 in France (when students, workers, 
and intellectuals created civil unrest in the country). The form of the play 
is inspired by Paul Claudel’s The City, which Badiou at many points directly 
subverts in the telling of his story. His other significant inspiration is Paul, 
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who is given new life as Paula: an apostolic voice on the edge of the 
revolutionary situation.  
Paul symbolising of the creation of the Event becomes crystallised for 
Badiou in the figure of Paula. She represents a reading of Paul in Badiou’s 
context in much the same way that Saul/Paul represents Luke's context. A 
betrayal, certainly, but also an important articulation of Paul's encounter 
with new possibilities of truth revealed through his experience of the 
Christ-event. In its novel setting, the play follows three moments in the 
formation of Christianity: Paul’s road to Damascus experience (the 
crumbling of the state), the incident at Antioch (the decision on how to act 
in the moment of revolution), and the council of Nicaea (the formation of 
a new rule after the fallout of revolution).  
Something that is striking is the way in which the play is structured 
around a number of voices desperately attempting to figure out what to do 
with the revolutionary moment which had unfolded before them. Pierre 
and Jean Maury (representing the left and right of established politics), 
and Claude Villembray and Cephas (representing the old politics and its 
disruption) are confronted with Paula, who seeks to cut through these 
differences in imagining an Event that breaks down all identities. She 
understands the true nature of politics as the way to unite people beyond 
‘the mind control exerted by the state’ (115). Yet we struggle to 
comprehend what might be created in this break from the overburdening 
control of the existing order.  
The play continually returns to this point; in the service of ending 
power itself, there is a trail marked out by a set of new opportunities – but 
no absolute answer. During a pivotal moment in the play that is 
reminiscent of Bartleby’s formula, Paula prefers not to act in the moment 
ripe for revolutionary action. She does not stop the revolution, but leaves 
it, preferring an alternative without any statement of what that might be. 
She later, in regretting her withdrawal, comes to a full Pauline revelation: 
it is only through acting in continuing service of the Event that this trail 
can be blazed.  
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 Paula, assuming a central trait of Paul’s personality, acts as a 
provocation to those around her without ever forcing their actions; it is in 
this way that she is able to participate in the revolution which surrounds 
her. She warns the council not to initiate violent revolt, that it is only their 
role to watch the crumbling of the current order; their participation in the 
process of power will only lead to their participation in the catastrophe to 
come. So she urges that they 'not seize a power that's there for the taking' 
(63). Revolution is, in this sense, 'the prelude to Empires,' and should be 
disavowed. She adds: 'just as circumcision was for St. Paul, revolution is 
nothing and unrevolution in nothing’ (65).  
The question, however, arises: how do you radically change the 
political coordinates of the situation without some form of revolution? How 
does a revolt occur against the ruling class without simply taking up their 
brutal position of power? These questions haunt the background of 
emancipatory projects: the Marxist Communist project given life through 
Lenin becomes Stalinism; the Christ-event given life through Paul, over 
time, becomes Constantine’s Christendom; democratic movements in 
Tahrir Square are transformed into further corrupt regimes. Disparate 
voices in contemporary continental philosophy are haunted by the question 
of how to overturn power itself without its brutal return. Paula’s answer is 
that the subject must remain dedicated to the unfolding truth of the Event 
which ties together its subjects in the same labour.  
What Paula does in naming both revolution and unrevolution as 
nothing is recognise the uncontrollable nature of history. She, in the end, 
acknowledges the futility of her gesture in attempting to halt the 
revolution; the wheels were already turning, and no breaks would bring 
that locomotive to an abrupt stop. She was also right in asserting that the 
revolution would be the very thing that would give life to and also destroy 
the revolution. She assesses the situation as such: 
 
no more does a picture window facing the South Seas compel me 
to smash its transparency by the fantasy that I could thereby 
possess the waves and the salt… the law of victory is too specific 
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for the universal subject to put an end to any constraint in it; 
it’s he who’ll be destroyed by it. (63) 
 
It is here that Paula situates their failure; in losing sight of the aims of 
their movement through the means used to achieve this. The means in this 
instance is in direct conflict with their emancipatory ends; this is at the 
heart of the disaster of twentieth century communist projects (it has also 
been an essential aspect of the failures of Christianity).  
Paula explains this failure as that of being drawn into the power of 
the state; you cannot ‘order your power to disappear’ once you have 
assumed such domination over others (103). ‘The desire for emancipation 
became deflected from its own origins,’ when the hypothesis of that 
emancipation ‘itself got swallowed up in the State’ and became ‘entirely 
focused on conquering it’ (103). This leads us to the great problem that 
faces leftist projects today - its history of violence from positions of state 
power. The extreme violence of the Soviet Union and Mao’s China haunts 
the far left. Badiou’s hope is to imagine a form of communism absent of 
such violence - that horrific acts of violence are not an intrinsic part of the 
communist project itself. Instead it is the disavowal of such power that 
must form its foundations. This is the impasse that Paula cannot quite find 
her way around: how can the symbolic violence inherent to power 
structures be overcome without being replaced by another world of 
violence?  
Therein lies the heart of the fascination with Paul in recent 
continental philosophy: is radical, or revolutionary, violence possible 
without appeals to physical destruction or the sacrifice of the Other? The 
answer for Paul was to be found in a transformation that occurs within the 
Symbolic when the Messiah revealed the eschaton. This is a transformation 
that first had to occur in the way in which reality was articulated in 
language. In terms of the communist project, the issue becomes: would 
the Marxist/Leninist project be possible without the physical terror that 
accompanied it, without the selfish ambition and grasping of power that 
opened the path to the Red Terror and to Stalinism? It cannot frame its 
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cause in the context of the end times; to use Paul in this context he must 
also be betrayed. 
For Badiou, the state cannot be overcome through the same logics of 
violence which define state power itself. Instead, it is the symbolism of 
state power which must be disarmed; through violence that appear weak in 
its eyes. The Incident at Antioch highlights that the connections between 
violence and revolutionary moments are key to understanding Badiou’s 
turn to Paul. Paula’s disavowal of violent means in overcoming the state is 
a direct denial of using the means of that state against itself.  This is as 
true for communist projects as it has been for Christianity; whose 
inception into state politics ensured its future influence while diminishing 
the subversive aspect of its message. The crucial question, then, that has 
led thinkers like Badiou and Agamben to Paul is: how does a radical 
movement avoid becoming a version of that which it sought to replace, or 
defeated and effectively written out of the narrative, by a greater power? 
Finding a way around this deadlock is one of the greatest problems for the 
disparate threads of leftist politics represented in many areas of 
continental thought.  
 
4.2.1 The Truth-Event 
 
Badiou positions Paul as a ‘poet-thinker of the event’ (2003, 2). As one 
with the passion to motivate faithfulness to an Event which, through love, 
ties the direction of a life to the truth that unfolds in the wake of the 
Event. Badiou’s idea of creating a subject out of a Truth-Event is 
exemplified in Paul’s fidelity to the Christ-event. Subjects of the Event are 
tied to the interpretation of its truth without ever fully completing this 
task.  
This interest in Paul is tied up in Badiou’s own road to Damascus 
experience: the collective expression of emancipatory hopes in the events 
of May 1968. In this respect, Badiou, ‘for once and once only,’ trusts ‘that 
fabricated biography of Paul that the New Testament presents under the 
title of the Acts of the Apostles’ (2003, 17). In recalling the moment Paul 
was subjectivised by Christ - not converted but, rather, called into the 
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body of Christ - Badiou finds a compelling narrative which mirrors his own 
transformative experience. It is not clear why this is the moment to trust 
the Lukan account of Paul’s mission, but it certainly dramatizes the radical 
break beyond (if not from) the Pharisaic tradition which had driven Paul’s 
religious and political convictions up to that point; not dismantling or 
replacing it, but heightening his awareness of its meaning. Kenneth 
Reinhard sums this up for Badiou as the experience which ‘emblematises 
the kind of eventual break that is the condition for the emergence of a 
new subject’ (2013b, xxviii). It is in this movement from the Event to the 
emergence of a new subject which allows the emergence of its truth.61 As 
Žižek puts it in The Ticklish Subject (one of his earliest attempts at pulling 
Badiou's Paul into his writings): 
 
the Event (crucifixion) becomes a Truth-Event 'after the fact,' 
that is, when it leads to the constitution of the group of 
believers, of the engaged community held together by fidelity to 
the Event. (1999, 141) 
 
The subject of the Event now becomes split between 'the finite biological 
life and the infinite life of participating in the Truth-Event' (147). In Paul's 
language this is signified by what the Gentiles experienced in their split 
between life in the flesh and in the spirit. He reassured the community of 
believers in Rome that 'what the law was powerless to do because it was 
weakened by the flesh, God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of 
sinful flesh to be a sin offering' (Rom. 8.3). Christ revealed that the 
Gentiles could now participate in what had previously been beyond their 
symbolic fields of comprehension. Participation in God's plan, which had 
previously only been possible through the Jewish law, was now possible 
through the Truth-Event that was forced by Christ's death and resurrection 
(it is not a break with the law as such, as Žižek suggests, but its 
deformation in relation to the Gentiles). It was the shattering of the 
                                                             
61 Reinhard, following Badiou, examines the way in which ‘Paul forces Jesus to have been 
the Messiah’ (2009, 82). This risk produces a new situation through new emerging 
possibilities in the light of his reading of this Event.  
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Symbolic, the breaking of the block between the law and the Gentiles, 
which was announced in the Christ-event’s undermining of the existing 
order.  
Badiou positions truth as the novelty that appears out of the static 
nature of knowledge. These truths are discernible in what Badiou calls the 
four conditions of truth procedures: love, science, politics, and art. An 
Event creates a subject through their fidelity to the new possibilities of 
truth that the Event creates through these procedures. Love is the force 
that bound the subjects of the Christ-event to its truth (a truth that was 
made possible only, in Paul's formulation, by the grace of God). Love 
dictates the practical workings of this faithfulness; the public declaration 
and dedication which allow the truth of the Christ-event to be made visible 
in the activity of the community of believers. It is this 'nonliteral law' 
(Badiou 2003, 87) that maintains the truth of the event in the 'power of 
doing' (84). Badiou theorises this connection between truth and love as 
such: 
 
the subjective process of a truth is one and the same thing as the 
love of that truth. And the militant real of that love is the 
universal address of what constitutes it. The materiality of 
universalism is the militant dimension of every truth. (2003, 92) 
 
The subject of the truth becomes such through the workings of love; made 
possible in a militant (public) dimension rather than merely in private 
conviction. In Paul's case this comes through the way the Christ-event 
allows for an articulation of an idea of love that would have been an 
important aspect of his life as a Jew (as he defines in his famous passage of 
1 Cor. 13).  
There is a crucial distinction here between Badiou and those strands 
of continental philosophy (found in Derrida, Vattimo, and so on) that frame 
all “truths” within a horizon of language. While Badiou does not dismiss 
the prominent role of language, he emphasises the importance of truth 
which exists beyond this horizon. It is the dedication to the Truth-Event 
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that shatters our worldview from a position beyond language. Yet Žižek 
reminds us that, following Lacan, 'truth has a structure of fiction' (2006, 
60). As he describes the condition of the subject of an Event: 
 
he is never fully adequate to the infinite order of Truth, since 
the subject always has to operate with a finite multiple of a 
situation in which he discerns signs of truth. (1999, 130) 
 
Its truth is sutured into the symbolic creation of a world given its 
possibility in the crumbling of the old order. As Žižek puts it, we should 
understand 'the Real of the Event as the “generator,” the generating core 
to be encircled repeatedly by the subject's symbolic productivity' (1999, 
165). This productivity is enabled by the suspension of the big Other; a 
suspension that is inherent to the divine violence that enables the Event to 
occur. It is the symbolic death of that which 'dominated and regulated our 
lives' (1999, 151). It generates the possibility for the subject to be created 
out of the Event, but its truth is pinned to the activity of the community. 
 According to Badiou, ‘an event is what decides about a zone of 
encyclopaedic indiscernibility’ (2009, 174). Through his fidelity to the 
Christ-event, Paul leaves certainty (wisdom) behind to be part of the 
unfolding of truth (foolishness). It called into question what Paul thought 
he knew about the time-period that he lived in. This Event is a creative 
form of resistance to elements of power that determine domains of 
knowledge, whether personal or public. Pertinent to both Paul and Badiou 
here is the resistance to the violence of totalising explanations of the 
state. The victory over death by the God who acted as a human is the 
creative act which, for Paul, ruptures the current theologico-political 
situation. This revealed the falsehood of Roman rhetoric and the fragility 
of its power over life itself, even if it could not diminish its physical 
strength. Badiou, while missing important aspects of Paul’s resistance to 
the power of Rome, has become hugely significant in the genealogy of his 
legacy.  
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4.2.2 Badiou's Paul 
 
Badiou disregards the necessity of religion with its rituals and superstitions 
when constructing his Paul, largely subtracting it from his reading (despite 
the deeply embedded religious foundations of Paul’s own thought). As 
Žižek describes this type of move, in a Lacanian reading of Paul, 'the first 
part provides the deepest insight...the second part is just theological 
rubbish' (1999, 149).  
One of the criticisms levelled against Badiou’s reading of Paul is that 
by bypassing the religious aspect, he misses important aspects of Paul’s 
worldview. Elizabeth Castelli criticises Badiou in his inability to break free 
from an imagined split between Judaism and Christianity. Indeed, she 
argues that ‘an especially troubling aspect of Badiou’s method of reading 
involves his predisposition to superimpose his own one-size-fits-all “event” 
on everything he sees’ (2013, 150). While Badiou ignores much of the 
recent study of Paul that withdraws from this Judeo-Christian break in his 
letters, there is an important aspect in Badiou’s thought to be 
acknowledged here: his insight that Paul is ‘anything but a moralist’ (2003, 
83). The unfolding truth Christ-event is not dominated in Paul’s narrative 
by metaphysical declarations of morality to appease his God, but 
guidelines intended to draw the believers together in the labour of the 
messianic now-time. 
 For Badiou, Paul forces the fabulous to be real through his 
commitment to the message of generic universalism inherent to his 
resurrection. In a similar way to Chigurh or Bartleby, Paul’s Christ descends 
into the narrative as a disruptive force – a violent rupture in the symbolic 
nature of time. Without a back-story, Paul's Jesus becomes Christ through 
his violent impact upon established norms that occurred through his 
crucifixion and resurrection. The miracles, good deeds, parables, and 
narratives that define the Gospels are not required in Paul's articulation of 
the divine force of Christ. He descends, shattering the reality of those 
caught up in his wake, and leaves the Holy Spirit as that which binds the 
subject to the truth of his shattering revelation.  
  Chapter Four  162 
 
 The voice of Badiou's Paul becomes active in his interpretation of 
Events that bear that same symbol of rupture in the potential creation of 
subjects of an Event. In one of Badiou’s less formal writings there is more 
than a trace of the “antiphilosopher” Paul. In an article expressing the 
importance of the idea of communism when thinking about contemporary 
political emancipatory movements, he makes a distinctly Pauline appeal: 
 
“communism” here means: common creation of a collective 
destiny. This “common” has two distinctive traits. First, it is 
generic, representing in one place humanity in its entirety. In 
this place there are people of all the kinds a population is 
usually made up of, all words are heard, all propositions 
examined, all difficulty taken for what it is. Second, it 
overcomes the great contradictions that the state pretends to be 
the only one capable of surmounting: between intellectuals and 
manual workers, between men and women, between rich and 
poor, between Muslims and Copts, between people living in the 
province and those living in the capital. (2011) 
 
Paul’s experience of the Christ-event resonates with Badiou’s 
understanding of communist emancipatory projects. Badiou understands 
the Event as the creation of opportunities that were hidden before its 
appearance. An Event does not re-make the conditions of the world; 
instead, it only opens it up to new possibilities. The potential universality 
of its address is revealed in the way its message cuts across social, ethical, 
political, and cultural boundaries: between rich and poor, male and 
female, intellectuals and manual workers, Jew and Greek, and so on. The 
Event is universal in the sense that it cuts across all identities in one 
common struggle.  
Badiou's context is radically different to Paul's, but he retains this 
same structure of commitment to the Event. In working to expose the 
violence of global politico-economic systems that rely on a narrative 
constituted by consumerism, personal wealth, and capital (supplemented 
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by charity), Badiou holds to the unfolding truth of May 1968, when people 
from many areas of society stood together against the exploitation 
intrinsic to the mechanisms of capitalism. A movement that stood in 
opposition to new walls, separating the insiders from the outsiders, 
continues to determine the direction of Badiou's thought. For a subject to 
emerge from a break in such a system, the Event must be ‘a-cosmic and 
illegal’ (2003, 32). It emerges as an organic movement from outside of the 
Symbolic Order, relying on faith to force the possibility of something new 
to emerge from a situation that resists such disruption. The interruption in 
the existing mechanisms and narratives of domination allows the truth to 
be revealed that had been hidden within those narratives.  
Žižek describes this function of the Event as ‘the moment of truth in 
the overall structure of deception’ (1999, 135). In such an Event there is a 
violation and disruption of the mechanisms which oppresses the potential 
of those within its grasp. Divine violence, in this sense, is an essential part 
of an Event; that which strikes as if out of nothing to exploit the instability 
inherent to the excess of a situation required for the domination over life 
itself. This does not mean that it denotes ‘an intervention from the 
Outside or Beyond’ (Žižek 1999, 130); rather, it exploits the inconsistency 
of the excess necessary in the systems or structures that allow its 
reproduction. It exposes and interrupts the narratives that sustain power.  
Badiou describes aspects of new movements of revolt and revolution 
emerging in a ‘re-birth of history’ in recent times as often being ‘blind,’ 
‘naïve,’ and ‘scattered’ (2011). There are commonalities which provide 
coherence, typified in slogans such as “Mubarak out” or “we are the ninety 
nine percent,” but such movements are plagued by fractures and power 
vacuums. Paul is also blind and naïve in this sense, as he works within the 
beginnings of a scattered movement. The chaos created by the Christ-
event did not, in any precise way, determine the movements that it gave 
life to. There are no guarantees of what will emerge out of the community 
dedicated to the proclamation of its truth. Yet it is in this radical break, 
this rupture in the Symbolic Order, that Žižek follows Badiou to affirm the 
potentiality that is tied to this Event. Paul, with all his deficiencies, is 
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vital to this a-cosmic and illegal Event – this crime against the Symbolic 
Order.  
Paul believed that the barriers between all identities were broken 
down through the revelation of the Christ. Male, female, Jew, Greek, 
slave, and free all became part of a collective with access to the promises 
of God. All were now heirs of the promise made to Abraham; first to the 
Jew, now infinitely expanded through the known world. The site of the 
death and resurrection of Christ was now the site where all humanity were 
granted common access to God’s grace. In the same way that Badiou 
believes communism has the potential to break down barriers created by 
capitalist systems, Christ broke down the symbolic barriers that prevented 
all people from accessing God’s plan for redemption.  
The incident at Antioch, which Paul describes in his letter to the 
Galatians, exemplifies Paul’s resistance to the previously accepted or 
assumed hierarchies. He accuses Peter of hypocrisy because he did not 
comprehend the consequences of Christ dying as a slave. The ‘truth of the 
gospel’ (1.14) is that order was now established by the Christ-event. As he 
made clear in a letter to the communities of believers in Corinth, the 
power of the cross of Christ is the ability to join together and be made 
equal, not to divide or create class distinctions between believers.  
 
4.2.3 Paul’s Universal address 
 
Infinite alterity is quite simply what there is. (Badiou 1993, 25) 
 
In pinning an idea of universalism to Paul, Badiou, wittingly or otherwise, 
stepped into a deeply contentious theological issue. Neil Elliot, in 
discussing the problem of a Christian universalism, says that it has been 
‘the lingering dominance of a liberal Christian agenda that poses Paul as a 
champion of an “intercultural,” “universalistic” religion’ (2008, 48). It is 
this universalistic idea which, not only in the address of Christ’s call but 
also in the nature of the truths that it proclaims, has so often been the 
driving force behind factions of Christianity. It is within this context that 
Paul is positioned as the founding figure of a religion which, despite an 
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inwardly fractious history, has made claims of being the universal religion. 
What is there to be gained, then, by continuing to fight for this notion 
universalism?  
Badiou’s answer remains trapped within the opposition between law 
and grace typified by an Augustinian-Lutheran reading of Paul (rather than 
the law supplemented and infinitely extended by grace).62 Badiou puts it 
like this: 
 
the law blocks the subjectivation of grace’s universal address as 
pure conviction, or faith. The law “objectifies” salvation and 
forbids one from relating it to the gratuitousness of the Christ-
event. (2003, 75) 
 
He argues that the universal address comes through grace, not law. Law 
cannot transcend cultures and societies; it is designed for a specific 
community and imbued with power therein. The new address, founded in 
grace, reaches all particularities in a way that a fixed set of instructions or 
signs cannot (circumcision, rites, rituals, rules for living, and so on). It 
does not obliterate such particularities, as we see through Paul’s letters to 
different communities. Instead the address manipulates the meaning of 
such particularities, it cuts through them. Read in this way, Christ 
redeemed us from the curse of the law through submitting himself to its 
experience. 
Engberg-Pedersen argues both with and against Badiou’s idea of 
universalism in Paul. He cuts to what is at stake in an essay on Paul and 
universalism in faintly referring to dangers to come in ‘universalistic’ 
                                                             
62 Badiou's interpretation of Paul moves away from many traditional understandings of the 
apostle, yet he remains bound to a reception history dominated by Augustine and Luther. 
His reading of Romans 3:27-30 ('God as One') leads him to the idea that God being One 
means that those addressed are also One, and since he is addressing all (both Jew and 
Greek, and so on), 'the One is that which inscribes no difference in the subject to which it 
addresses itself' (2003, 75). Law cannot be a universal address because it relates to a 
specific group at a specific time: ‘for Paul the law always designates a particularity, 
hence a difference. It is not possible for it to be an operation of the One, because it 
addresses its fallacious “One” only to those who acknowledge and practice the injunction 
it specifies’ (2003: 76).  
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religions, writing that if ‘a universal perspective on human beings and 
particular perceptions of identity…cannot in some way be reconciled, the 
practical result will probably be violence’ (2013, 87). Indeed, this split 
between the forcing of a universalistic doctrine on opposing particularities 
precisely relates to this idea of symbolic violence in matters of identity.  
It is here that Engberg-Pedersen engages with Badiou’s idea of 
universalism in relation to Paul in a way that attempts to delve behind its 
purpose as an illustration to perceive the ways in which there might be 
more substance to the idea of Paul as an important figure in the 
foundations of universalism. There is an emphasis initially here on the 
opposition between those who follow Christ, and those who do not; 
between those in the Spirit and those in the flesh. In this sense, it is not 
the type of universalism that means that all are redeemed or that all can 
continue in their current particularities in perfect harmony with their 
fidelity to the Christ-event. The point that Engberg-Pedersen makes here, 
and the way in which Paul does enact a type of universalism that was 
already evident in Stoicism, is that he allows all to act as they wish, as 
long as it does not run counter to the demand of the Christ-event; the 
demand of the fulfilment of the Law through love. In this we have what 
Žižek perceives as something worth redeeming in the Pauline corpus of 
letters; a universal violence against those who are the enemies of the 
people.  
What signifies the difference between Badiou and thinkers such as 
Emmanuel Levinas, who frame their thought around an ethics based on the 
love for the neighbour, is their inability to move beyond the confines of 
their situation. The significant criticism which Badiou sets against ethics 
based on alterity is in its failure to see beyond the face of the other, and 
therefore its susceptibility to being hidden from the truths inherent to the 
creation of the situation. In response to Levinas and the ethics of 
difference founded upon the recognition of the Other, whose primacy 
arises out of their replacement of God (the immediacy of the Altogether-
Other), Badiou writes: 
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this commonsensical discourse has neither force nor truth. It is 
defeated in advance in the competition it declares between 
‘tolerance’ and ‘fanaticism,’ between ‘the ethics of difference’ 
and ‘racism,’ between ‘recognition of the other’ and 
‘identitarian’ fixity. (1993, 20) 
 
It is not the commonsensical element of this discourse which Badiou 
opposes, as it lacks the force to disrupt the reality of these elements. It 
instead creates a dialectical distance which opposes alternative 
emancipatory discourses. It generates projects of identity politics which 
fight separate battles, leaving the real core of the trouble untouched. It 
also divides liberalism and fundamentalism without considering that which 
has the potential to cut diagonally through both. Among Badiou’s criticisms 
are that we end up with a religion without God, or a ‘spiritual supplement 
for incompetent governments’ (23). It is ethics devoid of philosophy; in 
other words, it prescribes action without the relevant force of thought 
which might connect people against their common enemy.  
It is this idea of infinite alterity that helps to define Badiou’s 
approach to universality. Universalism plays on our differences, and what 
allows those differences to exist together in a common fight. Common to 
all within particular divisions is their battle against something that 
impinges upon all within the reach of the Event. What Badiou does not 
emphasise enough is the political dimension of Paul’s struggle – it cut 
across the entirety of the Roman Empire by opposing its order with slavery 
in the service of Christ. 
This theologico-political cut, marked through the identities which the 
state claims power over, creates the messianic potential that must be 
'generic, representing in one place humanity in its entirety' (Badiou 2011). 
This generic potentiality, as seen at its most bare point in May 1968 in 
Paris, or more recently through the Arab Spring, exemplifies the powerful 
address of the Event as well as its fragility. Like Paula in the midst of the 
revolutionary moment, we must initiate the revolution as not revolution in 
order to maintain this potentiality which will be destroyed in the creation 
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of identity that occurs in the process of revolution. The new possibilities 
created by the Event are fragile and susceptible to manipulation in the 
return of the mythic violence of that which it opposed.  
An important question here in terms of identity formation is: does 
Paul’s message break down barriers between different ethnic and religious 
groups, or does it replace those barriers with another (for example, 
between the Christian and the non-Christian)? Can a generic potentiality 
really emerge in opposition to empire, to the dominance of symbolic 
forces, that does not simply replace it with other oppositions that are also 
violent? The Croatian theologian Boris Gunjević attempts to address this 
deadlock by drawing upon Hardt’s idea of the multitude as the political 
subject. He writes: 
 
only a catholic, universal community can offer an alternative to 
the practices of Empire which, under the guise of capital 
circulating as fast as possible, invariably celebrate violence and 
terror which then lead to nihilism. (2012, 97) 
 
Gunjević is asking an essentially Pauline question. Yet there is also an 
element of nihilism in Paul’s thought. It is precisely this that makes Paul’s 
reading of the Christ-event so violent. This universalism is based upon the 
meaninglessness of the claims of the powers. Indeed, Paul could only 
comprehend this in the context of the eschaton. 
In a similar way, Badiou believes that ideas of identity and 
universalism are now trapped in binary contexts of fundamentalism and 
liberalism. If fundamentalism claims the universality of natural truth and 
liberalism leads to a particularity which dismisses universality, then 
Badiou’s theory of universalism through the lens of Paul is the “third way” 
that cuts through differences without dissolving them into natural law.63 
Yet, if ‘universality is nothing other than the faithful construction of an 
infinite generic multiple’ (Badiou 2003, 46), can any construction of this 
                                                             
63 Badiou and Critchley discuss this idea of a “third way” between fundamentalism and 
liberalism in the recording Democracy and Disappointment: On the Politics of Resistance 
(2008).  
  Chapter Four  169 
 
set remain faithful to the Event that created it? As much as Badiou 
attempts to resist the particularities of identity politics, we must move in 
that direction to gain a better understanding of what this universalism 
might mean for those caught up in its wake. 
 
4.3 Paul and Identity 
 
Davina Lopez comments on the problem of the interpretation of Paul’s 
letters:  
 
it is true that Paul uses language of universalism, and this truth 
is unfortunately what has led to interpretations of Paul as a 
patriarch himself who conquers otherness in the name of 
oneness. (2008, 167) 
 
It is not enough to assume that the universal address of the Event will be 
able to unite people against a common cause without significant issues 
relating to identity politics arising; and, indeed, forming an essential facet 
of this movement. Participation in the event means dedication to its 
unfolding truth without knowing the ways in which this dedication will 
impact upon the world. Yet in this sense it is also a dedication to the 
current world fading away, or, more accurately, facing the coming divine 
violence. This jumbles our sense of identity in a way which allows the 
movement to exist, but also creates victims in its attempt to bypass issues 
relating to the particularity of identity. We can see in Paul’s letters that 
issues relating to identity were vital and difficult components of the new 
life in the communities of believers.  
It was not the case that Christ replaced the scapegoat who bore the 
brunt of violence; it was rather a shift in the dynamics of strength and 
weakness.64 The sacrifice of the other, of the meaning of identity itself, 
                                                             
64 Richard Hammerton-Kelly makes the link between Paul’s understanding of the Christ-
event and the scapegoat. He argues that ‘scapegoats bear the brunt of violence that 
cannot be contained or vented on a target that can avenge itself’ (1994, 25). In this line 
of argument, the Jewish system of law was a ‘system of sacred violence,’ which appeared 
and provided ‘theologically the bondage of sin into which the idolater falls’ (21). 
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still exists in the unfolding of the Pauline narrative. John Gager (2005) 
responds to Richard Hammerton-Kelly’s work on Paul’s articulation of 
Christ replacing the scapegoat by insisting that Paul did not break from 
Judaism or the language of violence at all. The idea of the Christ-event 
being about a break from sacred violence should be refused. Sacred 
violence has only ever been a facet of symbolic violence. The sacrificial 
logics of sacred violence are created in the symbolic violence which is 
hidden behind it.  
René Girard's assertion that Christ replaced the scapegoat by 
revealing its innocence, therefore, misses the point.65 The problem with 
this interpretation is that it was not strictly religion, or Judaism at all, 
which Paul understood as the problem. It was the religio-political 
manipulation carried about by the authorities - their systemic, symbolic, 
and physical violence - that was the problem. Christ defeated the 
theologico-political powers which imposed their domination over Paul's 
world. He was less concerned with those scapegoated in instances of 
sacred violence as he was with the violence of the Symbolic Order. He did 
not break from a system of sacrifice; he instigated its transformation in 
the reversal of the understanding of power.  
Shmuel Trigano argues that ‘it is hard to know what to make of René 
Girard’s theory that the end of mimetic rivalry followed the advent of 
Christianity’ (2013, 445). The claim is made not to diminish the idea of the 
role of mimetic rivalry in violence, but to question whether the 
development of Christianity does not rely on this very foundation of 
violence. Trigano argues that ‘Pauline universalism is sacrificial in nature’ 
(445). While his assumptions about Paul seem outdated and contentious in 
                                                             
65 Girard is perhaps the most prominent exponent of the emphasis on the role of sacrifice 
in sacred violence. His ideas regarding violence revolve around the idea that humankind 
relieves inevitable tensions, generated through mimetic desire, by finding a scapegoat to 
expel violence onto in the form of a sacrifice (an act of violence which creates a sacred 
object from a subject). If your crops do not grow, civilisation threatens to break down; 
therefore the force of the violence towards a scapegoat is needed to restore balance and 
peace. This logic then filters through the whole of society. Unhappiness, misfortune, and 
trauma can be relieved by finding a scapegoat that can be legitimised as the cause of 
misfortune. Through this sacrifice the group can continue to function without tearing 
itself apart; therefore the stability of a community is tied to the narratives it is able to 
create to dispel unrest. 
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many cases, there is an important point to be developed here about the 
ways in which forms of Christianity, as a religio-political movement, have 
demonised Jewish particularism. Trigano’s criticism of the turn to Paul is 
particularly stinging: ‘the rehabilitation of Paul, besides indirectly 
deposing the contemporary Jewish political and metaphysical subject, 
revives the terrible heritage that gave rise to twenty centuries of anti-
Semitism’ (431). He adds that the turn to the apostle, in light of this 
perceived legitimising of ‘the Jew’ as a sacrifice, is ‘depressing’ (431). 
 Trigano analyses Paul’s universalism as ‘a universalism minus one (the 
Jewish people)’ (440). According to this reading, Paul sparks a forceful 
change to the meaning of “the Jew,” reducing circumcision to a kind of 
‘ethnic tattooing’ (441). Here Badiou’s idea of Pauline universalism is 
flipped; where Badiou uses Paul as an example for, what he would call, the 
fact of infinite alterity (that what exists is infinite difference), Trigano 
claims that Paul attempts to justify ‘a conception of being without 
otherness’ (444). He continues, arguing that this divergence ‘from the 
altruism of the Torah, which is based on differentiation and separation’ 
(444), leads to the collectivising force of a catholic Christianity. More than 
this, here we have a Paul who not only legitimises the sacrifice of the Jew 
in the creation of Christianity but also gives legitimacy to the ideology of 
Rome; there is no longer Jew or Greek, in this way, means that there is 
only the Christian and its excess (the Roman and the barbarian). This 
process repeats itself, organising European ideology on the basis that the 
Jew (now in the form of the State of Israel) is the particularism to be 
demonised. 
 While Trigano’s claims should be strongly disputed with regards to 
Paul’s alleged demonization of the Jew (outside of the Book of Acts, at 
least); it should be noted that Paul does not manage to break free from 
language which has the potential to oppress. Indeed it is vital to 
acknowledge that Paul’s entire argument with regards to what Badiou’s 
understands as universalism, can only be understood properly in Paul’s 
imagined eschatological context. Paul had enemies, and shows a 
remarkable, if dangerous, dedication to fighting their power. There are 
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potential victims who have arisen out of his violent singlemindedness and 
cultural and historical constraints.  
 
4.3.1 No Male or Female? 
 
In what ways can the universal address of the Christ-event break down the 
way identity is formulated? Christian, Jew, or Gentile; male, female, or 
transgender; gay, bisexual, or straight; slave, factory-worker, or banker; 
what can the fidelity to this Event do to such logics of identity? Put 
differently, what does the universal address change in the narratives which 
are created that allow people to understand what defines their identity? 
The way in which we use terms such as “woman,” “slave,” and “Christian” 
leaves a forceful imprint on the subjects who are collected under such 
terms. Such markers of identity have the ability to liberate and the ability 
to oppress. They are necessary in the construction of the symbolic world 
that allows meaning to exist. The Event ruptures the Symbolic Order in 
such a way that opens up a myriad of possibilities that were previously 
impossible. For Paul this meant a dramatic shift in the way in which he 
understood various markers of identity, yet the shift in how he understood 
those markers themselves was less dramatic. 
It is evident that Paul's belief in the transformation in potentiality 
relating to identity politics did not require a radical transformation in 
social roles; it was the shift in purpose within the body of believers that 
was vital. When Paul wrote, 'let each of you remain in the condition in 
which you were called' (1 Cor. 7.20), his purpose was to testify to the shift 
in the meaning of the condition rather than the importance of conditions 
themselves (circumcision, slavery, marriage, and so on). The Christ-event 
rendered all such markings as unimportant within the context of the 
community of believers. In the now-time that had arrived, their 
importance had been transformed. Traditional markers of identity became 
irreversibly altered in their meaning. Paul became a slave of Christ and 
apostle to the Gentiles (whilst also remaining a Jew, a citizen of Rome, 
and a man marked out by his deficiencies). Imagining the interconnected 
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aspects of these identities, at some points universal in their address (the 
call to be a slave of Christ) and at other points ethnically or politically 
particular (Roman citizen and Jew), profoundly impact upon the type of 
movement that will emerge from the haze of new possibilities.  
Paul’s communistic possibilities in relation to identity and 
organisation liberated the believers from their previous restraints in 
relation to the context of the eschaton (working in the body of Christ in 
the end times), but outside of that context its effect was not as potent. 
What did not break down for Paul were aspects of identity that remained 
unaffected in his worldview. Contemporary ideas of gender equality, racial 
equality, gay rights, workers’ rights, and so on, did not exist within the 
Symbolic Order in order to be shattered in the first place. These issues, 
dominant in our minds, were not on Paul’s radar. This has implications for 
how we understand the movements that followed. 
Paul is still wrapped up in violent language. His subversive attack on 
the governing authorities and his ability to create division are two facets 
of this violence that have already been discussed. He also, due to this 
divisive language and his misunderstanding of the particularities related to 
the length of time remaining, plays a role in symbolic violence against 
groups including women, Jews, and slaves. John Gager argues that Paul is 
complicit in this violence. He contends: 
 
I see the post-conversion Paul as still very much entangled in the 
coils of violence… I see Paul as a violent personality, in his 
actions, in his language, and in his ideology of Gentiles and their 
world as a world of violence. (2005, 16)  
 
The basis for this thinking is simply and succinctly put by Gager in relation 
to Paul’s ‘violent language,’ he explains, ‘when I was young – one of the 
lessons that it took me years to unlearn: “Sticks and stones can break my 
bones, but words will never hurt me.” But violent words do hurt – by 
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themselves and as precursors to violent acts’ (17).66 An important facet of 
this violence is the way that Paul remained trapped with the symbolic coils 
of violence which were prevalent in his cultural context with regard to 
markers of identity. His universalism remained trapped in this sense. This 
does not relieve him of his guilt in this regard, Gager's imagining of Paul's 
violent personality is an important assertion, but, as we saw with the 
violence behind Anton Chigurh, we are not attempting to ascertain 
innocence or guilt (categories which are transformed after the Christ-
event). Instead it is a genealogy of violence that is of interest here, of that 
we are all guilty and innocent (to radically differing extents).  
 
4.3.2 Eschatological Re-ordering 
 
What if, to the worst expectations of our liberal sensitivities, Paul really 
did think that female subordination was an intrinsic part of God’s plan for 
creation? Paul did not dispute that God had created things in determinate 
ways; each thing has its purpose (Rom. 9.23). All purposes, however, came 
together with equality in the body of Christ (1 Cor.12.12-26). What does 
this mean in the community of believers, and outside this community, to 
those defined as inferior? For Paul, 'If one member suffers, all suffer 
together with it; if one member is honoured, all rejoice together with it' 
(12.26), but this did not mean equality for all or the end of oppression on 
the basis of markers of identity. In the twisting and resisting of the logics 
of social order, Paul began to think of a generic universality that opposed 
the existing order. How does this, however, look outside of Paul’s 
eschatological context? 
                                                             
66 This echoes Žižek’s appropriation of an essence of violence that is violent in its own 
symbolic and systemic domain, but also opens the grounds for further violent acts. He 
explains: ‘Heidegger does not merely provide a new variation on his standard rhetorical 
character of inversion ("The essence of violence has nothing to do with ontic violence, 
suffering, war, destruction, etc.; the essence of violence resides in the violent character 
of the very imposition/founding of the new mode of Essence - disclosure of communal 
Being - itself"); here, Heidegger (implicitly, but clearly) reads this essential violence as 
something that grounds - or, at least, opens the space for - explosions of ontic violence 
themselves’ (Žižek 2008b, 151). 
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It is worthwhile being clear on the reality of this situation, in all 
likelihood Paul believed woman to be inferior to man. There is little 
reason to doubt this.67 As Dale Martin contextualises the body in this era: 
‘all bodies (male and female, young and old) fall somewhere on a 
spectrum from moist to dry, cold to hot, soft to hard… women and infants 
were moister, colder, and softer than men’ (1995, 29). Paul gives this 
position its proper theological grounding: man comes from God and woman 
from man (1 Cor. 11). There was no intellectual reason for Paul to believe 
anything other than this. What changes, all that changes, is the meaning 
inherent to this inferiority.  
Even though this was a fact for Paul, such distinctions were rendered 
meaningless in the period between the resurrection of Christ and the 
coming judgement. The overall impression of specifically named women in 
his letters is positive, with little or no indication of inferiority or 
subordination in these cases, precisely because of their worth to the 
activity of the now-time (in Romans 16 he counts females among his 
friends, co-workers, and apostles). Richard Hays creates an impression of a 
Pauline mission in which ‘women did play a significant role,’ and provided 
a social structure which would have been ‘particularly attractive to 
'upwardly mobile' urban women' (2004, 144). Indeed, in the only seven 
surviving Pauline epistles, women are found in places of Paul’s gratitude, 
appreciation, and praise.68  
In discussing 1 Corinthians 11, Michael Lakey argues that due the 
unknown nature of what is to come, Paul's defines the sexual metaphysic 
as 'rendered provisional and open to revaluation' (2010, 189). The veil, 
while maintaining a distinction between man and woman, breaks down the 
difference between the way they might honour God. In this way, 'the veil is 
a sign that the Christian woman, while metaphysically subordinate, is in 
the process of being eschatologically re-ordered or transformed' (188). 
Herein the suggestion is that we can only interpret Paul’s statements from 
                                                             
67Dale Martin (1995) shows that there were strong physiological reasons why women were 
believed to be inferior to men.  
68 Hays, among others, argues that the most likely explanation of the appearance of 1 Cor 
14.34-35 within the Pauline corpus is that it was a later interpolation.  
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the perspective that the world is fading away; what there was previously is 
now subject to revaluation in the context of the coming end. In this sense, 
Paul still has to make a practical interpretation of the generic potentiality 
inherent to messianic time.  
Paul’s letters, as well as the Gospels, acknowledge the position of 
the female as part of a marginalised group; these writings testify to their 
important position within the early formation of the Christ-cults. There is 
a revaluation within the woman’s position as inferior; while Paul sees little 
point in resisting social conventions, he sets no restrictions on the roles 
than women can potentially hold in the new movement.  The new economy 
of a debt of love to one another supersedes what Paul believed to be 
natural truth. Paul's following (apparent) attack on women in the 
Corinthian church (1 Cor. 14.33-36) re-iterates an important point: this re-
ordering of status retains an idea of inferiority that remains an aspect of 
the world that had not yet faded away. 
Therein lies a problem with Paul's treatment of marginalised groups. 
The Christ-event releases a potential that had been silenced before its 
appearance. Paul's effort, furthermore, was bent towards the further 
release of potential – a breaking of the power that came from outside of 
the body of Christ. The view remains, however, that woman cannot simply 
break free from her temporal subordination to man. The re-ordering 
inherent to the Christ-event had not been completed. Paul’s treatment of 
women was indicative of the developed sense of subjectivity impelled by 
the Christ-event, as part of a body where all were heir of the same 
inheritance. Yet this could not disturb all social limitations.69 This leads us 
to another way that the implications of the Christ-event have been 
imagined in recent continental philosophy. Agamben understands messianic 
time as the period in which potentiality is released (in a way that resists 
both the particularities of the law and the universality that Badiou 
proposes).  
                                                             
69 In exploring the Adam-Christ typology in Paul, Benjamin Dunning argues that it is a 
‘failure of this typology and its afterlives to resolve embodied differences without 
remainder’ (113). This is an example of why it is not simply a case of redeeming Paul or, 
on the other hand, dismissing his relevance all together, but to critically examine the 
consequences of his articulation of the Event.  
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4.4 Slave of Christ: Social Order and Proper Possibility 
 
The God in rags made a mockery of the prevailing social order through 
turning foolishness into a virtue. Agamben's description of ‘the messianic 
vocation’ as the ‘revocation of every vocation’ shows this idea of re-
ordering within social status without breaking down these statuses as such 
(2005b, 23). It did not change the social reality that enveloped their 
world, but it did radically change their meaning in the context of the end 
times. This re-vocation describes a ‘generic potentiality’ (26) which is 
epitomised in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians: 
 
the appointed time has grown short; from now on, let even those 
who have wives be as though they had none, and those who 
mourn as though they were not mourning, and those who rejoice 
as though they were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though 
they had no possessions, and those who deal with the world as 
though they had no dealings with it. For the present form of this 
world is passing away. (1 Cor. 7.29-31) 
 
The Symbolic Order which imposes the meaning of status was interrupted, 
giving each person their ‘proper possibility’ (2005b, 39), without any 
guarantee of that being fulfilled. 
 Agamben opposes Badiou’s concept of universality which he attaches 
to Paul’s message. He insists, ‘it makes no sense to speak of universalism 
with regard to Paul’ (2005b, 53), that ‘no universal man, no Christian can 
be found in the depths of the Jew or the Greek’ (52). It is the remainder 
cut out of Paul’s oppositions that is important. This remnant renders the 
law inoperable rather than destroying it. Messianic time, therefore, is the 
period in which new possibilities are cut for the people who are specifically 
addressed by Christ’s death and resurrection.70 Agamben argues, ‘the 
                                                             
70 Kaufman (2013) outlines some of the differences and similarities between Agamben and 
Badiou in their approach to Paul.  
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messianic is not the destruction but the deactivation of the law, rendering 
the law inexecutable’ (2005b, 98). Indeed, for Paul, the law is still holy and 
good for the circumcised. What is at stake is the destruction of the 
limitations placed on the Gentiles because of the law. Simply put, the law 
did not relate to the Gentiles as it did to the Jews. Paul’s vocation as an 
apostle and a slave of Christ means that he understands that the system he 
lived in has changed. A potential now exists which did not before because 
of this move into the messianic era.  
Agamben is much closer to the heart of the matter when he talks 
about Bartleby.  
 
If what is at issue in a scientific experiment can be defined by 
the question "Under what conditions can something occur or not 
occur, be true or be false?" what is at issue in Melville's story can 
instead be formulated in a question of the following form: 
"Under what conditions can something occur and (that is, at the 
same time) not occur, be true not more than not be true? 
(1999b, 260-261) 
 
Identities do not fade away in messianic time, but their potential is no 
longer bound to the law in the same way as it had been before the Christ-
event. Instead they are bound to the messianic vocation, as Agamben 
argues, ‘the syntagma “slave of the Messiah” defines the new messianic 
condition for Paul’ (2005b, 13).  
While social boundaries still existed, and Paul did not untie himself 
from these boundaries, of ultimate importance was the extension to be 
heir of the promise given to Abraham (Gal. 3.29). In this scheme what was 
once considered low and despised reduced their opposite; therefore male 
and female, slave and free, and Jew and Gentile lose their ultimate points 
of distinction. Paul’s language, however, remains dominated by 
masculinity and his concerns about the critical issue of circumcision are 
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androcentric.71 The female is too often invisible in Paul’s text. His implicit 
views towards women can be positive, hailing their pivotal role in his 
mission, but the female remains secondary to male in Paul’s concerns (if 
not his theological declarations). This re-ordering inherent to this proper 
possibility remained locked within social confines.  
 Agamben emphasises the importance of grasping this new vocation 
understood under the marker of slave. He writes: 
 
the messianic vocation is not a right, nor does it furnish an 
identity; rather, it is generic potentiality (potenza) that can be 
used without ever being owned. To be messianic, to live in the 
Messiah, signifies the expropriation of each and every juridical-
factual property (circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; 
man/woman) under the form of as not. This appropriation does 
not, however, found a new identity. (2005b, 26) 
 
Being a slave of Christ entailed being a part of the community that formed 
the body of Christ and was filled with the Holy Spirit. As Agamben notes in 
Paul this generic but not abstract subject, in the service of the messianic 
vocation, signifies a new formation of being under the form of “as not”. 
The slave of Christ is the signifier that Paul used to address himself as part 
of a community that cuts across all parts of social and economic order. 
This messianic vocation cannot avoid the return of identity, but it does 
transform the significance of such markers of identity.  
In the midst of a crucial passage in a letter to the church in Corinth, 
concerning the status and responsibilities of the community in a world 
which in its present form was passing away (1 Cor. 7.31), Paul instructs:  
 
whoever was called in the Lord as a slave is a freed person 
belonging to the Lord, just as whoever was free when called is a 
                                                             
71 ‘If the hymin (“you”) and the second person plural verb of Galatians 5.2 is not 
addressed to her, what about the hemas of the previous verse, “For freedom Christ has 
set us free”?’ (Polanski 2005, 14) 
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slave of Christ. You were bought with a price; do not become 
slaves of human masters (7.21-22).  
 
In the same way as he announces himself at the beginning of his letters to 
Rome and Philippi, Paul calls them to be slaves of Christ. Paul used this 
term to describe his relationship with Christ, even tying it into the rhetoric 
of being purchased. Captivity and emancipation are vital themes in Paul’s 
letters; the primary focus is theological rather than social, so what are the 
implications of Paul’s ideas about slavery? Paul writes, ‘for freedom Christ 
has set us free, therefore, do not submit again to a yoke of slavery’ (Gal 
5.1)? The foremost implication of this freedom, bought at a price, was that 
those in the body of Christ were now slaves to Christ. This was a reminder 
to the Gentiles that Christ has given them access to the promises of God. 
This was not a comment on the reality of slavery throughout the 
Roman Empire; yet this idea is tied to its understanding within this 
context. Only a slave, the subjected “thing” of the social order, could turn 
the tables of power on the powers that crucified Christ.72 This brings us 
back to the way Paul challenged the logics of the Roman Empire. Neither 
Badiou nor Agamben manage to fully appreciate the specifics of Paul’s 
attack on these logics, despite it being central to Taubes’ Pauline 
revelation. It is not merely a generic potentiality or a generic set created 
by a universal address – it is a violent attack on the existing order that 
attempted to undermine God. 
 
4.4.1 Slavery in the Roman Empire 
 
In the beginnings of Western civilisation – the Roman Empire, Christianity, 
Greek culture, and so on – was the reality of a structure of society that 
determined there were levels to humanity; that some were ‘understood to 
be more human than others…a sliding scale on which some humans 
approach the status of things, of objects’ (DuBois 2003, 6). The 
                                                             
72 ‘Legally, the slave was res, a thing, a property, an object. Roman law acknowledges 
slaves as people and distinguishes human property from other property, although at times 
the distinction is difficult to see.’ (Joshel 2010, 38) 
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uncomfortable reality is that this type of thought has appeared in every 
generation since. Divisions between races, genders, nationalities, religions, 
classes, and abilities have defined many of the sliding scales on which 
human beings are judged and positioned. It is the slaves who allow empires 
to exist; it is the poorest, least free, and subjects of forms of ownership 
that mine and grow the materials, stitch together the products, and allow 
the growth and spread of the basic forms of capital which drives 
expansion.  
This was as true for the Roman Empire as it has been with modern 
capitalist, Islamic, or communist states; each, in its own particular way, 
have used slaves – workers left with little or no freedom or individual rights 
– to expand and dominate. In the Roman Empire it was slaves who would 
be volunteered for the army on the front lines of the battle when there 
were not enough freedmen. The Roman Empire depended on slaves for its 
very existence. In this context, to adopt for oneself the marker “slave” 
was absurd, yet it was also subversive. The social implications of Paul’s 
rhetoric here should not be underestimated. To align his movement with 
slavery was a bold move. It was not surprising in the context of Paul’s 
interpretation of the Christ-event: Christ claimed victory through dying a 
slave’s death. Therefore it was the weak position which Paul also 
embraced. Paul, in this same way, also aligned himself with what were 
considered effeminate qualities (weakness, foolishness, being in pain of 
child-labour, and so on) in a time when virtue, and violence with it, was a 
masculine quality.  
Paul transforms the slave, that “thing,” into a part of the body of 
Christ. He undermines the Roman structure by placing slaves directly in the 
power of Christ, bypassing the rest of the social order; indeed, both 
Emperor and Slave were now placed together directly under the power 
inherent to Christ as Lord. This did suddenly transform their practical 
conditions, this was not what was at stake for in the truth of the Christ-
event; the slave remained a slave while the free remained free. This was a 
transformation in the meaning of their position.  
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Reconciliation with God was now possible for the Gentiles from this 
marginalised position. This made the new movement popular among ‘those 
who felt disadvantaged in some significant way’ (Gager 1975, 24). These 
proto-Christian communities grew out of the disinherited of the Roman 
Empire; this included foreigners, women, and those oppressed on religious 
grounds.73 This mirrors a contemporary problem which Žižek describes as 
‘the automatic creation of excluded and dispensable individuals from the 
homeless to the unemployed’ (2008a, 12), the group which Vattimo and 
Zabala call the ‘discharge of capitalism’ (2011, 64).  
Paul’s world was saturated in slavery. A great number of individuals 
lived their life in perpetual subservience to their master’s control. They 
were the possessed rather than the possessor, and with this came a 
particular, lowly, status. The practice and reality of slavery was ever-
present throughout the region. For the Greeks, slaves were ‘the furnishing 
of their world’ (DuBois 2003, 6). Their lives were defined by service, and 
their status reflected this. They were always in the background of society, 
without the same rights as the free. Slaves did not have the right to get 
married, male slaves could not be considered to be fathers, and female 
slaves were the sexual property of their masters (actual practice differed 
depending on circumstances; there were slaves who were allowed to live 
as families, for example). Throughout the empire, however, slaves were 
little more than bodies; ‘available, vulnerable bodies’ that would be 
subject to their masters needs or wants (Glancy 2002, 156). They were 
little more than an object with specific purposes in the eyes of many 
masters.74  
Slavery was an integral and accepted part of the symbolic landscape 
of Paul’s world. Despite instances of violent resistance to their masters in 
the slave wars of the previous century, there is little to indicate that there 
was a slave class consciousness or a will for revolution. Keith Bradley 
                                                             
73 Gager argues that this spreading of Christianity by the time of Constantine was such 
that ‘Christianity alone could serve as the religious basis of the far-flung empire’ which 
made his move a ‘shrewd political judgement’. (1975, 142) 
74Herodotus’s story of the slave with a secret message tattooed onto his head exemplifies 
this point. The message was tattooed to incite action in another part of the empire, 
written on his scalp and hidden when his hair had grown back. The slave, the possessed 
body, was a tool for writing with nothing on the inside to interrogate.  
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asserts that slaves could never hope to ‘effect a radical transformation of 
the social and institutional structures around them’ (1994, 108). A full 
picture of slavery in the Roman Empire is difficult to create due to the lack 
of writings available from slaves themselves.  
People seldom moved from being a citizen into slavery; they would 
come to this existence as captives of the wars of expansion, children of 
other slaves, or through being unwanted at birth. Many girls, in particular, 
were unwanted at birth; they were often considered a burden on the 
family, so were subjected to exposure (left in specific areas to be 
collected, usually for slavery, or to die).  
The sale of slaves was another dehumanising experience, more akin 
to cattle markets. Slaves would be put on blocks and sold – a human 
represented as a thing, treated as little more than an animal with the 
appearance of a human. This reality of slavery was deeply embedded into 
the society and economy of the Roman Empire. This social hierarchy 
violently created the lowly image of the slave. They were all around, the 
cogs in the basement of an empire. Their occupations were wide-ranging 
and included ‘estate managers,’ ‘shepherds,’ ‘craftsmen,’ and ‘domestic 
servants’ as well as ‘construction workers,’ ‘entertainers’ and ‘field hands’ 
(Schiedel 2012, 90). A common occupation of female slaves was 
prostitution; and this profession forces an important point here, this was a 
system ‘rooted in violent domination’ (106). Manumission was uncommon, 
especially in rural areas, and brought with it its own problems; it could be 
better to be under the protection of a master, condemned to the existence 
of a slave, than to die outside of this protection.  
The treatment of slaves was not seen as wholly negative. Seneca, 
from his position of rhetorical influence in the Roman Empire, was among 
those who advocated the fair treatment of slaves. More than being mere 
things, positioned as slaves through accident, slaves should be judged on a 
‘moral standing’ (Bradley 1994, 102). The Roman agricultural writer 
Columella also advocated the fair treatment of slaves; noting that slaves 
are of more use when they are kept in good health, given warm clothing, 
and so on. Doing so ‘contributes greatly to the increase of the estate' 
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(Bradley 1994, 22). This, though, did nothing to challenge the hierarchical 
arrangements of Roman society; it maintained the slave/master 
relationship through advocating good handling of slaves and the good 
behaviour of slaves. And while it would appear that such practices were 
encouraged in the treatment of slaves, there were many masters who ruled 
through threat. Flogging was a common punishment, but typically masters 
could punish their slaves as they saw fit and for what they saw fit. Varro, 
for example, tells the story of a slave who is beaten for being slow to bring 
hot water. For Paul it is the nature of Christ as the master that defines this 
identity as slave. This was the context in which Paul found the Messiah 
crucified as a slave.  
 
4.4.2 Christ as Slave and Lord 
 
Neil Elliot argues that an important factor in the idea of kenosis is not 
simply Christ’s appearance as a human being, but as a slave. This was a 
subversive act which opposed the structures of the Roman Empire. This is 
what is at stake in kenosis: the slave resisting the logics of that which 
subjects the people to captivity. There is a power play in motion here. It is 
only the king who can make such a declaration. It is only the crucifixion of 
the true Messiah, God Himself, which contains the authority to subvert this 
power structure. 
Elliot adds to this point through opposing the abundant ‘symbolic 
representations of the spectacular violence, invincible military might, and 
inevitability of Roman hegemony’ (2011, 43). He emphasises this 
overturning of the Roman rhetoric in placing Christ alongside the slave as 
‘an unmistakable expression (in the language of Jewish apocalypticism) of 
solidarity with the lowest classes’ (43). While Paul’s message subverted the 
order intrinsic to the Roman Empire, it is unclear how much of a threat his 
message would have been considered to be to this order. The violent force 
of the empire, however, did not require a threat to be real in order to 
exert itself; there was no necessity for its structural violence to 
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differentiate between a real threat and any other who attempted to exist 
outside its structure of dominance.  
 In aligning Christ with the figure of the slave, Welborn writes: ‘the 
crucified Christ was regarded by the cultured elite of his day as a coarse 
and vulgar joke’ (2005, 2). Within a reception history which has placed the 
emphasis on the consequences of the cross and the nature of Christ, the 
social statement of crucifixion has at times been overlooked. In a socio-
religious marketplace where gods were venerated for their power, 
preaching Christ crucified was foolishness. The Messiah, who was and 
remained God, was killed in the lowest of places. His body was desecrated, 
hanging on a cross. Amongst the scandal of the crucified Messiah is a 
question that requires analysis: why did a strong enough collection of 
Gentiles wish to become part of this body? 
 The freedom bought through the cross entails servitude to Christ, and 
therein to the body of believers. And since Christ is Lord, what Paul is 
preaching is a radical religious devotion to God. Paul believed that all 
Gentiles should now serve in the body of Christ, the vessel of the 
messianic-era that carries Christ in the world until the end. Travis Kroeker 
describes this new responsibility: 
 
for Paul the ekklesia is precisely this classless society where all 
are freed by becoming slaves of Christ. They became 
free…precisely by using the world “as if not,” in a dispossessive 
manner that assesses the value of each particular thing or 
relation with reference to the passage of God in the world. 
(2010, 61) 
 
This freedom is found not by revolutionising the social and economic 
hierarchies of these disparate communities under differing levels of Roman 
rule. It is the introduction of a theologico-political novelty which 
undermines Roman rule as such. As Paul Griffiths asserts, ‘the ekklesia, the 
community of the called, is then the community of those whose vocations 
have been revoked but not erased, emptied but annihilated, removed from 
the juridical sphere to the sphere of life, of zoe reconfigured’ (2010, 184). 
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This creates an unsustainable volatility in the tension between life in the 
world and life in Christ. This only made sense to Paul in the imminence of 
the world in its current form passing away. 
 The striking question for Paul would have been whether or not these 
slaves could have participated in the body of Christ. Jennifer Glancy raises 
the issue of slaves being sexually dominated by their masters, and slaves 
held in the profession of prostitution. Were enslaved prostitutes ‘beyond 
the boundaries of the Christian community’ (2002, 67) due to their 
polluting of the body of Christ? This raises an important question for the 
theologico-political vision of Paul: did the designations of slave/free only 
dissolve for Paul after a person was found to be eligible for baptism? There 
were certainly unrecognised implications for marginalised groups such as 
these enslaved prostitutes who potentially contaminated the body of Christ 
through the dictates of their service (1 Cor. 7.12-20). 
 Paul undermined social conventions, but only in the context of the 
Christ-event. He did not order slaves to be released, but he did encourage 
it. He did not demand equality for women, but he did acknowledge the 
critical work they did in all areas of his mission. In this same way he did 
not abolish Roman rule, but he did show the Christian body to be 
incompatible with the hierarchy of the Roman Empire.  
Elliot, in assessing weaknesses in Badiou’s understanding of Paul’s 
situation, asserts that: 
it is even more important for us to recognise that the 
fundamental ideological requirements of Roman imperialism are 
directly opposed in Paul’s representation of the body of the 
crucified and risen Christ in the world. (2010, 144) 
The Roman Empire, underpinned by tributary states, is undermined 
through Christ’s victory over death in Elliot’s reading. Christ used the very 
mechanisms which the empire chose to crush resistance in order to show 
that God’s weakness was stronger than man’s strength. The key here, and 
what Badiou fails to emphasise in his reading of the resurrection, is that 
we should situate Paul within an apocalyptic tradition which believed in 
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the power of resurrection. This was an attack on the powers that crucified 
Christ. Elliot then adds to the sense in which Paul interprets the 
resurrection as the eventual site: 
 
it follows quite clearly in the apocalyptic logic that if a crucified 
man is resurrected, there is neither slave nor free person, since 
resurrection means a divine intervention that interrupts the very 
system of significations that oppose slave and free, man and 
woman. (2010, 148) 
 
Read in this way, Paul is inscribing the actuality of resurrection into the 
logics of the empire by turning the crucifixion of a slave from weakness 
into strength.  
 It is the reality of the slave’s death which Elliot emphasises. He 
argues that Philippians 2:7-8 has ‘traditionally been taken to refer 
generically to Christ’s appearance as a human being, but surely refers 
more pointed to the manner of his death, the shameful subjection to a 
slave’s death by crucifixion’ (145). In this reading, Christ subverts the 
dominant symbolism that the empire enforced upon their enemies, 
dehumanised in the image of the conquered. It is this aspect of the Event, 
God subjecting Himself to being conquered, which creates the possibility 
for a new experience of truth to appear. And it is in the potential inherent 
to new truths which the Event finds its power. There is no immediate 
physical victory to come from the resurrection; it does not create a 
political situation in which the empire can be overcome by force.   
Welborn points out, ‘Badiou’s attempt to disjoin death from 
resurrection leads him to place the Pauline concept of the Christ in 
dangerous proximity to the Nietzschean idea of the Overman as a figure of 
pure self-affirmation’ (2013, 127). Through missing the acknowledgment of 
the weak and the poor inherent to the manner of Christ’s death, Welborn 
argues, Badiou fails to notice that it is participation in this death which is 
as meaningful as the overcoming of it. This overlooking of the importance 
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of the cross is the ‘most significant failure to understand Paul [in Badiou’s 
work]’ (139).  
This overlooking is not without reasoning; to focus on the suffering of 
Christ can lead to a Christian maxim of achieving redemption through 
suffering itself. Yet it is not suffering itself that is to be sought here, but a 
statement of God’s interest in those who were placed into a position of 
death by the ruling authorities. This place of the cross is that place where 
it is declared for all to see that ‘a slave is not really a man’ (135).75 The 
cross was ‘the “situated void” of Roman society’ (136) from which it 
became possible for the Messiah to declare God’s love for the weak and 
the despised in spite of those who oppress and humiliate them in their very 
existence.  
 Welborn contends that ‘how deeply slaves lived in the shadow of the 
cross is illustrated by episodes from satires and novels’ (135); such works 
depicted slaves being humiliated and brutalized, often with the use of 
crucifixion scenes. Christ is situated in this position, as the slave humbled 
on the cross, the fool confounding the wise – as not only dying in his 
physical body but suffering the death of his political life being stripped of 
him through a slave’s humiliation. When Paul relates Christ to the lowly 
and despised of the world, it is with reference to the humiliated subjects 
of the Greco-Roman world. 
 
On the stage, one encounters portraits of slaves and the poor in 
abundance, since, in accordance with the Greek and Roman 
theory of the laughable, their weakness and deficiencies, both 
physical and intellectual, were taken as subjects of ridicule. 
(134) 
 
It is with the figure of the slave that Christ aligns himself with at the cross. 
His death and subsequent resurrection are only possible from this site: as a 
subject of ridicule. Paul also aligns himself with this figure.  
                                                             
75 Welborn uses the example of Juvenal’s description of a story in which a Roman matron 
crucifies a slave out of ‘a humour to do so’ (135), using the justification that a slave is not 
really a man.   
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 It is from this site of crucifixion, Welborn argues, that ‘Paul seizes 
upon the cruel and disgusting term that the educated elite of the Roman 
world least wanted to hear and pronounces it with a vengeance’ (137). 
Paul attempts to invert the logic of the violence, symbolic as well as 
physical, enacted upon the poor, the weak, and the despised. The 
attraction of this Messianic cult to these groups in great part came from 
this theologico-political statement inherent to the manner of the Messiah’s 
death. Neither the humiliation nor physical stripping of life could defeat 
the Messiah; Jesus could not have been Christ if that had been the case. 
The resurrection, then, was for Paul proof that death no longer had 
dominion over anyone who has faith in Christ (Rom 6.8-11). 
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Chapter Five 
 
Creation as Original Sin 
 
5.1 Žižek and Paul: Common Battles 
 
There is something in the Christian legacy worth saving, and Paul is at the 
centre of it. This message is evident throughout Žižek’s writings. At the 
forefront of this focus is a theory of violent love which has so often been 
deeply hidden within Christian traditions. He makes this point clear: 
‘Christian charity is rare and fragile, something to be fought for and 
regained again and again. Even among Christians, confusion about its 
nature abounds’ (2001, 118). This confusion about its nature is a recurring 
feature of recent re-readings and re-imaginings of Paul springing from 
areas of continental philosophy. Among the theories and counter-theories, 
Žižek’s descriptions stand out as the most forceful. As we have seen, 
Badiou, Agamben, Critchley, and others have made an important 
contribution to the re-contextualisation of Paul, but it is Žižek who is most 
provocative in his sense of Paul’s importance. Could it really be, as 
suggested in the connection he has provoked between divine violence and 
Pauline love, that there is something in this theory of love which has the 
potential to speed the inherently unstable mechanisms of capitalism to 
their own spectacular implosion?  
It is with great difficulty that an individual manages to transform, 
even after an encounter with an Event. This, though, is precisely the point 
of being subjectivised in the framework of a political struggle. For Paul this 
entailed being called into a new narrative dedicated to hastening the 
destruction of the powers that opposed God's promises. This was an 
attempt to transform the situation within the Symbolic realm of signifiers 
and representations. It is a narrative detailing the victory that developed 
out of the death of God at the hands of those powers. The resurrection, as 
the turning point of the narrative, dictated the purpose and character of 
the labour required in the now-time (1 Cor. 15-51-58). 
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At the heart of this theory is God’s own transgression on the cross. 
The radical re-interpretation and re-situating of time itself, from chronos 
to kairos, was propelled by Christ ‘becoming a curse for us’ (Gal. 3.13). 
This was not a dismissal of the old law, as Paul is at pains to make clear, 
but a sign that the now-time had begun. A shattering hole punched through 
the symbolic formation of reality revealed God’s frustration with the 
structures of “strength” in the world. It was only through a foolish 
proclamation (1 Cor. 1.21) that God could reveal the empty foundations of 
their claims to power. It is in this same way that Žižek claims that we 
should subvert the powers which, if remained unchallenged, will continue 
down a devastating path to its catastrophic conclusion. 
Paul is such a compelling figure for Žižek due to his transformation 
from a parochial religious zealot to a universal subject of an Event. He 
disavows the previous site of his battle in order to attempt to connect all 
peoples in a common struggle against the powers of an apocalyptic age. 
The time had come to set aside differences and join a common fight; or be 
the enemies of this fight and face the wrath of God.  
In this vein, Žižek claims that he is not being abstract when pointing 
to the violence embedded in the functioning of capitalism. He points to 
four basic antagonisms which prevents its indefinite reproduction: 
 
the looming threat of ecological catastrophe, the 
inappropriateness of the notion of private property for so-called 
'intellectual property,' the socio-ethical implications of new 
techno-scientific developments (especially in biogenetics), and, 
last but not least, new forms of apartheid, new walls and slums. 
(2010, 212) 
 
The excess created by the instability of the mechanisms required to 
reproduce the conditions of capitalist dominance creates instabilities. 
These antagonisms in the environment, in access to food, water, and 
medicine, and in the gap between the rich and the poor are not only 
produced by violent forces, they are also creating greater volatilities. 
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These stresses upon the material pressures, which create instability in the 
formation of ideological forces, are essential facets in the diagnosis of 
ongoing violence. Within the potential for such mechanisms to exist is the 
potential for them not to exist, yet this potential is covered-up and written 
out of the controlling narratives. Divine violence reveals the possibility of a 
different understanding of truth. 
It is only when we can accept our own influence within the Symbolic, 
and see beyond the walls that violently manipulate our understanding of 
truth, that we can begin to participate in a transformation played out in a 
divine economy. For Paul this meant participation in the common body 
whose service was given over Christ. It was the transition from individual 
to community, echoing the story of Adam and Eve, which created subjects 
out of the Christ-event; yet understanding how to live within this body, 
participating in this messianic vocation, proved to be a difficult task for 
the Gentiles.  
This final chapter draws together the theory of radical violence in 
this work and examines it in the context of Paul famous passage in Romans 
7. Paul here provides an insight into the mechanisms at the heart of the 
battle at the heart of the Symbolic. The theory of original sin is drawn 
away from the individual and placed on the community. It is only, 
therefore, through the extension of the God’s promises to the Gentiles 
that the Christ-event can overcome the condition of sin first realised by 
Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden.  
The Christ-event, like the Fall, allows the subject to gaze into the 
abyss at the heart of authority. The foolishness of God defeated human 
strength through the Messiah’s death on the cross, and in the resurrection 
Christ unplugs from the world of masquerade and enjoins us to follow Him 
through participating in the power of the Holy Spirit. This economy of 
power made sense within Paul’s imagined eschatological context. God 
revealed a new set of possibilities inherent to the nature of the time which 
had arrived. All peoples could now participate in these new possibilities, 
and it was this participation alone which would direct the wrath of God.  
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Žižek, and others writing from contemporary political, cultural and 
political perspectives, see something different at stake in this outpouring 
of new possibilities: the shift from the private to the commons. One of the 
most difficult tasks in contemporary radical political projects of the left 
come before such projects can properly begin; to allow the people to not 
only see the empty centre of the dominant “mainstream” of politico-
economic power, but to be able to participate in its unmasking. This is the 
hermeneutics at the heart of a new communism.  
 
5.1.1 Zizek, Paul, and a theory of Original Sin 
 
Original sin, as eminent Christian figures such as Augustine would describe 
it, is the name for a deficiency in human nature caused by the sins of our 
ancestors, tracing all the way back to Adam and Eve’s original 
transgression. It creates the image of subjects who are in desperate need 
of redemption through a force which can only come from God. Paul did not 
think this way. Instead, Paul indicated that it was not a force internal to 
our being which was ultimately flawed but our proclivity for falling for 
false teachings which created the conditions for sin to multiply. Indeed, 
the Gentiles were now ‘dead to sin and alive to God in Jesus Christ’ (Rom. 
6.11); not at some future point but in their life in the body of Christ. A key 
section here relates to Eve. In relation to the precise gospel which the 
believers in Corinth have received, Paul writes: ‘I am afraid that as the 
serpent deceived Eve by its cunning, your thoughts will be led astray from 
a sincere and pure devotion to Christ’ (2 Cor. 11.3). The good news of 
Christ had the potential to free the Gentiles from this condition, while the 
false message did not.  
 Critchley argues forcefully against a traditional understanding of 
original sin, dismissing the idea that ‘there is something essentially 
defective in human nature which requires a corrective at the political and 
theological level’ (108). Yet we should not dismiss this idea completely. 
Critchley is very much interested in Paul’s message of love for the 
neighbour, but it is only in the context of sin that his message becomes 
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possible. What Žižek does is shift the focus on original sin away from the 
Augustinian reading which has dominated protestant Christianity. In doing 
so he also makes a step away from Paul, but remains an important 
interpreter of his letters. Original sin is not about a deviation from God, or 
a deficiency in the soul which creates a tendency towards evil. Original 
sin, and this is his distinctly Pauline point, is located in creation itself, 
inherent to that which makes us vulnerable to manipulation and coercion. 
Put differently, original sin is located in violent forces which direct the 
realities which they help to create.  
 It is in this context that the Fall can be understood as a narrative that 
details an Event which allows Adam and Eve to come to consciousness as 
humans, aware of the imperfection of the world around them which had 
previously been hidden from them. It is in this sense that ‘the Fall is “in 
itself” already Redemption’ (128). This is redemption understood as an 
‘explosion of freedom, the breaking of our natural chains’ (128). 
Emancipation is only possible after the Fall. It initiates the inception into 
the ‘properly human universe’ (129). Here we understand that ‘the Fall 
never happens since it has always already happened’ (119); it is not a point 
located in history, guilt passed through generations, it is the awareness of 
our vulnerability.  
 
 
5.2 The Divided Subject of Romans 7 
 
In his letter to the church in Rome, Paul shows signs of being aware that 
there is something violent at work in the imagination. Before violence can 
be manifested physically, symbolically, or systemically, an aspect already 
exists in the deceptions that occur in our own (un)conscious. Žižek puts it 
this way: 'every imagination is already violent in itself, in the guise of the 
tension between apprehension and comprehension: the second can never 
fully catch up with the first' (1999, 42). There is a connection here to 
Paul’s explanation of the difficulties which the Gentile were troubled with 
in relation to the law in Romans 7, which Žižek calls Paul’s ‘(deservedly) 
most famous passage’ (1999, 148). Within the inability to comprehend 
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comes violence inherent to the zero-level of reality (we might not realise 
that we participate in it but do so all the same).  
This is a critical passage in Paul’s explanation of what it means to be 
a slave ‘in the new life of the Spirit’ (7.6). Paul believes that being ‘slaves 
of righteousness’ (6.18) is the path to freedom from death. It is the 
opposite path from that of sin and death which had fed upon the ‘natural 
limitations’ (6.19) inherent to the conditions of being separated from the 
promises of God. Stanley Stowers links this passage to Greek tragedy. He 
writes, ‘tragedy emphasises the often evil consequences of these 
limitations, but it also claims that what is good and beautiful about human 
life is intrinsically bound to this vulnerability’ (1994, 261). We hear in the 
voice of Rom. 7.7-25 that ‘the very commandment that promised life 
proved to be death to me’ (7.10). In this letter Paul is explaining the plight 
of the Gentiles who are struggling to come to terms with the truth of the 
Christ-event, and precisely how they can reclaim victory out of this 
vulnerability found in their encounter with the law. 
Much of the study of Paul in the past half century has been dominated 
by the battleground epitomised in this passage; between the traditional 
readings of justification by faith which have cast a long shadow over the 
interpretation of Paul and the “New Perspectives” on Paul that battles 
against such readings. The claim here is that this was not Paul’s voice. Put 
differently, this is not, as the Christian imagination so often has it, the 
voice of the Christian-convert breaking free from the law.  
Krister Stendahl’s essay on the Introspective Conscience of the West 
is at the roots of this turn in the understanding of the Pauline epistles. In 
this essay he argues that 'Paul did not have the type of introspective 
conscience' which had dominated readings of Paul up to that point (1963, 
82). This was not about a Jew who had previously tried to be perfect 
through the works of the law and failed, as Stowers puts it: 
 
the picture of Paul the Pharisee, who attempted that impossible 
task, clearly comes from reading the narratives of his conversion 
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in Acts through the lens of later Christian constructions of 
Judaism and the law. (1994, 269) 
 
On the contrary this was about the nature of the Gentiles, who had been 
separated from God’s people. Stowers goes on to argue, ‘the view of 
gentiles as morally degenerate must be considered a fundamental feature 
of Jewish self-definition in antiquity’ (273). This, therefore, was about the 
inability of the Gentiles to understand what was required of this new 
subjectivity of being a slave of Christ.  
In Romans 7 we are presented with, as Emma Wasserman puts it, ‘an 
internal monologue that depicts the radical disempowerment of reason at 
the hands of the passions’ (2007, 794). She later adds: ‘the appetites thus 
emerge as the fiercest and most dangerous part of the soul’ (801). This 
move towards a “speech-in-character” (προσωποποιία) interpretation of 
this passage highlights the battle with the passions over the soul.76 The 
voice in this passage is that of a Gentile who has been split by sin, and 
thus is thrown into a battle between the Spirit and the flesh (the will and 
the passions). This passage is a key text in the formation of the subject 
who is to be part of the body of Christ, which questions the ability of those 
outside the Jewish covenant to manage their carnal urges.  
The subjects of the Christ-event struggled with understanding its 
truth (which was perhaps itself an impossible offshoot of thinking 
prevalent in Stoicism). Paul is attempting to relate the condition of being 
an Israelite under the law given by God to a new member created by the 
Christ-event as a slave of Christ. Each finds their righteousness under the 
promises of God. As Paul put it in his previous life, before Christ aligned 
him with the Gentiles: 
 
circumcised on the eighth day, a member of the people of Israel, 
of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews; as to the 
law, a Pharisee;  as to zeal, a persecutor of the church; as to 
righteousness under the law, blameless. (Phil. 3.5-6) 
                                                             
76 See Stowers (1994, 16-21) for an overview of this idea.  
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Wasserman uses the story of Medea from Greek mythology to exemplify 
what Paul is demonstrating. This is not the subject’s struggle with sin as 
the basis of the human condition but the inability to make the correct 
choices because they have been deceived. Under the law Paul had not 
been deceived but since it was not designed for the Gentiles it deceived 
them. In the case of Medea, ‘immoral actions result from competing claims 
about what is true…Medea kills her children because she holds false 
beliefs’ (2007, 802). It is this deception - put differently, this transgression 
in the Symbolic - that is at the heart of violence. This is the responsibility 
that is thrown onto the community of believers; a responsibility over 
creation that extends back to its origins.  
 
5.2.1 The Struggle against Original Sin  
 
Who has not, at one time or around, found sympathy with the sentiment: ‘I 
do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but do the 
very thing I hate’ (Rom. 7.15)? Was this not the very condition that had 
overcome Llewellyn Moss in his decision to take the bag of money? Moss 
knew what he was doing meant trouble, yet his desire for the money 
exceeded all other reason. He was possessed by the thought that the 
money would be a path to something greater. As with the fruit in the 
Garden of Eden, the prohibition only added to the forces driving him 
towards the object of desire. This is a condition of original sin: the nature 
of creation itself and our vulnerability to its violence.  
Paul’s words in Romans 7 have transcended cultures and eras to form 
a central cog of the Christian faith. We have here the very idea of 
imperfection (sin) that is at the heart of Christianity; this is the idea that 
we will always be in need of the redemption offered in God's grace 
extended to us through Christ's atoning death on the cross.  
This, though, misses a crucial aspect of what Paul is attempting to 
demonstrate. It was about the effect on the whole community within a 
cosmological context which had reached its final days, not the soul of the 
individual. This is an integral aspect of Paul’s evoking of Adam in his letter 
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to the Romans. It is not the effect of one man on his own soul as it is in 
works-righteousness model of reading Paul; which Neil Elliot rightly calls 
‘historically untenable and morally bankrupt’ (2011, 44). It is instead the 
effect of that act throughout the entirety of creation. In comparing Adam 
to Christ by affirming that ‘just as one trespass resulted in condemnation 
for all people, so also one righteous act resulted in justification and 
life for all people’ (Rom. 5.18), Paul is effectively testifying to the 
interdependency of the created world with regards to God’s coming 
judgement (even Christ was subject to this economy). This is why it is so 
important for Paul to imagine the community of Christ as one body. It is 
not about the individual, but the effect of the individual on the society. 
Paul is deeply rooted in this understanding of the creation of humankind as 
the society that carries God through what he has created. As Paul puts it:  
 
do you not know that you are God’s temple and that God’s Spirit 
dwells in you? If anyone destroys God’s temple, God will destroy 
that person. For God’s temple is holy, and you are that temple. 
(1 Cor. 16-17) 
 
Here we can see the connections between Žižek’s interest in Paul and his 
continuing interest in the idea of communism. The statement is clear, act 
in the interest of the body of Christ or you will be destroyed.  
Žižek’s Paulinist theory of violent love is provocative. It conjures 
language of division in order to construct the battleground for a fight 
against the domination at the heart of the Symbolic structure of reality. He 
reads into Paul the type of violent fidelity which has epitomised many 
communist projects. He writes: 
  
when Paul says, "there are no Greeks or Jews, no men or 
women...," this does not mean that we are all one happy human 
family, but rather that there is one big divide which cuts across 
all these particular identities, rendering them ultimately 
irrelevant: "There are no Greeks or Jews, no men or 
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women...there are only Christians and the enemies of 
Christianity!" Or, as we would have to put it today: there are 
only those who fight for emancipation and their reactionary 
opponents; the people and the enemies of the people. (2009b, 
45) 
 
This is a struggle within a community which places its purposes above those 
of the individual; likewise Paul’s message is about the part that the people 
play in God’s plan for His creation. Original sin, in this sense, is not about 
the condition of the individual but of the community. It is a theory steeped 
in theologico-political importance. 
By remaining faithful to God through following the Christ-event, the 
community of believers could avoid false teaching, avoid destruction, and 
overcome their condition in original sin. Humans were condemned not by 
their own nature, but by their sinful participation in the world around 
them. Crucifixion, as a prominent symbol of the need to correct the nature 
of the people, typified the idea of controlling the population by force. The 
Christ-event undermined that culture of domination. 
In describing the way in which ‘anarchism is the political expression of 
freedom from original sin’ (2012, 108), Critchley writes: 
 
the idea of original sin is not some outdated relic from the 
religious past. It is the conceptual expression of a fundamental 
experience of ontological defectiveness or lack which explains 
the human propensity towards error, malice, wickedness, 
violence, and extreme cruelty. (108) 
 
In overcoming the propensity to use this idea as the justification for the 
type of total dominance over life that was epitomised in the Roman 
Empire, Paul’s Messiah tied all people under the command to love your 
neighbour. This, not the control of the state or the dictates of ritual or 
law, was how the Gentiles could overcome their condition in sin. This was 
the manner in which the emancipatory power of the law had been spread 
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throughout the world in the Christ-event. It was the power of love, and not 
Jewish particularities of law, which God intended for the Gentiles. For Paul 
it was not that the Gentiles needed to be controlled because of this 
condition; the attempt at correction (circumcision and so forth) through 
the old law was a false teaching (it was a sign the Jews special relationship 
with God). Rather, it was that they had to overcome the idea that they 
were trapped in this condition of sin without a hope of overcoming it. 
Participation in the body of Christ, dedicated to love for the neighbour, 
was the path to overcoming the idea that it was symbolic domination, and 
not a full experience of Christ, which meant emancipation. This was how 
Paul put it: ‘there is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in 
Christ Jesus’ (Rom. 8.1). Or, put differently, it was full participation in the 
foolish force of love, and not the law, empire, or any other power, which 
dictated the nature of the body of believers through the messianic era.  
In this sense Romans 7 should be read alongside Genesis 2-3, 
confirming its description of the susceptibility to false teachings. Adam 
and Eve, as foreigners to the law, became fixated on this prohibited object 
causing their desire to increase and the violation of this divine command. 
The serpent, inherent to God’s creation, seizes upon the prohibition 
placed upon eating the fruit from the tree in the middle of the Garden, 
convincing the woman to eat the fruit.  
The violent appetite at work in the body of the Gentile sinner links 
desire to violence. For Paul, the community of believers could not be free 
from the violence internal to the community without its members freeing 
themselves from the power of the passions. And this power could only be 
overcome through the labour of the body of Christ. This link to the 
passions could not be broken without full submission to the Christ-event (a 
submission which, as we saw in Romans 13, was completely detached from 
the temporal system of authority). It was the coming to consciousness as 
part of the body of Christ, the life in the spirit, which was vital.  
 Joseph Blenkinsopp notes a similar idea in his reading of Genesis. He 
writes, ‘the decisive event in the history of the garden is the passage from 
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individual to society’ (2011, 68).77 The choices and decisions made by the 
individual are not of consequence for that individual only. The important 
point, which reappears throughout the narratives of the Bible, is that 
‘disorder in social relations’ (68) continually reappears because of the 
actions of individuals. This was an important aspect of Paul’s Jewish 
background (the community acting in accordance with God’s plan).  
In the chaos of creation the will to choose means that the whole of 
society will be laboured with the consequences. If God does not want to 
continually destroy what He has created, as he did in the flood, then He 
must accept this reality. This is what makes Him so powerless in the 
narrative of Job. He is the creator of all things, more powerful than any 
other being, yet relies on the faithfulness of Job to justify His creation.  
The author of Genesis 3 had already showed an awareness of this link 
between desire and violence; or, at least, the link between our actions and 
unintended consequences. The forging together of desire and violation 
caused the reality of shame, suffering, and expulsion from the garden. 
Genesis 2-3 tells the story of humankind’s descent into creation and the 
compelling forces it encounters; Paul continues to tell this story in Romans 
7. In the Garden of Eden the serpent helped tempt Eve into eating the 
fruit, but this was not an outside force tempting Eve – it came from within 
God’s creation.78 We are all driven, to an extent, by objects of desire but 
these objects are not only desirable because of their intrinsic properties. 
The fruit was turned into an object to be desired by factors inherent to 
God’s creation. Eve’s knowledge of good and evil only came after she ate 
the apple; what is the meaning of a transgression prior to this point? As 
Mark G Brett puts it:  
 
                                                             
77Blenkinsopp argues for a coherent understanding of Genesis 1-11, in which the author 
brought together sources that would have had a cultural resonance in the context that the 
narrative was formed. It is a story of ‘creation-uncreation-recreation’ (17) and the drama 
of the struggle of humankind. This idea of creation, ‘as a more complex phenomenon with 
several phases,' or alternatively, viewed from different perspectives and angles of vision, 
was developed not to scientifically or theologically trace our origins but to help reflect 
upon issues in the present, ‘to add value and resonance to life in the present’ (16). 
78This is a prominent theme of this passage. Even the tree is described by the narrator as 
‘nehmad’ (3.6) meaning ‘that which is to be desired’ (Alter 1996, 12).  
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This humbling of the humans is pointed up by the fact that, 
although they must first eat the fruit of a forbidden tree to gain 
wisdom, the talking reptile has wisdom to start with. (2000, 33) 
 
This is the real irony of the story. Adam and Eve are betrayed by creation 
to the extent that it overwhelms them. The truth revealed in the fruit was 
that they did not know what they were doing; their naïve understanding 
was based on a command by God which was intrinsically conflicted with 
the world which God had created. The point the author is making here is 
not about the origin of the human race, but that this link between violence 
and desire is an aspect of creation itself. The deficiency does not belong in 
Eve, as if the guilt for eating the fruit somehow originates in her actions, 
but in her vulnerable position within the world of the serpent and the tree. 
She does, however, participate in this action, which allows her to come to 
consciousness as a part of the world as it is. She becomes aware of an 
infinite responsibility that was previously impossible for her to 
comprehend. 
 
5.2.2 Eve’s Voice in Romans 7 
 
This is an integral aspect of original sin, and, for Paul, its overcoming was 
vital to God’s plan for redemption. In Romans 7 we hear the voice of the 
Gentile still struggling to commit to the community of believers, still 
struggling to come to terms with this infinite responsibility. Stowers is one 
among many recent writers to insists that ‘it is not the later Christian focus 
on Adam and Eve’s moment of disobedience in the garden that stands 
behind chapters 1 and 7 of Romans’ (1994, 275). It is certainly probable 
that, following Stowers, Paul is speaking in the voice of contemporary 
Gentile followers of Christ without Adam and Eve in mind. It is, however, 
the very idea of being betrayed by her own nature is that which makes Eve 
an appropriate prototype of the Gentile propelled into a new consciousness 
of Truth caused by the Event. Rom. 7.7-25, therefore, can be read as the 
confession of Eve. Not only the confession of being deceived by the 
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serpent, but of being betrayed by God. This struggle with desire was 
caused by the conditions of creation. If Paul was influenced by Stoicism in 
this passage, as has been suggested by Stowers, then ‘the passions were 
disturbed or diseased states of the soul engendered by false beliefs’ (262). 
The serpent disturbed Eve’s passions and increased her desire for 
transgressing God’s rule. We should, however, read beyond Paul’s intuition 
here. What Paul does not, or could not, acknowledge here is that this is 
the inevitable consequence of the Fall: it is creation itself that sells us into 
slavery under sin (7.14). 
If God had not instructed Eve that she ‘shall not eat of the fruit of the 
tree that is in the middle of the garden’ (Gen. 3.3), would the serpent 
have been able to produce in her all kinds of covetousness (Rom. 7.8)? Eve 
desired to be like God and so, along with Adam, ate the fruit from the 
tree. God did not deceive them with his warning; this act placed them in a 
body of death. As Paul would have understood it, until God’s promise made 
through Abraham, and the subsequent election of the Jewish people tied 
to God through the law given through Moses, humankind was separated 
from God. The Gentiles remained in this condition until Christ extended 
God’s grace to all people.  
Austin Busch makes this link between Eve and Rom. 7.5-25, arguing: 
‘Paul’s allusion to the Genesis episode is subtle, but it permeates the 
entire chapter and suggests a complex interpretation of Eve’s temptation 
and sin’ (2004, 12).79 What makes Eve such a good fit for this passage is the 
tension between her ‘passive victimisation and active responsibility,’ that 
creates ‘a picture of the self split under sin’ (23). Eve ‘represents the 
dynamics of the self fragmented under sin’ (36), emphasising the complex 
nature of the moment of violation. This moment of violation was the 
moment when Eve comes to realise this split exists. She becomes suddenly 
aware of the absence and imminent presence of God and the freedom 
which this brings. God prohibition brought with it the possibility of 
                                                             
79 Busch makes a number of indications why this passage is linked with Eve, including the 
link between sin’s deception in 7.11 and the serpent’s deception of Eve (mediated by the 
deception of the church members in Corinth in 2 Cor. 11) (15).  
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freedom, and the trespass revealed the consequences of this freedom – the 
emancipation from God’s control but the responsibility over His wrath. The 
realisation of their nakedness was the realisation of their vulnerability and 
responsibility.  
The Gentiles, who were isolated from the law, shared the particular 
vulnerability of Adam and Eve (or, more poetically, plays on the Hebraic 
words for “man” and “life”). These figures are manipulated towards eating 
the fruit from the tree. Adam is severely reprimanded on account of 
‘listening to his wife’ (3.17) and Eve is cursed to be ruled by her husband 
(3.16). Paul, as we see throughout his letters, is deeply influenced by this 
story. What Paul cannot perceive, though, is that Yahweh Elohim appears 
as the archetypal villain of this text. Like Anton Chigurh in No Country for 
Old Men, Yahweh Elohim is the amoral force that acts without compassion, 
simply in the service of creation. This is what makes this such a piercing 
piece of wisdom literature; at once we are given life and death through 
the gift of a will that is bound to a volatile divine economy of choice and 
chance.  
Circling back round to an important point Žižek’s all too Lutheran-
Lacanian reading of Romans 7, he understands this passage to mean that 
there was no sin prior to, or that exists independently of, the law: ‘if it 
was not for the law, I would not have known sin’ (Rom 7.7). Sin exists 
because of prohibition, Žižek writes:  
 
here St. Paul and Badiou seem fully to endorse Hegel’s point that 
there is Evil only for the gaze that perceives something as evil: it 
is the law itself that not only opens up and sustains the domain 
of sin, of sinful urges to transgress it, but also finds a perverse 
and morbid satisfaction in making us feel guilty about it. (1999, 
150) 
 
Here we find the idea that ‘it is the very act of prohibition that gives rise 
to the desire for its transgression, that is, fixes our desire on the 
prohibited object’ (1999, 148). Žižek reads this as Paul's assertion that 'the 
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law itself generates the desire to violate it’ (2003, 104). For Žižek, the law 
holds the subject in a cycle of prohibition and violation, and it is only 
through the death of the moral God that we can break from this cycle (to 
see beyond the current world of masquerade).  
Furthering his theological insight, in a connection between Paulinism 
and the story in Genesis 2-3, Žižek rejects the reasoning that ‘Adam had to 
fall in order to come down to earth and dispense salvation’ (2014a, 130). 
He adds that, in this narrative line, God ‘wants them to be miserable so 
that he will be able to help them’ (130). To avoid this perversity we must 
accept that it is the Fall, and not God Himself, which signifies the 
beginning. That, 'in Christianity, the true Event is the Fall itself' (126). In 
other words, the condition of the Gentile speaking in Romans 7 is the very 
same condition of Adam and Eve; they are vulnerable to the forces of this 
necessary freedom.  
When Žižek argued, a decade earlier, that Christianity was 'probably 
the example' of how a Truth-Event can open up possibilities that did not 
previously exist in the Symbolic Order (1999, 147), he had not yet 
acknowledged this connection between the Fall and the Christ-event. For 
Žižek, again following G.K. Chesterton, the Christ-event is Original Sin 
(2014a, 129). It is a sign of our freedom and our responsibility. It reaffirms 
what always has been true: God is dead. It is in this sense that ‘Christ 
redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us’ (Gal. 
3.13). Christ went through this very experience himself to reveal the 
possibility of freedom of its condition. It is this insight that begins to take 
us back to why Paul is such a crucial figure in the diagnosis of violence 
inherent to capitalism.  
 
5.2.3 Objet Petit a 
 
In bringing Žižek and Paul together in this reading, the intention has not 
been to only understand Paul better in his own context. Our readings of 
Paul, and our understanding of his mission, can both challenge and 
influence ideas of political and cultural resistance. It is the diagnosis of 
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violence, and formulations of resistance, which are at stake in these 
readings; particularly the violence which exists at the zero-level of the 
symbolic construction of society.  
Nudge theory, developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, has in 
recent years become a prominent theory in behavioural studies. It has 
wormed its way into the heart of political power, finding a place in the 
policy making of the administrations of Barak Obama as well as David 
Cameron. The basic premise is that in our everyday lives we can be, and 
are, “nudged” towards making certain decisions. Advertising campaigns, 
government policies, product placement, and so on, attempt to guide our 
decision making towards certain goals without revealing the little 
manipulations that have taken place. In utilising this theory the aim is to 
keep an illusion of our free-will intact while guiding (nudging) towards 
certain outcomes. In this sense, nudging is at the heart of the Symbolic 
Order; an attempt at influencing this zero-level of reality. The way we 
perceive the world is influenced, in no small part, by the way items are 
stacked on a supermarket shelf, the language used to describe government 
policy, the terms used to describe the victims of economic and social 
exploitation, and so forth. We are constantly nudged into making decisions 
and forming ideas that we believe are entirely created of our own volition. 
Our “free” will is bound to a lens on reality which is constantly 
manipulated by interested parties. 
The prominently positioned tree with its good fruit (a delight to the 
eye and placed in the middle of the garden), the crafty serpent created by 
God, and the promise of the knowledge of good and evil - there are nudges 
at play in the manipulation of creation as encountered by Adam and Eve. 
As if it was not enough to create such a tree bearing this fruit, God then 
forbade them from eating from the tree on the penalty of death (a 
peculiar threat for those who had never experienced death). God 
redoubled the attraction of the object of desire by making it taboo.  
The claim here is not one of pure determinism, that God designed the 
garden with only one possible outcome. We could end this story with Adam 
and Eve choking on the fruit, leaving Yahweh Elohim to ponder the very 
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literal deliverance of his threat. This is a narrative that demonstrates not 
only our limited frame of decision making ability but also the profound 
impact we can have even with that limited frame. Bartleby took this to its 
extreme – all he could do to jolt the lawyer’s worldview was “prefer not 
to” do anything at all. Paul, in a similar way, could only fashion this 
critical disturbance within an eschatological framework. Their effect, 
however, extends beyond their own respective deaths.  
What we have is a world with an infinite number of influences. Among 
those is what the serpent offered Eve: the missing object. Žižek 
exemplifies this in the idea of the ‘totally useless’ toy at the centre of a 
Kinder Surprise chocolate egg (2003, 145-171). The unknown toy at the 
centre of the egg replaces the chocolate as the object of desire; the 
mysterious X that is desirable precisely because it has been hidden. As 
Žižek puts it: 
 
is this toy not l’objet petit a at its purest, the small object 
filling in the central void of our desire, the hidden treasure, 
agalma, at the centre of the thing that we desire? (145) 
 
The fruit represents a void at the centre of desire; the promise of 
something beyond its ability to satisfy. Even living in the Garden of Eden 
was not enough to satisfy Adam and Eve, they required an unknown 
supplement to what they already possessed. This is the basic premise of 
consumerism: ‘the more you have, the more you want’ (Žižek 2003, 145). 
Adam and Eve were the first, in the Biblical narrative at least, to be 
exposed to the perversity of this truth.  
Their discovery went beyond the uncovering of the empty centre of 
the excess in desire. The shattering nature of their encounter with the 
fruit came in that they actually encountered the raw Real of their desire. 
Eve, in eating the fruit, attained the impossible; she encountered the 
Objet petit a itself. In the case of the Kinder Surprise egg, what usually 
occurs is the dissolution of the object of our desire; a paradoxical mixture 
of mild satisfaction and disappointment which displaces desire onto a new 
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object. The Symbolic representation is experienced without any encounter 
with the Real. It is only an 'imaginary representation' that exists in l’objet 
petit a, 'it has no substantial consistency of its own, it is just a spectral 
materialization of a certain cut or inadequacy' (Žižek 2014a, 403). No 
object can exist without the Symbolic universe that shapes its 
understanding, meaning that the ultimate object of desire does not exist, 
it is already cut by what it is not, what it might also be; its potential to be 
the object is already denied because of its position within the Symbolic.  
Eve experienced the monstrous void at the core of desire. She came 
to consciousness as the first atheist, experiencing not only the empty 
centre of the fruit but the empty centre of the garden itself. It is the 
horror of glimpsing the divine Real that causes the re-ordering of the world 
– not because it gives new, positive, meaning to a situation but because it 
dismantles all its previous claims to truth. In eating the fruit Eve became 
like God, emptied out into a chaotic and painful creation. The expulsion 
from the Garden revealed the infinite responsibility inherent to a world 
absent of the big Other. 
Paul configures Christ as a new type of Adam; as an individual that 
reconfigures the societal. In his first letter to the Church in Corinth, he 
writes, ‘for as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive’ (15:22). 
He then adds to this idea in his letter to Rome: 
 
therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and 
death through sin, and in this way death came to all people, 
because all sinned – To be sure, sin was in the world before the 
law was given, but sin is not charged against anyone’s account 
where there is no law. Nevertheless, death reigned from the 
time of Adam to the time of Moses, even over those who did not 
sin by breaking a command, as did Adam, who is a pattern of the 
one to come. (Rom. 5.12-14) 
 
Paul used this is as an example for the Gentiles who had continued to 
suffer in the same sense as Adam and Eve. The kairotic moment of the 
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Christ-event revealed a reordering of identity so that all could share in the 
coming glory (Rom. 8.18). Paul believed that this could be attained by 
submitting oneself to Christ rather than the forces that bring death. He 
was enjoining the Gentiles to uncouple from the lies of the existing order, 
but instead of this leading to an Adamic separation from God it would lead 
to reconciliation in the Parousia (the divine outcome determined through 
the labour of the now-time).  
 
5.3 Diagnosing Contemporary Violence 
 
Looking back at Robert Hammerton-Kelly’s arguement that in Paul’s 
worldview Adam symbolises the deformation of desire into rivalry, we can 
see his view that desire is intrinsically linked to violence.  
 
The myth of the serpent, therefore, is also a scapegoating of the 
responsible self in the sense of the expulsion of responsibility 
onto an external fiction, and this scapegoating of the self is 
perhaps the most ironic moment in the story of the birth of 
consciousness. (1992, 95) 
 
Is there not another way of reading this? The serpent does not represent 
the scapegoating of Adam but of God. It is the serpent, inside the body of 
creation, which reminds us of the nature freedom with regards to sin. This 
made the law necessary for the Jew and Christ necessary for the Gentiles. 
The narrative of the Fall provides an example of the way in which 
humankind is overcome by the desire necessary in God’s creation.  
Hammerton-Kelly acknowledges this point himself with regards to the 
market system that our desires are bound to. 
We buy art for its investment potential and we write books for 
the market. The market defines our likes and dislikes rather 
than the other way around; there is very little free about the 
“free market system”; it is a network of bondage to one 
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another’s imagined likes and dislikes, an essentially fantastic 
web of servitude to the phantoms of desire. (1992, 23) 
 
This network of bondage is simply what there is – our actions have a 
rippling effect upon the world around us. Roland Boer takes this on a 
further stage with regards to our freedom.  
 
My ability to choose from various products in a supermarket is 
therefore formal freedom: faced with a bewildering array of 
choices, I fail to see that the political economic structure that 
generates supermarkets has already set the boundaries of the 
range of choice. (2013, 203) 
This range of choice only serves to tie us to an enslavement to desire – an 
obsession with the ‘(totally useless) plastic toy’ at the centre of a Kinder 
Surprise chocolate egg (Žižek 2003, 145). These are the conditions of 
creation in the Garden of Eden that make the Fall the true source of 
creation. The problem of this “formal freedom” is its ability to hide the 
way we participate in systemic violence. Going back to Žižek’s main 
antagonisms, this means that our freedom only allows us to continue to 
participate in ecological vandalism, in the privatization of the commons, in 
dangerous new techno-scientific developments, and in new forms of 
apartheid.  
This systemic violence, that Žižek defines as the 'catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political 
systems' (2008, 1), masquerades itself in our formal freedoms that really 
amount to the freedom to live inside of these systems or to die outside of 
them (like Bartleby).  
Žižek tells the story of a man who is moving from Germany to work in 
Siberia. He establishes a code with his friend that if he writes to him in 
blue ink everything is true, but if he writes in red ink it is false. He soon 
writes to his friend explaining how wonderful everything is in Siberia - 
except there is no red ink in the shops (2002, 1). The punnchline here is 
that our formal freedom is always pinned to forces that are greater than 
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our ability to actually have freedom. These forces, furthermore, do not 
simply operate on their own. As Žižek puts it: 
 
the experience of recent decades clearly shows that the market 
is not a benign mechanism which best works when left to its own 
devices - it requires a good deal of extra-market violence to 
establish and maintain the conditions for its functioning. (2009, 
79) 
 
This violence is hidden in the “bewildering array of choices” which we are 
faced with in a supermarket. If the spectacles that allowed such an array 
of choices were laid bare – if the condition of steroid injected chickens 
crammed together in small cages was placed behind the chickens on sale - 
then the boundaries of choices would be radically transformed.  
 
5.3.1 The Violence of Capitalism 
 
At the core of Žižek’s work is a desire to reveal and prevent the violence in 
the functioning of capitalism; to unmask the violence which manipulates 
reality and perpetuates systems of mastery to the benefit of private 
property and profit. In The Fragile Absolute he reveals this underlying 
impetus behind his work on violence. 
 
(The) speculative dance of Capital, which pursues its goal of 
profitability with a blessed indifference to the way its 
movement will affect social reality. That is the fundamental 
systemic violence of capitalism, which is more uncanny than 
direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is 
no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their "evil" 
intentions; it is purely 'objective,' systemic, anonymous. (2000, 
15) 
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The earthquake that devastated parts of Haiti in 2010 is a reminder of such 
violence. The effects of natural disasters should not detract from the 
circumstances surrounding their appearance. In the case of Haiti, the 
social and economic circumstances which made the earthquake so 
devastating showed that the disaster already existed at the zero-level (in 
the already existing conditions). The contingent factor of the earthquake 
tore the veil between the outside and the disaster which already existed. 
The urgent demand for action can often hide the longer term need for our 
thinking and action that challenge the very structures which shape 
catastrophes. Countries such as Haiti should not be merely understood as 
“victim states,” as many, especially central, African countries are so often 
portrayed. This is precisely the point – they should not be understood as 
merely the subjects of Western charity, as if part of a separate world, but 
at all times as part of the same world.  
This is one of the reasons why Žižek’s provocative language attacks 
those who give to charity. They create new walls and divisions before 
seeking to alleviate the problems exacerbated by such divisions.  
 
The exemplary figures of evil today are not ordinary consumers 
who pollute the environment and live in a violent world of 
disintegrating social links, but those who, while fully engaged in 
creating conditions for such universal devastation and pollution, 
buy their way out of their own activity, living in gated 
communities, eating organic food, taking holidays in wildlife 
preserves, and so on. (2008a, 125) 
 
The highest form of violence is perpetrated by those who have the power 
to manipulate what appears as normal in order to disguise the violent 
forces which maintain their lifestyle. The guilt of such self-serving living is 
alleviated by a capitalist notion of charity; “buy a Starbucks coffee, save a 
child in Africa” is an example of the pressure release valves through which 
this system can continue to function (Žižek 2011, 236). As this violence is 
anonymous, there is no longer even a need for those guilty of its 
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perpetuation to realise what it is that they participate in. The forces 
which preserve injustice, disruption, and violation are often inherent to 
the normal state of things, making them either invisible or appear as non-
violent. Hidden from view are the exploitation of workers, the movement 
of capital with little regard for those it oppresses, and the preservation of 
the poor to serve the rich.  
The so-called “enemies of capitalist democracies” (communists, 
Muslim extremists, socialists, corrupt individuals, and so on) are positioned 
as examples of the violent alternatives to this system. Winston Churchill’s 
famous statement on democracy as the “worst form of government apart 
from all others that have been tried” is an example of the way in which 
systems are maintained through the creation of powerful ideas; nudging 
the population into believing such ideas are self-evident. The statement 
assumes that all alternatives tend towards a greater disaster in a way that 
denies the opportunity to explore an alternative. This is something which 
Vattimo and Zabala agree with Žižek on. Such systems are ‘always 
prepared to exploit and dominate with a ‘human face,’ as Žižek often 
emphasises’ (Vattimo 2011, 134). Their argument is that it is the violent 
force of metaphysics which legitimises such exploitation and domination; a 
force that must be met by a ‘weak’ counter-force through a type of 
hermeneutics. Ethical action, trapped within this framework, can only 
begin to see clearly once the uncoupling from the symbolic mastery of the 
existing order has occurred. 
 
5.3.2 The Infinite Demand 
 
Critchley, an increasingly interesting figure in the turn to Paul, frames this 
resistance to an ideology of original sin in the idea of the infinite demand. 
The Christ-event, as a re-imagining of the world through a shift in time, 
exposed the truth of the powers who would even crucify God Himself in 
their attempts to gain mastery over the population. It is the infinite 
demand to love the neighbour which allows the faithful to participate in 
the truth of the Christ-event. This power message has been carried into 
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the secular era in many forms, including the powerful messages contained 
in science fiction (in many ways one of the bearers of the legacy of the 
Christ-event). Joss Whedon’s Firefly and Serenity are heirs of this message 
of resistance. 
 In this fictional frame, a rusty old firefly class ship, built with 
smuggling in mind, enables this crew to survive outside the control of the 
Central Alliance (a multi-planet empire). Her captain (Mal) and first officer 
(Zoë) took up the vocation of smugglers after finding themselves on the 
losing side of a war fought for independence against the Alliance. This was 
a battle fought against the totalising claims of the Alliance over life itself. 
As explained by a young River Tam before her violation at the hands of the 
authorities: 
 
People don't like to be meddled with. We tell them what to do, 
what to think: don't run, don't walk. We're in their homes and in 
their heads and we haven't the right. We're meddlesome. 
 
After being trained, through force, by the Alliance as an assassin, River had 
locked within her head information about an experiment in population 
control carried out on one of the planets that was populated by the 
Alliance. In order to calm behaviour, restricting the boundaries of 
emotions, the air in planet's environment was manipulated with a form of 
mood suppressant. The consequences were catastrophic. Some of the 
population simply stopped living – they ceased all activity and waited for 
death. The rest of the population, however, reacted in such a way that 
they turned into violent creatures that are intent on raping, killing, and 
violently coercing others into their service.  
Upon discovering the truth of this planet, the crew of Serenity 
become resolved to spread the information that they discovered: the 
determination of the Alliance to decide upon the limits of human potential. 
The crux of the matter, and a critique of Christianity itself, comes from Mal 
after defeating the agent sent to stop him from sending out the message 
throughout all the planets, in the form of a video sent in distress from a 
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scientist involved in the project before she is killed. He says, “I'm going to 
show you a world without sin.” Contained here is the message of the 
gospel: it is for the burden of freedom, of slavery to the neighbour, that 
Christ has set you free, no longer to be subject to any authority who would 
seek to control you through force or ritual (through their systemic and 
symbolic violence) (Gal. 5.1 paraphrase).  
Freedom here is bound to the infinite demand to love the neighbour. 
At times Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding reads like a secret love letter to 
Paul, before this admiration for aspects of the apostle’s writings becomes 
more explicit in The Faith of the Faithless. According to Critchley, the 
same political disappointment that creates new ethical demands has also 
fuelled a return to Paul, precisely because Paul’s call to fulfil the law 
through love entails an infinite demand. It is this demand for the 
impossible which connects Critchley’s work to Paul. Despite the enormity 
of their differences in the perception of the situation and detail of this 
demand, they are connected by the imperative to create an immediate 
connection to the demands of the neighbour; for Paul in the community of 
the body of Christ, and for Critchley in ethically driven political 
communities. For both, this is the way in which the possibility arises for 
original sin to be overcome.  
Critchley draws a comparison between this infinite demand and the 
idea of the commandment, identifying the Beatitudes as an important 
example of this connection.80 He cites Benjamin’s example of the 
commandment not to kill as being distinct from the law; it does not entail 
punishment, rather it places a demand on the people to do their utmost to 
follow these commands. This demand, though, comes not from God but 
directly from the face of the neighbour. This places an ethical demand on 
us not to harm or exploit them. Critchley states: ‘conscience is the 
                                                             
80 Despite the lack of interest in the living Jesus in Paul’s letters, Critchley writes at times 
as if the two are synonymous with each other. Jesus and Paul are both marked by an 
infinite demand; both called their followers to live by impossible commandments. He 
writes that ‘Jesus’ ethical demand is a ridiculous demand’ (2012, 220).  
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location of the ethical demand, a demand that is impossibly demanding, a 
demand to be infinitely responsible, a demand that divides us, that sunders 
us’ (2007, 87). Whether Paul thought that the demand was impossibly 
demanding is a matter for debate, but at least many within the community 
of believers did. In a way that was reminiscent of Eve in the Garden, it 
tore them between a slave to the law of God and a slave to the law of sin. 
This demand is tied to the Event. As Badiou puts it, on becoming a 
subject of the truth, ‘that is to say at any given moment, everything he is – 
his body, his abilities – is called upon to enable the passing of a truth along 
its path’ (1993, 40). Situated here is an example of complex relationships 
that drive continental philosophy. Critchley draws upon Levinas (the face 
of the neighbour) and Badiou (the Event) in order to help construct his idea 
of the infinite demand, despite the yawning (and often hostile) gap that 
separates Badiou and Levinas. In this stitching together of opposing figures, 
Critchley identifies faith as the ‘lived subjective commitment’ that is 
synonymous with the infinite demand which he associates with Paul (2012, 
162).  
The Christ-event placed an infinite demand on Paul, and the content 
of this demand was to bring the message of fulfilling the law through the 
love for the neighbour to the Gentiles. The crucifixion of the Messiah was 
at the centre of ‘a political theory of the wretched of the earth’ (2012, 
159) through aligning God with the lowest place in the Roman chain of 
honour. The command to love the neighbour that was at the heart of the 
scriptures (Lev. 19.18) became the foundation of faith in the messianic 
era. As Critchley puts it: 
if faith is the coming forth of the subject in the proclamation of 
an infinite demand, then love is the labour of the subject that 
has bound itself to its demand in faith. (2012, 165) 
In a reading of Paul that follows a similar line to Agamben, we can see the 
neat tapestry of thinkers which Critchley stitches together here; he writes: 
‘the power of being in Christ is a powerless power… it gives subjects a 
potentiality for action through rendering them impotent’ (160). Love is the 
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weak force which allows the potential for something else to exist outside 
the framework of the existing order. It is the fact of already being 
redeemed that makes us impotent; or, in other words, we do not seek 
power because we know that Christ has already taken such power away 
through the resurrection. Love is the essential action after accepting to 
participate in the unfolding truth of the Christ-event.  
This demand is blocked in the global financial system by the demands 
to make profits, to grasp power, and to ceaselessly consume. In opposition 
to Critchley, Žižek insists that charity becomes a discharge of these 
demands, a placebo to allow these demands to continue to fuel the 
primarily self-serving system of capital. The type of argument that ethical 
philosophers align with the continuation of capitalist democracies are 
twisted here. Peter Singer narrates the example of a drowning boy and the 
question of whether or not you would ruin a new pair of expensive shoes to 
save that boys life (conflating this situation with a decision between buying 
a new pair of shoes and giving the money to a charity which might save a 
young boy’s life).81 Is this decision not already caught up in an ethical 
system which is already unjustifiable? If you buy the new pair of shoes you 
then aid the economy, therefore increasing the opportunity for someone 
else to give to charity – or do you give the money to charity and hope that 
it invests in the economy in some way as well as saving the boy’s life? The 
dilemma is already wrapped up in the way in which the economy operates. 
It is the economy which is the master of this situation. The attempt 
to create a fairer economy for all is also fraught with the contradiction of 
a market-driven economy which by its very nature is unfair. The split here 
is more than between the decision to gratify the desire to buy a new pair 
of shoes or to give to charity; the split is between what is possible within 
the economic restrictions of the market and what becomes possible when 
the violent forces defending those boundaries are exposed. Expensive 
shoes are usually no more than empty signifiers which are utilised within 
an economy of phantasmic desires, but they are empty signifiers which are 
nonetheless vital in the mechanisms of capitalism. This is where Critchley’s 
                                                             
81 In the documentary Examined Life (2008). 
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idea of the infinite demand is particularly interesting, and, rather 
perversely (given his criticisms), what moves him towards Žižek’s divine 
violence. It is not the withdrawal from charity that forces divine violence 
but the withdrawal from everything but charity. Capitalism, by its very 
nature, cannot survive if charity is moved to its centre. 
 
5.3.3 Militant Weakness 
 
Charity, as a facet of Pauline love, is understood here as a twisting of 
Bartleby’s stance of pure negation. The violence at the centre of Paul’s 
theory of love is situated in its militant weakness. Yet the hope that the 
powers will crumble under their own weight was indeed a foolish notion. 
The movement Paul was involved in was swallowed by the mechanisms of 
society under the Roman Empire. The idea that paying taxes (which did not 
matter as time was short) and loving the neighbour would hasten the 
Parousia turned out to be false; or, at least, the community lacked the 
sufficient faith to force the appearance of the divine. Žižek asks that we 
do the same – yet the practical questions that haunt Paul’s letter to the 
Romans remain. Do we pay taxes or not? In the United Kingdom, taxes 
supported the war in Iraq at the same time as the National Health Service, 
it bailed out morally dubious banks while providing vital services to the 
poorest in society. Paul’s militant weakness can only relate to such 
situations by moving towards the infinite demand on the individual in their 
impact upon society. As with Eve’s condition relating to original sin, the 
situation can only be transformed through the transgression that reveals 
falsehood of the truth propagated in the existing order. 
The important detail is in the way the Christ-event transformed the 
Symbolic Order for those like Paul. The resurrection of the Messiah after 
his brutal murder on a Roman cross transformed the economy of power. It 
is in this sense that Critchley goes as far to say that ‘Nietzsche’s call for a 
revaluation of values is based on a sheer jealousy of Paul’s achievement in 
bringing about such a revaluation’ (2012, 156). Nietzsche’s valorising of the 
Roman Empire hides from view the fact that they too rely on a false 
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construction of truth. This uncovering of a genealogy of morals is precisely 
what Paul had already undertaken (if in a very different context to 
Nietzsche). This idea that power can come from a position of weakness is 
at the heart of the work of a thinker like Vattimo, but it is Kenneth 
Reinhard who articulates the idea best when he writes: ‘a certain militant 
weakness constitutes the act of forcing – it is, we might say not exactly 
weakness, but playing from a weak hand’ (2009, 82). This militant 
weakness should not be confused with the ethics of love related to thinkers 
like Levinas. Ethics is given is possibility, its boundaries, after the forcing 
of the limits of truth by this militant weakness which aims to destroy 
power itself. 
Reinhard presses upon the crux of the matter here; turning the cheek 
(or paying taxes or not) in itself will not produce a new situation. It will 
probably create another victim. He argues that ‘redemption requires 
something more revolutionary: the destruction of power as such’ (2009, 
105). This destruction comes from, in Benjamin or Žižek’s language, an act 
of divine violence. To force such an occurrence requires participation in 
‘the process of forcing the logico-rhetorical expansion of the generic set of 
human and textual elements that will have implied the redemptive 
conclusion’ (105).  
For Paul, things are only complete when ‘the end will come, when he 
hands over the kingdom to God the Father after he has destroyed all 
dominion, authority and power’ (1 Cor. 15.24). This destruction, this divine 
violence, comes through the love of your neighbour. In this new situation 
the truth becomes visible; the law is only fulfilled through love. This act of 
forcing undermines the current world powers by taking away the 
legitimacy of the source of their power. For Reinhard, the great mistake of 
the communist projects of the last century was to imagine Communism as 
an ‘objective state construction’ (2009, 104). Paul is not interested in 
taking that kind of power; his is a weak politics, focused on releasing the 
potential of love.  
Clayton Crockett writes about this radicality in relation to the forcing 
of divine violence. He argues, in the same vein as Paul, that we must find a 
    220 
 
way to undercut the powers that reproduce the conditions that create 
suffering.  
 
In our contemporary corporate-capitalist world, the most 
difficult and maybe the most subversive act is to choose to not 
do something, not to shop, not to buy, not to consume, not to 
work. Only a drastic constraint of our incredible potentiality to 
produce, consume, and devastate natural resources can perhaps 
ward off social collapse and increased global warming. Such 
action seems incredibly urgent but virtually impossible given 
current political and economic arrangements. The effort 
required to stop or at least slow down our production, 
consumption, and proliferation of forms of violence is so 
enormous that it must be divine because “only a god can save 
us.” But if we await such a god it will not come; only if we find a 
way to realize this impotentiality of divine force or weakness can 
we preserve our transient happiness and be saved. (Crockett 
2013, 59) 
 
Divine violence undermines such authority and the foundations of its 
power. As Neil Elliot puts this type of idea with regards to Paul: ‘Read in 
apocalyptic terms, Paul’s proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection means, 
inevitably I think, that the biopower of the state is not sovereign, that its 
totalising claims can be resisted’ (2010, 147). Paul’s mission to the 
Gentiles, and his faith in Christ as Lord, was also based on the type of 
fundamental antagonisms that has led Žižek to the position that capitalism 
cannot be fixed but must be opposed. The pressures on God’s plan for 
creation had reached a point of rupture, making the appearance of the 
Messiah a necessity. Paul’s activity in forcing Jesus to have been the 
Messiah is played out in the idea of radical weakness; the Messiah became 
a necessity in creating the potential for the totalising control of the 
powers of that age “not to be.”  
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 First and foremost it is the narrative of the age which is being 
resisted. The fictions which regulate reality are transformed for the 
believers in the Christ-event. It is this dramatic shift in the narrative, 
through the undermining of metanarrative of Paul’s world in the Roman 
Empire, which makes Paul an important figure in contemporary discussions 
about violence. Yet, following Žižek, Cricthley, and others in their own 
distinctive ways, we move beyond what Paul could acknowledge himself. 
Indeed, it is the death of God that allows us to understand the trick which 
Paul plays on the existing powers. He, perhaps rather unwittingly, rips 
metaphysical certainty away from beneath their feet. It is Paul who allows 
Nietzsche to come to understand the death of God, even if Nietzsche 
himself was unaware of this. The world of manipulation and masquerade 
which he so forcefully describes in the Genealogy of Morals, is precisely 
the world which Paul described. Nietzsche’s hatred of Paul is down to his 
own historical conditioning; the power of Christianity hides from him the 
genius of the trick played by Paul on the world around him.     
 
5.4 The Blood turns Brown 
 
One of the greatest lines of separation between Žižek and Paul is drawn in 
relation to the nature of the illusion at the centre of the Christ-event. Put 
differently, Žižek fully understands the trick inherent to kenosis while Paul 
is still very much in awe of God’s plan for His creation. Yet both 
understand the possibility inherent to the God who humbles Himself to His 
own creation. It allows the subject of the Event to pass through an 
apparent impasse between the law (control) and sin (imperfection) by 
shifting the power of the narrative towards a power, indeed a (weak) 
violent power, which can only exist in the hands of the people.  
In Rian Johnson’s film The Brothers Bloom (2008), Mark Ruffalo and 
Adrian Brody play con-men brothers adept in the art of illusion. Stephen 
and Bloom employ a variety of tricks, large and small, in order to secure 
their pay-offs. In revealing the tell of one such sleight of hand, Bloom 
explains that the problem with fake blood is that it remains red. Real 
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blood fades to a rustic brown. In performing their final job together, in a 
nod to much used trope in film they encounter unexpected trouble from 
those they have previously conned. As this trouble builds towards the 
climax of the story, Bloom finds a bloodied Stephen seemingly dying on the 
stage of an abandoned theatre. Stephen reveals this to Bloom as his final 
trick: the staging of his own death to allow Bloom and his new found love, 
Penelope, to escape. This miraculous staging was designed to buy them 
their freedom. After a final embrace, Bloom and Penelope make their exit. 
The twist is revealed some time later, as Bloom glanced at the “fake” 
blood that had been transferred onto his coat – it had turned brown.  
This final trick is the same one played in the unfolding of the 
Christian narrative. The triumph of the resurrection allowed Paul to 
understand his freedom, but, and we cannot be sure of the extent of Paul’s 
realisation of this, as Paul awaited death in Rome the real trick of Christ’s 
death was made clear. He would have been in no doubt that Christ’s body 
was subject to an actual resurrection, but hidden in this new body was the 
actual death of the God that took place on the cross. It was the death of 
the God that guaranteed the outcomes of our actions – the death of divine 
providence. This turn should be read back into Paul’s struggle with 
accounting for the economics of messianic time. In this sense, this death 
lives on in the responsibility of the community of believers, with no 
guarantee that their actions will result in the return of Christ.  
Žižek relates this idea of the illusion to Christ’s death. Using 
Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige (2006), he recounts the illusion of a 
disappearing bird. 
 
A little boy in the audience starts to cry, claiming that the bird 
was killed. The magician approaches him and finishes the trick, 
gently producing a living bird out of his hand – but the boy is not 
satisfied, insisting that this must be another bird, the dead one’s 
brother. After the show, we see the magician in the room behind 
the stage, bringing in a flattened cage and throwing a squashed 
bird into a trash bin – the boy was right. (2009a, 286) 
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The trick here is the same as the one that occurs between the crucifixion 
and resurrection of Christ. The resurrection is not merely a subsequent 
event that replaces the crucifixion to reveal that Christ managed to cheat 
certain death. Upon seeing the empty tomb and the risen Christ one must 
insist, as the little boy did, that this must be a replacement Christ. Of 
course, the actual physical resurrection of Christ was essential to the 
beginnings of the Christ movement. Indeed, it was essential to Paul’s 
potential, as a Pharisee, to formulate the Christ-event. It was indispensable 
to the messianic event of a Pharisee. Yet the insistence here is that the 
crucifixion and resurrection occur simultaneously - Christ is both dead and 
alive.  
Further on in Nolan’s Prestige, the illusionist discovers a trick with a 
real centre; a replica of any creature can be conjured upon the death of 
the original subject in a machine created by the inventor and physicist 
Nikola Tesla. With this machine the illusionist himself is able to perform a 
version of the bird trick, dying in a pool of water each night with a replica 
appearing to the side of the stage. Each night the illusionist dies and is 
replicated – always remaining dead and always finding new life. It is in this 
way that Žižek understands the death of Christ: he must actually die, and 
remain dead, in order for his resurrection to occur.  
Following Žižek, Peter Rollins uses this idea of the prestige (the 
twist/turn in the illusion) in relation to the moment of Christ’s death. In 
The Divine Magician, Rollins argues that the moment of revelation occurs 
when the curtain in the Temple is torn. Revealed behind the curtain is 
nothing, an empty space. God is not present in the Holy of Holies but is 
actually out there dying on the cross in the body of a slave. This God is 
dead and cannot reappear in the resurrection in anything other than the 
body of believers.  
The resurrection was not only a sign that the messianic age was about 
to begin, it was also revelatory in its proclamation of the nature of the 
relationship between the Messiah and the community of believers. It is in 
this way that these communities symbolically cannibalised the body of 
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Christ. The Lord’s Supper not only remembered Christ’s death on the cross, 
it also signified the acceptance of responsibility over that body. These 
communities of believers were ‘answerable for the body and blood of the 
Lord’ (1 Cor. 11.27); they carried the responsibility for the fate of Christ. 
This was a symbolic participation in the truth of the Christ-event: Christ 
must be consumed in order to give him life. In this act there is 
remembrance of death and a call to new life.  
Žižek understands the death of Christ on the cross as the death of 
‘the “private” God, the God of “our way of life”’ (2009a, 295). The 
universal appeal of Christ appears from this space: ‘it appears as the “holy 
Spirit,” the space of a collective of believers subtracted from the field of 
organic communities, of particular life-worlds (“neither Greeks nor Jews”)’ 
(295). This is the radically demanding revelation in the simultaneous death 
and resurrection of Christ; God dies in order that he might regain life 
within a new collective of believers. God announced his triumph and his 
death. The absence of an external moral or political force is coupled with 
the burden of responsibility over the divine economy; the burden of debt to 
the neighbour cannot be repaid in full. This, however, was not the 
shattering of the Jewish position; rather, it was the fulfilment of a 
sequence beginning with Adam and was also present in the narratives of 
Abraham, Moses, David, and the prophets.  
 
5.4.1 The Commons 
 
Central to this stripping of power is the idea of common access to the 
promises of God. The Roman Empire privatised the power over life and 
death through mechanisms such as crucifixion. Christ had to break the law 
to become a curse in order to show that they had no such power. As 
Michael Hardt puts it, 'Pirates have a much more noble vocation; they steal 
property. These corporations instead steal the common and transform it 
into property' (2010, 137). Paul was deeply concerned by any privatisation 
of God’s promises, and this meant aligning everyone directly under Christ 
as slaves. 
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It can be of little surprise that Paul’s name is evoked in the contexts 
of those seeking to re-imagine forms of communism; of alternative views 
of the world beyond its current condition. The determination to redeem 
some form of communism has a root in the will to see what should be 
common - food, water, housing, work, medicine - to all. Žižek, in 
summarising this idea, looks towards ‘what Hardt and Negri call the 
'commons,' the shared substance of our social being, the privatisation of 
which involves violent acts which should also, where necessary, be resisted 
with violent means (2010, 212). This inherent violence of privatisation is 
shown in the mega-rich, who own large amounts of intellectual and 
physical property; from drug or technological patents to the control over 
water supplies in drought ridden countries.82 
 In general terms, the belief at play at the heart of capitalism is that 
human nature is essentially selfish, that people are dominated by the 
desire to seek their own interest before the interest of the other. In order 
to contain this propensity toward self-interest from spilling over into 
conflict, it becomes necessary to create networks of personal interest 
which forms a system that in turn necessitates self-interest only within its 
own contexts. In Christian theology the parallel is found in the defective 
soul in a theory of original sin which dictates that humankind cannot 
redeem itself.  
Communism, on the other hand, tends more towards the idea that 
political, social, and economic redemption is possible only through the 
labour of the people. Paul, in this sense, is aligned more closely to 
communism: serve the people in the body of Christ or face the wrath of 
God. And the vital lesson of Paul, for Žižek, Badiou, and others connecting 
Paul with the idea of communism, is that the wrath always belongs to an 
external force which is only ever an indirect consequence of the actions of 
                                                             
82 A report by the Oakland Institute in 2011 claimed that 'it is alarming that investors are 
free to use water with no restrictions' in Ethiopia. According to the report, investors 
purchase large areas of land which leaves much of the local population displaced and with 
a lack of farmable land. The main production in many of these areas is the farming of land 
to produce the raw materials for bio fuels - so that wealthier countries can ease their 
concerns about human-made climate change. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/land-
deals-africa-ethiopia  
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the people. This is an idea of communism very much opposed to the 
Stalinist and Maoist projects of the 20th century. It is not for human 
authority to wield this wrath, it is only for God alone; the power which is 
always beyond our mastery. In this imagining, original sin is the name for 
the corrupting power of the forces founded within creation, and 
communism is the name for the collective struggle against this force. Yet 
it only through divine violence that it can hope to overturn the dominance 
of the existing order, through exposing its pretence at truth. 
It is here that we can participate in redemption without any certainty 
of the outcome. This interpretation of redemption, of the hope of the 
overturning of present suffering, should be aligned with the activity of the 
community of believers working to overcome their oppressors. It is here 
that Vattimo and Zabala’s hermeneutic communism should be read 
alongside divine violence. They claim: 
 
hermeneutic weak thought is the thought of the weak, of those 
who are not satisfied with the established principles imposed on 
them and who demand different rights, that is, other 
interpretations. In this politics of interpretation, conversation 
becomes the realm where the powerful describers of the world 
can listen to the requests of the weak and perhaps change their 
selfish priorities. (2011, 107) 
 
It is the ability to imagine the world in a different way - attempting to 
force change even in the most difficult of circumstances - which creates 
the possibility for a different world to exist. This is where hope is situated 
in the violent love which becomes possible after the Christ-event.  
 
5.4.2 The Domain of Pure Violence is the Domain of Love 
 
Žižek is the Christian-atheist who provokes something which is easy to 
forget about Paul: his aims are divisive, radical, and, at the symbolic level, 
violent. This is clear for Žižek through the parallel which can be drawn 
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between their respective battles. They participate in the labour of the 
destruction of the existing order through participating in the revelation of 
its untruth. They enjoin other to unplug from the symbolic restraints 
inherent to that order, so that the labour of the people can begin. Love is 
what ties the subject to a demand outside of the demands of the current 
order, bypassing systems which dictate that the people must be controlled 
from above. The power is displaced from on high and distributed among 
the people, but only to the extent that they remain answerable to a divine 
force. It is the realisation that original sin is not a deficiency in the 
individual which needs to be controlled, but the name for the nature of 
what is generated within the created world. It is the consequences of the 
simultaneous death and resurrection of God.  
The connection between Žižek and Paul is not found in a historical 
reconstruction of the apostle, but in a re-contextualisation of his message. 
Paul was a radical Pharisee who believed he was living in the end times; in 
an era where the messianic labour of love was vital to God’s plan for 
creation. For Žižek the modern apostle is found in figures such as Julian 
Assange and Edward Snowden, who leaked state secrets through mediums 
such as WikiLeaks. The crux of the motivation here is not found in ethics or 
morality, though they remain important categories, but in the revelation of 
truth and its ability to shatter the boundaries that are imagined in the 
existing order. In other words, to disrupt the systemic and symbolic 
violence of the powers and allow a new labour to begin which will create 
the foundations of what will inevitably follow.  
Žižek pushes this connection further, to their meeting in communism. 
He argues that 'WikiLeaks is doing the practice of communism. WikiLeaks 
simply enacts the commons of information' (2014b, 52). The job of the 
whistle-blowers here is the contemporary technologico-political version of 
Paul's theologico-political pitting of God against the state through the 
death and resurrection of Christ. Its message is clear, a God willing to give 
up his sovereignty and be humiliated at the hands of the governing 
authorities has real power. The power of crucifixion held no threat over the 
self-defined slaves of Christ in the context of the time that had arrived. 
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This foolish power of weakness, therefore, situates the fulfilment of the 
law (the whole point of creation) in the body of Christ bound to the love of 
the neighbour. The split subject of Romans 7, the victim of sin, therefore is 
not read, as Paul reasoned, as the subject on the cusp of perfection 
through weakness (2 Cor. 12.9) but as the subject already striving against 
the powers of the Symbolic Order.  
 This is not only the struggle to radically reconfigure the zero-level of 
our world, but also the very participation in this reconfiguration. In Paul’s 
case, taking the revolutionary impact of the Christ-event and participating 
in its unfolding truth. Žižek and Paul, in their respective ways, write in the 
service of a difficult and demanding message which would attempt to 
violently jolt the world out of its current state. What is acknowledged here 
is the connection between all actions, and the necessity of the community 
being connection in the possibility created in the unplugging from the 
boundaries created by the existing order. With this foundation the 
potential is released to participate in the revolutionary labour which makes 
no specific demands for power. This requires a leap of faith; that the 
actions of the community can force the possibility for something new to 
occur, without any pretense that the actions hold any guarantees.  
 Paul’s focus, given his religious and eschatological context, was very 
different to Žižek’s contemporary political and cultural context of writing. 
Yet they converge on this demand on labour of faith and truth. Paul’s 
imagined God is a loving God, undoubtedly, but also a violent God. Not 
violent in a will to punish or destroy, but as an amoral God who deals in 
consequences alone. He is the absent God poured into creation. The 
demand is on the ability to act, to break beyond the confines of the 
Symbolic Order; to work against original sin and participate in the labour 
of love of the now-time which serves a divine violence.  
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Conclusion 
 
Chigurh, the Shopkeeper, and Original Sin 
 
This brings us back to Cormac McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men. 
McCarthy through his novels, despite no particular religious affiliation, 
displays a fascination with the nature of God. The figure of Anton Chigurh 
evokes a theory concerning the connection between violence and original 
sin in the inevitability and interconnectedness of our actions. This is his 
explanation. 
 
Anything can be an instrument, Chigurh said. Small things. Things 
you wouldnt even notice. They pass from hand to hand. People 
dont pay attention. And then one day there’s an accounting. And 
after that nothing is the same. Well, you say. It’s just a coin. For 
instance. Nothing special there. What could that be an 
instrument of? You see the problem. To separate the act from 
the thing. As if the parts of some moment in history might be 
interchangeable with parts of some other moment. How could 
that be? Well, it’s just a coin. Yes. That’s true. Is it? (57) 
 
When the proprietor of a filling station crossed paths with Chigurh he 
faced an unexpected and potentially decisive moment in the course of his 
life. The outcome of that moment, whether or not Chigurh would kill him, 
was placed on the toss of a coin (a call which landed in his favour). His 
short yet traumatic encounter with this mercenary might have ended the 
other way if it were not for the toss of the coin. This moment was fraught 
with the fragility and volatility of luck; the shopkeeper could see that his 
life was not in his own hands.  
Ostensibly at least, he had done nothing to warrant this visit from 
Chigurh. He had taken on the isolated filling station from his father-in-law, 
placing him directly in the path Chigurh was being propelled through. 
There was no moral judgement being pronounced over the man himself in
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this encounter. He is put in this position by a myriad of “things,” small and 
large, which have brought both him and Chigurh to this point.  
The response of Job’s accusers in this situation might be that he was 
being judged on the morality of his past deeds, and that the coin had 
found him innocent. We should, however, resist asserting such 
pronouncements of meaning in relation to the amoral force of Chigurh; his 
terrifying presence is not one of moral judgement but of excess turned 
into force.  
Chigurh, in many ways, brings into being the unintended 
consequences of those acting within his world. This is not unrelated to 
moral or ethical sensitivities; he is directed most of all by the greed and 
selfish actions of others. Yet his violence, furnished elsewhere, is 
unleashed upon all who lack the luck to avoid his force. It is in the coin 
toss that potentiality moves into actuality; a move which has no 
guarantees in the big Other which would suture it to a type of justice. It is 
propelled by a series of transgressions, charting back to the original sin – 
found in the nature of creation itself. 
 
The Road 
 
This sense of risk is ever-present in our ethical, political, and religious 
activity; there are no guarantees in the decisions we make, the protests 
we participate in, or the ideals we put our faith in. It is with faith, often a 
foolish faith, through which we commit to resisting powers without 
resorting to physical violence. On this point Critchley is correct to follow 
Levinas in asserting that it is the infinite demand placed on us to love the 
other that drives this faith. Yet this is not possible without the type of 
perversity with which Žižek engages. The question that is most pertinent 
here is the very same question that Paul addressed: how can the narrative 
of the existing order be disrupted in order to make real change possible? 
McCarthy’s The Road confronts us with a very different world than 
that of No Country for Old Men. In No Country for Old Men we are 
confronted with a violent force which rips through the world, in The Road 
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we are confronted by a violent world in which any sort of peace is hard 
fought for. Goodness struggles to find any foothold in this post-apocalyptic 
world of violence. A man and his young son travel through a landscape of 
gray in search for food, shelter, safety and, above all, hope.  
In the aftermath of a catastrophic event, the United States has been 
turned into a cold, colourless wasteland. Any source of food is cause for 
great joy as the father and his boy attempt to reach the ocean, in search 
of anything beyond the hopeless landscape. Unlike many of his other 
works, McCarthy’s post-apocalyptic nightmare ends in a peculiar hope. 
After the boy’s father dies, which seems to re-affirm the absence of 
goodness from the world, the boy is taken in by a group of strangers who 
happened upon his plight. An unexpected, and quite foolish, hope had 
appeared as if out of no-where.  
Is this a false hope of a world that can never be repaired or a true 
hope of emancipation from a seemingly insurmountable defeat? There are 
no guarantees either way. In comforting the boy after the death of his 
father, the women assures the boy, ‘the breath of God was his breath yet 
it pass from man to man through all time’ (306). This is the intense and 
infinite responsibility which we are charged with; in solitude, without the 
promise of the big Other that our endeavours to end oppression, 
inequality, and acts of destruction will succeed.  
There is a sense in which both the outcome for the boy and the shop 
proprietor only leads to a false sense of hope; that avoiding the figure of 
death for another day does not change the hopelessness that pervades the 
worlds they inhabit. The issue here, as pertinent today as it was for Paul, 
is how to redeem a sense of hope within such landscapes. The wager of 
this work is that what makes Paul a potentially valuable figure for radical 
social and political movements is the way in which he configures a Messiah 
which cuts through the theologico-political stranglehold of the a historical 
monster, the Roman Empire. His articulation of a symbol that transformed 
a site of death into the foundations of life is a powerful subversion of the 
ideology of the age. In the same way as Bartleby reveals an example of 
radical resistance, Paul uses Christ as an impetus to resistance which 
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subverted the symbolic domination of the powers. Put differently, the 
Messiah resisted the ideological domination that pervaded the Symbolic; 
and this hope survives even beyond Paul’s own death at the hands of these 
authorities. 
In returning to the problem of disappointment, the issue was not with 
the force that was exerted but, rather, why this force did not accomplish 
its goal. In other words, the question is not about whether or not we 
should turn to physical violence to radically change the situation but why 
our force was rendered as nothing more than a footnote in a larger 
narrative. In this point Žižek is correct. Without the dismantling of the 
powers which control the parameters of our actions, they are ineffective, 
futile, or even assimilated into their narrative for its continuation. Žižek’s 
accusation is that there is a lack of sufficient faith among those who resist 
contemporary economic and political powers. As Sheriff Ed Tom Bell would 
put it – you can’t have wars without an arms trade, and you can’t have an 
arms trade without ordinary people participating in it through their 
everyday-lives.  
Where Žižek’s interest in Paul and in violence converges is in the 
search for a type of revolutionary action which avoids the impotence of 
the tolerance of liberalism while also avoiding the destructive violence of 
fundamentalism. A response is demanded not just from the face of the 
neighbour, but also the systemic and symbolic violence of the ideological 
mechanisms, such as neoliberalism and consumerism, which are sustained 
under the general banner of capitalism; creating inequalities, divisions, 
domination over the poor, and environmental instability. Žižek’s broad 
answer is to withdraw from these mechanisms and expose them to the 
divine; which contains the potential to reveal the (un)truth of the 
symbolism which sustains their functioning. Through this there is a 
revelation of alternative possibilities. Paul’s Christ, in this sense, can be 
read in the same way as Bartleby; a disruptive force which revealed the 
way in which the powers regarded God’s potential as their own. And 
ultimately Paul’s mission also ends in the same way as Bartleby; death in, 
what one would assume was, a forgotten place. Paul could only invent a 
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guarantee which existed beyond his revolutionary and messianic moment 
in time. In this way Paul follows the path of Bartleby; he opens up the 
potential to overcome the identities ruled by the power of death, yet he 
dies in the service of his proclamation, only to then be consumed in 
greater narratives (beginning with the later epistles and the book of Acts).  
It might appear as foolishness or perversity to follow this path without 
the certitudes embedded in fundamentalist religious thought, but it is also 
entirely enticing to thinkers such as Vattimo or Critchley, who have lost 
faith in the overbearing solutions of traditional religion or the totalitarian 
far left of the political spectrum. Paul’s call to love the neighbour to fulfil 
the law has been of particular interest to such thinkers for this reason; he 
offers a narrative based on the subversion of authority, and a radical 
hermeneutics embedded in the compulsion to fulfil the law through love 
on the basis of God’s judgement on the powers which propelled his death 
and resurrection. It is a religion after the death of the big Other, with no 
guarantees under natural law, and the onus placed fully on the capacity of 
the subject of the Christ-event to understand what it means to participate 
in this love for the neighbour.  
There has been a wide variety of, often conflicting, ways in which 
this revolutionary potential has been assessed in continental philosophy. 
The tension between these thinkers, as with the dispute between Critchley 
and Žižek, has at times spilt over into conflict. Yet Žižek’s divine violence, 
Critchley’s infinite demand, Badiou’s Truth-Event, and Agamben’s 
potentiality of messianic time are all indebted to this radical thinker who 
opposed the biopolitical power of the Roman Empire with his articulation 
of the crucified Messiah who defeated the powers of death.  
To follow the God who dies on a cross - being an active part of the 
community of believers as an integral part of the body of the Christ in the 
now-time - implies not escalating a situation by resorting to physical 
violence, but through declaring war on that which obstructs our servitude 
to the neighbour and the very participation in the body of Christ.  
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The Example of Bonhoeffer  
 
The question is, in this context, what makes Žižek an important figure in 
this legacy of Christianity? There are certainly figures in Christian history 
who have exemplified what it means to dedicate themselves to the 
demands of participating in the body of Christ.  In the example of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer we find a Christian whose thought moved around the edges of 
the moulding of this thesis. The essence of ethics in Bonhoeffer’s 
interpretation of what it means to be a Christian is that we ‘must take our 
share of responsibility for the moulding of history in every situation and in 
every moment, whether we are the victors or the vanquished’ (1997, 9). 
Bonhoeffer provides a similar provocation to the understanding to the 
Christ-event as many of the interpreters of Paul in continental philosophy: 
the responsibility of living within a world without the direct cover of the 
big Other, sharing in responsibility and suffering of Christ.  
 Critchley turns to Bonhoeffer as an example of a figure dedicated to 
an infinite demand rather than law-like principles. Indeed, in his 
participation in the plot to assassinate Hitler, his ethics rest on the 
position of a ‘freely assumed responsibility that, in extreme situations and 
as a last resort, [he] is willing to act violently’ (2012, 236).  This, 
according to Critchley, is not a celebration of violence but ‘an infinite 
responsibility for violence that, in exceptional circumstances, might lead 
us to break the command “Thou shalt not kill”’ (237). It is the ‘willingness 
to become guilty’ which ‘is the price one pays for freedom’ (237).  
The point which is particular to this thesis is that while the call to 
physical violence might only occur in exceptional circumstances, the 
subject of the Christ-event must always be willing to participate in forms 
of violence. That is to say, the real power of Bonhoeffer’s example is not 
that he was willing to resort to physical violence, but that the demand to 
love the neighbour extended to all circumstances he encountered, even if 
that included breaking the commandment to kill. The lesson from Žižek 
here is vital: such exceptional action, indeed violence, must also be 
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participated in when confronting the systemic and symbolic violence which 
underpins the situations we encounter. 
 In discussing the turn to Paul, Jens Zimmermann reminds us that 
‘Bonhoeffer’s political resistance to the Nazi regime on the very unity of 
incarnation and participation found in Paul’ (2010, 248). Zimmermann’s 
description of Bonhoeffer’s particular understanding of the Christian 
legacy, centred on the idea of the church acting as ‘Christ in community’ 
(248), resonates with Žižek’s interest in the idea of the political force of 
the body of Christ. Zimmermann, however, concludes that Paul has not yet 
been allowed sufficiently to challenge continental thought; that figures 
such as Žižek, Badiou, Taubes have not yet fully realised the power of 
Paul’s theologico-political position. Bonhoeffer, in this sense, had already 
grasped precisely what was at stake in the subversive message of the 
Christ-event: that it created a community not only dedicated to the 
example of Christ but responsible for the continuation of Christ in the 
world; yet it this “new creation” which Žižek pointing towards in his turn 
to the apostle (even if he has not explicitly made the connection to 
Bonhoeffer). Žižek already shows an awareness of Bonhoeffer’s idea that 
‘whoever from now on attacks the least of people attacks Christ’ (251). It 
is this principle which brings him to the potential of divine violence in 
Bartleby, and the opposition between the people and the enemies of the 
people on the basis of the symbolic and systemic violence carried out 
against the least among us.  
Bonhoeffer, like Paul, is less concerned with moral absolutes than he 
is with being involved in that same struggle to become a subject of the 
Christ-event. It is the responsibility of the Christian to live in a ‘godless 
world,’ to ‘share in Christ’s suffering’ and the ‘powerlessness of God’ 
(1997, 190). In this same sense, there is also an echo of Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of power and of ideology in Žižek’s work. Is this not a little bit of 
Žižekian provocation already prefigured in Bonhoeffer: ‘like a bull he 
rushes at the red cloak instead of the person who is holding it’ (1997, 1)? 
This is why Žižek can call himself a Christian with a great sense of 
legitimacy. They are both, following Paul, captivated by the shattering of 
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God’s omnipotence caused by Christ’s simultaneous death and 
resurrection.  
Bonhoeffer’s own participation in the body of Christ took on a 
devastating relevance in the political and humanitarian disaster of Nazism 
which developed around him. The plot to assassinate Hitler was a small yet 
remarkable part of the response to the demand to share in the experience 
of Christ, which did not define the exception to his ethics but an example 
of it. In such moments we see how questions of morality lose their 
grounding in a desperate move that is compelled by the debt of love to the 
neighbour.  
What would it have meant to be part of a successful assassination 
attempt on Adolf Hitler? Harry Mulisch, through his novel Siegfried, asks 
the question, ‘to what extent was Hitler really a human being?’ (151). 
Mulisch’s character Rudolf Herter casts Hitler as some sort of antichrist, 
but more than this. 
 
The only thing I can think of is with Hitler we are dealing with 
something like a metanatural phenomenon – comparable with the 
impact of that meteorite in the Cretaceous period that wiped 
out the dinosaurs. Except that he was not an extraterrestrial 
creature but an extraexistential being: Nothingness. (148) 
 
This man equated with Nothingness held a responsibility for unconscionable 
hatred and suffering. Yet in killing him there would have been no 
guarantees of what the outcome would have been. It could have led to a 
disintegration of the ruling powers or, conversely, it could have led to a 
more cautious replacement regime which might have prolonged the 
suffering under Nazism. The question at the heart of this demand for action 
was how to divert or destroy the long history of violence that led to this 
point. Put differently, how a rip might be torn in the Symbolic curtain of 
the ruling powers in order to expose their very untruth. 
This is precisely Žižek’s Pauline point with regards to divine violence: 
we are already participating in violence, and we cannot hope to break from 
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its coils without radical, even violent, action of our own. What we require 
is the perversity of the community of adherents to the Christ-event who 
would ritually consume their own Messiah in order to remind them of their 
responsibility to carry the body of Christ through the messianic era.  
 
Žižek and the Christian Legacy 
 
 Like Paul, and like Bartleby, Bonhoeffer lives in the service of the 
hope of the possibility of something which exists beyond the current 
boundaries of the world conditions. This is why Žižek can claim to be a 
significant contemporary voice in the tradition of Christianity. It is a 
reminder of the impossible demand of the Christ-event and the attempt to 
cling onto its unfolding truth. Christianity is a name for the necessary 
betrayal of Paul’s eschatological context. His message could only live on if 
it could break out of its perceived time scheme. The act of betrayal and 
the act of giving life are connected here; Paul is given life in the death of 
his past certainties. This is the mechanism at work in the trick of the 
Christ-event. God has to die, and remain dead, in order to continue to live 
on in the actions of the community of believers. This was the responsibility 
which defined Bonhoeffer’s life as a Christian. This is the figure that 
accepts responsibility for their part in the world, but also understands that 
they are bound to the service of a faith in something beyond their 
immediate control. There are no guarantees in the outcomes, but the 
possibility of something other than the current violent structures which 
dominate political, economic, and cultural narratives.   
 This is an uncomfortable legacy. It requires the body of believers to 
live beyond the service of their own desires. It, as Žižek puts it, ‘madly 
insists on the impossible’ (2011, 116). It demands of its subjects an 
impossible mandate to fulfil the law through love, lived in the service of 
the possibility of a new world. This provocation leads us to Paul’s own 
theory of divine violence encapsulated in Romans 13. This is the 
relationship between the actions of the people with divine wrath. Paul’s 
imagining of Christ was designed to illustrate that the authorities were not 
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absolute; that the real power existed in the subversive act of the death and 
resurrection of Christ. Yet outside of a Pharisaic tradition which believed 
that the resurrection of the death was a sign of the coming end, we are left 
which an even more troubling and demanding narrative.  
 Žižek’s Bartlebian example of resistance, of refusing to participate in 
the symbolic and systemic violence of the ruling ideology through refusing 
to participate in any of its mechanisms, is also impossibly demanding. Yet 
through doing so there is the possibility to participate in the forcing of 
something new; something beyond what the current situation allows. This is 
why the decisions to cease participating in charity or to participate in a 
plot to kill Hitler can remain emphatically Christian. They are dedicated to 
the possibility of emancipation for the neighbour. The Real and the 
Symbolic replace God and creation in tis narrative, but they point towards 
the same goal. The divine intervention reveals a new possibility for 
creation.  
 The Christian legacy is bound up in a leap of faith: a fidelity to the 
hope of a new world forged out of love which forever struggles against the 
existing order. It is the conflation of means and ends which makes the 
imagining of Christianity the religion of divine violence which struggles 
against the original sin of creation.  
 A central part of the construction of this thesis, indeed one of the 
reasons that this project was embarked upon, was the will to connect 
threads of thought in the philosophers’ turn to Paul with ideas from more 
traditional (or more expected) areas of Pauline research. The question has 
not been directly about what the philosophers have said about Paul, but 
about the ways in which this can be used to construct new, or at least 
revived, possibilities surrounding Paul as a radical thinker. The provocation 
of the philosopher draws Paul back into a theologico-political context 
which mirrors that of his own: the struggles against the manipulative 
powers of the existing order.  
 The idea pursued in this thesis is that Paul is an important figure in 
the diagnosis of contemporary forms of violence. As well as developing a 
deeper project surrounding the violent potentiality inherent to Romans 13, 
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and moving towards fulfilling the potential of a genealogy of violence in 
Christianity which has only just begun in the scope of this work, it is here in 
the thinking of the potential of the Christ-event in conjunction with our 
own battles that this project begins to move beyond its initial site in this 
thesis. Paul’s radical voice, which brought the Christ-event to the Gentile 
world, is still as relevant today as it has ever been.  
 This work is about the manipulative power of symbolic and systemic 
forces which combine to furnish experiences of reality, and the potential to 
push back against these forces. A great deal of what has been done here is 
an attempt to push against preconceived ideas and stubbornly held 
positions; to provoke the possibility of better understanding violence. The 
symbolic substances of this work will always be trapped within a horizon of 
language, but it has hopefully participated in the disturbing of its 
boundaries. To see something beyond many of the current discussions on 
religion and violence, or the place of Christianity in a post-secular age, or 
the influence of the apostle Paul on radical leftist political projects, has 
been a principal aim of this work. Hopefully we can begin to blaze a path 
beyond the Girardian context of thinking about religion and violence, some 
of the all too comfortable narratives of Christianity, and place the political 
back at the heart of our discussions of Paul.  Yet above all this, the thought 
that this work seeks to disseminate is that we all serve the divine. Even 
after the death of God we must understand that our interconnected 
activity is all thrown back into the tumultuous power of something beyond 
it all, ready to strike back in its divine rage. And in this we struggle in the 
fight against original sin, the imperfection of the world.  
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